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ABSTRACT
A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICIES: THESIGNIFICANCE OF IDENTITIES, VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS ON POLICY
TOWARD CUBA
SEPTEMBER 1, 2003
LANA L. WYLIE, B.A., MCMASTER UNIVERSITY
M.A., THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda
Long-time friends, Americans and Canadians share many world-views and
values. Yet, important differences exist. This study examines one foreign policy where
these differences are striking. The United States and Canada have had very different
policies toward Cuba, especially since Fidel Castro assumed power in 1959. Canada’s
policy of constructive engagement stands in marked contrast to the isolationist solution
adopted by the American government. Much of the current literature offers traditional
economic or domestic interest group explanations for the two policies. This study
challenges these conventional narratives.
By examining each country’s policy toward Cuba in tandem this study
demonstrates that there is far more than domestic political or economic calculations
involved in the formulation of these foreign policies. Adopting a constructivist approach,
this study will show that differences exist over Cuba because the two countries are
different in other ways- they have their own identities, values and perceptions that
contribute to the formation of very distinct approaches toward this island regime.
VI
Canadians and Americans perceive Cuba through different lenses. The American
identity as an exceptional country and their corresponding view of Cuba as inferior as
well as the perception that Cuba is within the American sphere of influence has affected
the relationship between the United States and Cuba since the days of the Monroe
Doctrine. The American identity as the guardian of freedom and democracy helped to
construct American policy. After 1959, Cuba was seen to be an anathema to everything
the United States represented. In contrast, the Canadian identity as “not American” and
the need to assert this in foreign policy, as well as their identity as a good international
citizen with its emphasis on values such as dialogue and compromise have greatly
influenced the Canadian perception of Cuba.
In sum, the examination of identity and its related values, perceptions, and norms
offers an alternative way of making sense of US-Cuban and Canadian-Cuban relations.
These two case studies reveal how these variables influence foreign policy and enable us
to better understand Canadian and American foreign policy as well as international
relations.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Long-time friends, Americans and Canadians share many world-views and
values. Yet, important differences exist. Even before the world stood on the brink of
nuclear war over Cuba in 1962, the United States and Canada had very different policies
toward Fidel Castro’s regime. These same differences persist in the twenty-first century
and have, at times, caused considerable tension between the countries on either side of
the 49 parallel. The American isolationist approach is in many ways antithetical to
Canada’s policy of constructive engagement. Much of the current literature offers
traditional economic or domestic interest group explanations for the two policies. This
study questions these conventional narratives. It hypothesizes that ideational variables
have compelling explanatory power.
This study demonstrates how each explanation is incomplete without an
examination of the normative and cultural influences over these policies. Canadians and
Americans perceive Cuba through different lenses. The United States has long thought of
itself as an exceptional nation. The perception of other countries as inferior and the belief
that Cuba is within the American sphere of influence has affected the relationship
between the United States and Cuba since the days of the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore,
after 1959, Cuba was seen to be an anathema to everything the United States represented,
especially to the American identity as the guardian of freedom and democracy. Thus,
relations between the two countries have been tense and, at times, hostile. The end of the
1
Cold War did not have the expected moderating effect on U.S. policy toward Cuba and in
tact, American policy has become, in many ways, more hardline since the early 1990s.
In contrast, Canada has pursued a policy of engagement with the regime. At
times, Canada has been referred to as Cuba’s closest friend in the West. Connections
between the two countries are wide ranging. Ottawa has often encouraged greater
economic, cultural and diplomatic ties to the regime. The Canadian identity as “not
American and the need to assert this in foreign policy has influenced Canadian policy
toward Cuba. Likewise, the Canadian self-perception as a good international citizen and
their identity as a peacekeeper have shaped the Canadian policy toward the island.
By examining each country’s policy toward Cuba in tandem this study will
demonstrate that there is far more than domestic political, security, or economic
calculations involved in the formulation of these foreign policies. Prior to the ascent of
the Cuban American community the most popular explanation put forth for U.S. policy
was a security based argument. It asserted that the policy of isolation was a reflection of
the threat posed by the Castro regime. After the consolidation of the Cuban American
community, a domestic interest group explanation became the most popular narrative. It
argues that the American policy is a direct result of the power of the Cuban American
National Foundation (CANF). This theory asserts the electoral clout of the Cuban
American community in Florida and New Jersey practically guarantees that they can
dictate policy toward Cuba.
The most popular explanation for the Canadian policy of engagement is the
national economic interest argument. It maintains that Canada has engaged with Cuba for
economic reasons. Canadian scholars argue that the opportunity for Canadians to invest
2
in Cuba, tree ot American competition, drives Canadian engagement. 1 This study
problematizes these explanations and demonstrates that the policies are distinct because
the two countries are different in other ways- they have their own identities, values, and
perceptions that contribute to the formation of very distinct approaches toward this island
regime.
Lastly, this study highlights how evolving values and identities are continuing to
affect each country’s relationship with Cuba. Both Canadian and American policies
toward Cuba are changing. Each approach reflects new perceptions of the island nation
that began to emerge in the late 1990s and are slowly gaining strength. Ironically, the two
strategies became more similar as both sets of perceptions about the island and Castro
evolve.
In summary, this study demonstrates that the traditional narratives of both
policies have ignored ideational and cultural factors. It offers an alternative view of both
policies, one that reveals the importance of perceptions, culture, norms, ideas and
identities.
The Outline of the Study
The following chapters will examine Canadian and American policies toward
Cuba in detail, highlighting the socially constructed elements. The next two chapters set
the stage for the rest of the study. Chapter Two briefly traces Cuban history and Chapter
Three reviews the history of Canadian and American relationships with Cuba. Chapter
Four explores the connection between identity, values, and culture and American foreign
1
See tables in chapter 3 for more information on Canadian trade and investment in Cuba.
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policy. Chapter Five analyzes the U.S. approach toward the island, demonstrating the
relevance of ideational factors and the failings of other paradigms to offer complete
explanations. Chapter Six similarly ties identities, values, and perceptions to Canadian
foreign policy. Chapter Seven examines the Canadian approach toward Cuba, revealing
that the Canadian identity, norms, and ideas have greater explanatory power in this case
than the traditional accounts. Chapter Eight directly compares the Canadian and
American reactions to first, the Brothers to the Rescue shoot-down and, second, to the
possibility that Castro’s regime supports terrorism. Chapter Nine reviews recent
developments in the bilateral relationships and looks at where U.S.-Cuban and Canadian-
C'uban relations are likely to head in the next decade. However, first, this chapter will
examine the treatment of these ideational variables by International Relations,
Comparative Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis scholars.
The Study of International Relations and Comparative Politics
In the 1980s and early 1990s, both the fields of International Relations (IR) and
Comparative Politics eschewed studies based on “soft” explanations like ideas and
culture. IR was dominated by varieties of Realism, an approach that dealt in hard power
calculations and notions of balance between powers. 2 By that time, Comparative Politics
had dismissed most of the early political culture studies as ethnocentric. The field of
2
However, it is necessary to note that European scholars of international relations did not abandon
these factors. The rise of realism and behavioral methods in the study of IR was never as popular in Europe.
Thus, when we speak of the “return” of the study of culture and identity we are speaking of primarily a
change in American scholarship.
4
Comparative Foreign Policy was focused on behavioral studies that only touched on
cultural or ideational factors in a cursory manner.
Yet, the end of the Cold War and the failure of Realism and other models to
explain the seemingly sudden change in Soviet domestic and foreign policy, and the rapid
reconfiguration of global politics that followed, forced scholars to take another look at the
earlier “soft” explanations. 3 They found that cultural and ideational factors could help
them understand the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Richard
Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen’s edited volume, International Relations Theory
and the End ofthe Cold War examines the failure of International Relations theory to
explain the end of the cold war. Many of the authors in this volume reveal that ideational
factors had a central role in the formulation of foreign policy and were crucial factors in
the transformation of the international system in the early 1990s.
Furthermore, the questions that had dominated the study of world politics for
decades: superpower rivalry, and the arms race and bipolarity became, almost overnight,
the relics of an earlier era. Instead, the oft-considered secondary, or even irrelevant,
issues of international relations drew increasing scholarly attention. The increase in
ethnic tensions, questions of nationality, and the spread of democratic values that were
the byproducts of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Warsaw pact
alliance, came to the forefront of political science. Culture and identity variables were at
the heart of these now important issues. Political cultural studies enjoyed a “renaissance.”
3
See Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the
End ofthe Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) for an excellent analysis of this topic.
5
Realizing the relevance of these variables, a greater number of political scientists
began to apply norms, beliefs, identity, and cultural factors to other research questions.
As the 1990s drew to a close, these variables were being increasingly used both in
conjunction with traditional explanations or to provide alternative hypotheses for a wide-
variety of international behavior. The next sections examine the treatment of these
variables in greater detail.
International Relations (IR)
Culture and other ideational variables have been studied by a number of
International Relations scholars over the years. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s,
Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, and other functionalists discussed the role of values and
culture in the integration of Europe. Deutsch argued that contact between peoples (trade,
communication etc.) produced similar values in the two societies. This created trust
which in turn, produced increased cooperation, economic integration and eventually
political integration. Though not focusing on ideational variables like culture or identity,
the neoliberal and regime literature that rose to challenge neorealism in the 1970s and
1980s, also addressed some of these factors. In fact, Jennifer Sterling-Folker argues that
neofunctionalism, neoliberalism and constructivism have far more in common than most
4
See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1 952). Also
important are Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957); and Ernst Haas, The Uniting ofEurope (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1958).
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scholars acknowledge. 5 She argues all three come to many of the same conclusions and
“rely on the same functional-institutional logic to explain social change.”6
Though these are excellent research programs, the main goal of neofunctionalism
and neoliberalism was not to integrate these variables into the study of International
Relations. They often treated these variables as secondary. Thus, IR scholars interested in
these variables often had to turn to other disciplines. Anthropology, sociology, and
psychology, as well as comparative politics, all produced works that integrated these
variables. For example, many International Relations theorists drew from Clifford
Geertz’s 1973 work in anthropology. 7 International Relations scholars would often turn to
these works to supplement their cultural discussions.
However, IR scholars no longer rely on other disciplines for information about
ideational variables. There is now a rich literature in International Relations itself. In the
past two decades, cultural studies have been embraced by a new scholarly tradition in
International Relations. Known as constructivists, or sometimes as refectivists, they posit
that culture and identity are intregral to a complete understanding of the dynamics of
international relations. Unlike most other IR theories (such as neorealism or
neoliberalism) constructivists do not treat the identity and interests of international actors
as given. Constructivism problematizes the identities and interests of actors, revealing
5
Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and
Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared,” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000), 97-1 19.
6
Ibid.
’Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation ofCultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
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that they are socially constructed. These scholars emphasize that our perceptions, beliefs,
assumptions, ideas, actions and interactions create the world we live in.
Constructivists claim to occupy the ground between rational choice and
postmodern theones of International Relations. Rational choice scholars argue that norms
and ideas, at the most, limit the choices of rationally behaving states. Neorealism, the
reigning IR theory, and one that treats states as rational actors, marginalizes norms,
arguing that, if anything, norms merely reflect existing power structures. In contrast,
constructivists assert that variables like norms, culture, ideas and beliefs can
fundamentally change the interests of states. Constructivists maintain that social
structures mold the identity and interests of actors who, in turn, create social structures
through their interactions and beliefs. It is a mutually constituting process. This goes
significantly beyond even the neoliberal and regime literature that contend that norms are
important because they are capable of constraining or facilitating choices of states and
thus have a role in explaining the behavior of states. However, unlike their constructivist
cousins, neoliberal theorists do not believe that norms can affect the very identity or
interests of states.
Constructivism shares a number of significant similarities with postmodern or
critical theory. As Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit maintain, like postmodern
scholarship: “constructivism problemizes both agents and structures, it explores the
dynamics of change as well as the rhythms of stasis, and it calls into question established
understandings of world politics, it is analytically open not closed.”8
8
Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and
Constructivism,” European Journal ofInternational Relations 4, 2(September 1998): 259-294.
8
However, there are important differences. Critical theory draws on the writings of
Friedrich Nietzche and on the more recent work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida
whereas, constructivism finds its roots in Max Weber and Emile Durkhiem. Unlike
postmodern scholars, most constructivists do not reject the scientific study of political
interactions. Postmodern writings reject social science and positivist research as suspect
and question the possibility of being able to truly “know” anything. There are no truths in
postmodern research. In contrast, most constructivists (for example Alexander Wendt and
John Gerard Ruggie) believe that there is an objective reality. However dependent it
might be on social construction, it does exist and it can be understood.
The Rise of Constructivism
The intellectual roots of constructivist thought have been traced to Max Weber,
Emile Durkheim, and other sociologists. Ruggie argues that social constructivists owe a
debt to Emile Durkheim for his elucidation of social facts (“linguistic practices, religious
beliefs, moral norms, and similar ideational factors”) and their influence on social
behavior. Ruggie explains that Max Weber took this exercise further by exploring “actual
processes whereby certain ideas had become social forces.”9
In 1989 Nicholas Onuf gave rise to the term constructivist in political science. In
World ofOur Making Onuf argued that people use language to understand the world and
also use it to bring their influence to bear on the world itself. Language is used as a tool
to influence how others understand the world. Onuf states “Fundamental to
9
John G. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, 4 (Autumn 1998), 861.
9
constructivism is the proposition that human beings are social beings, and we would not
he human but for our social relations. In other words, social relations make or construct
people ... Conversely, we make the world what it is... [and] talking is undoubtedly the
most important way that we go about making the world what it is.” 10
In World ofOur Making Onuf was building on the recent work of other scholars
such as Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, who in 1986, stressed the necessity of
[ojpening up the positivist epistemology to more interpretive strains.” 11 The work of
Alexander Wendt, who brought attention to the agent-structure question in 1987, and
John Ruggie who, in 1989, criticized IR for its inability to account for historical
transformations were also important precursors to constructivism in International
Relations.
12
Similarly, in 1988, Robert Keohane argued for the creation of a “reflective”
research program in IR. 13 These, and many other, works in International Relations in the
mid to late 1980s formed the basis of what would soon become widely understood as
constructivist thought.
10
This quote is from Onuf s later summary of the argument he made in World ofOur Making.
Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual,” in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul
Kowert, eds. International Relations in a Constructed World (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1998), 59.
11
Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art and an
Art of the State,” International Organization 40, 4 (Autumn 1986): 753-755.
12
Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,”
International Organization 41,3, (September 1987): 335-370; and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms,
Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
13
Robert Keohane’s presidential address to the ISA; Robert Keohane, International Institutions
and State Power (Boulder: Westvew Press, 1989).
10
However, Wendt s 1992 article “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics” 14 has become the seminal work in constructivism. Wendt
uses the concept of anarchy to show that many things that are taken as given are actually
created by our ideas, perceptions, norms, culture and interactions. Wendt argues “that
people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that
objects have for them.” 15 For example, he explains that “if a society ‘forgets’ what a
university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist... It is
collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions.” 16 He
asserts that just as people have identities (like daughter, wife, nurse) so do states (like
superpower, leader of the western alliance, peacekeeper). Identities are defined as
“relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self.” 17 How others
relate to those people (or states) and how those people or states act is often based on
those identities. “Identities are the basis of interests.” 18 Interests will differ based on
“who you are.” It is in the interests of a professor to conduct research, publish and teach
so that they can obtain tenure. In contrast, it is in the interests of a student to learn and
achieve good grades so they can graduate. Similarly, it is in the interests of a state who
14
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power
politics,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
15
Ibid, 396.
16
Ibid, 397.
17
Ibid, 398.
18
Ibid, 398.
11
identifies itself as a "champion of democracy” to promote the development of free and
fair elections amongst its neighbors. Another democratic country that did not see itself as
the champion of democracy” would be less insistent that its neighbors conduct their
elections in certain ways and consequently have a different relationship with those
neighbors.
Contrary to neorealism, Wendt argues that the structure of the system (anarchy)
does not produce the identity and interests of the actors, but, instead that the states
themselves (i.e. their interests and identities) have created the structure of the system
which in turn influences those very interests and identities. He explains that anarchy as
we know it is a creation of the social context. States act like they are in an self-help
environment - they believe that other states are threatening and as a consequence engage
in activities (building up their own armaments etc.) that appear threatening to others.
Other states in turn do the same in response, which creates a security dilemma- and
thereby creates anarchy. It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. “Self-help security
systems evolve trom cycles ot interaction in which each party acts in ways that the other
teels are threatening to the self, creating expectations that the other is not to be trusted.” 19
In other words, we make our own reality - in this case an anarchic self-help international
system.
Since Wendt and Onuf helped to clarify the constructivist methodology a number
of other IR scholars have tried to further test or implement this approach. By now,
constructivist writings have ably demonstrated that norms have constitutive effects. For
19
Ibid, 406.
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example, Martha Finnemore in National Interests in International Society examines the
influence of cultural norms on the development of institutions in developing countries.
Finnemore reveals how certain international norms are spread via international
organizations. She shows that states have adopted or changed their policies because of the
successful diffusion of an international norm. For example, Finnemore demonstrates that
a number of states adopted similar science bureaucracies at the same time because of an
international norm promoted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).20 Similarly, Peter Katzenstien’s edited volume on national
security. The Culture ofNational Security
,
addresses the role of norms in the construction
of state interests. The chapter by Thomas Risse-Kappen demonstrates that norms
influenced the formation and persistence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). In another interesting chapter in that volume, Richard Price and Nina
Tannenwald examine the impact of norms about the use of biological, nuclear, and
chemical weapons on state actions. They demonstrate that norms of “civilization” and
self-identification as a “civilized” country prevent the spread and use of these types of
weapons. 21
The late 1980s and 1990s also saw an increase in studies that addressed the role of
ideas in international political economy and foreign policy. These studies drew on both
20
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, Cornell University Press
1996).
21 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case ofNATO”
in The Culture ofNational Security Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),
and Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons
Tabbos” in the same volume.
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the international relations and comparative politics fields.22 Judith Goldstein’s two
articles published in International Organization in 1988 and 1989 explored the effect of
ideas on trade policy.23 A few years later Goldstein and Keohane’s edited volume. Ideas
and Foreign Policy identified three types of beliefs (world-views, normative beliefs and
causal beliefs) and explained the three ways they can influence foreign policy (as road
maps, focal points and through institutionalization).
Goldstein and Keohane, as well as many other scholars who study the influence of
ideas on policy, acknowledge a debt to Peter Haas’ work on epistemic communities. The
Special Issue of International Organization (10') published in Winter 1992 explored “the
channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as
from country to country.”"4 These epistemic communities are "a network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area"25 The members of
~ For example, see Paul Egon Rohrlich, “Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive
Analysis of Economic Policy Making,” International Organization (Winter 1987); Peter Hall, ed„ The
Political Power ofEconomic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989); and Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
"’Judith Goldstein, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy," International Organization
,
43, 1
(Winter 1989); Judith Goldstein, “Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy,” International Organization
42, 1 (Winter 1988); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical
Framework," in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993). Other works on ideas include: John Kurt Jacobson, "Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor
in Economic Policy," World Politics 47, 2 (January 1995): 283-310; Peter Hall, The Political Power of
Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Albert Yee,
"The Causal Effects of Ideas on Politics," International Organization
,
50, 1, (Winter 1996); and Peter Haas,
ed., "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination." Special Issue of International
Organization 46, 1 (Winter 1992).
24
Peter Haas, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination,”
International Organization 46, 1 (Winter 1992), 27.
25
Ibid, 3.
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an epistemic community share a set of normative and principled beliefs, causal beliefs,
notions of validity, and have a common policy enterprise. The work on epistemic
communities highlights an important pathway between ideas and norms and policy.
Other articles and books primarily examine the role of state identity in the
formulation of state interests. The end of the Cold War has been traced to changes in
Soviet self-identification and, thus, interests. Michael Barnett argues that the pan-Arab
identity of countries such as Iraq. Saudia Arabia, Syria, and Egypt influenced many
aspects of their foreign policies. He also maintains that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is
based on shared identity
.
26
Barnett and many of the contributors to the Katzenstein volume tie state identity
to domestic characteristics. However, the majority of the constructivist IR scholarship
focuses on the impact of international norms, rules and ideas on the formulation of state
interests and action. Wendt s seminal article has been criticized for treating the state as
a unitary actor and ignoring the role of domestic level factors. He emphasizes that
identities and interests of states are created via the interaction among states, ignoring the
role of domestic variables such as politics and national history
.
28
26
Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East” in The Culture ofNational
Security, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
~ 7
The interplay between domestic norms and foreign policies have been studied by scholars such
as Kier who asserts that military culture in France had a significant influence on foreign policy behavior.
However, most of the literature remains focused on international norms.
28
For criticisms of Wendt’s approach see Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, “Culturing International
Relations Theory: A Call for Extension,” in The Return ofCulture and Identity in IR Theory, Yosef Lapid
and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 85-104.
15
Most of this literature also ignores why some international norms take hold in
some countries and not in others. Jeffery T. Checkel, A. Florini, and Andrew Moravcski
have criticized constructivist scholarship on this point
.
29
Checkel states “Lacking a theory
of domestic agency, constructivism thus overpredicts international normative influence
and cannot explain cross-national variation in the constitutive impact of systemic
norms.”
30
Thus, the rise of constructivism in International Relations has filled a gap that
none of the leading theories or approaches attempted to fill. Constructivism brought a
renewed energy to the study of ideas, identities, values, culture, and norms to the field.
However, most of constructivist scholarship ignores domestic level variables. In contrast,
Comparative Politics has long studied domestic factors. The next subsection will review
the contributions made by Comparative Politics scholars to this research program.
Comparative Politics
As Paul Kowert and Jeffery Logo assert in Culture ofNational Security if “norms
matter to the conduct of international politics- then the origins of norms is a natural
subject for further study.”31 The origins of ideational factors are more likely to be studied
29
See Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics,” International Organization 51, 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-53; Jeffery T. Checkel, “Norms,
Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999):
83-1 14; A. Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (September
1996): 363-390.
30
Jeffery T. Checkel, “Norms,” 83-1 14.
3
'Paul Kowert and Jeffery Logo, “Norms, Identity and Their Limits,” in The Culture ofNational
Security.
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by comparative politics scholars. Indeed at times, this field has explored both the norms,
values or identities ot particular cultures, societies or states and the origins of those
norms in the particular history of the entity in question. However, most of this research is
not consciously constructivist. As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink explain
“[w]hen we look for constructivists in comparative politics, we find instead more eclectic
scholars who at times make compelling arguments about discourses, language, ideas,
culture, or knowledge relevant to specific thematic areas.”32
The most well known subset of this research in Comparative Politics has focused
on political culture. Political culture has been defined in a variety of ways but a relatively
well-accepted definition is “the general ‘pattern of orientations’ to political objects such
as parties, government and the constitution, expressed in beliefs, symbols and values.”33
Gabriel Almond traces the history of the study of political culture to thinkers such as Max
Weber, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Walter Lippman, and Harold Lasswell, among
others .
34
Most political culture research is concerned with the relationship among culture
and political and economic development. The seminal work in this field was The Civic
32
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program
in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Animal Reviews Political Science 4 (2001): 391-416.
33 Andrew Heywood. Key Concepts in Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 216.
34
Gabriel A. Almond, “The Study of Political Culture,” in Culture and Politics: A Reader, Lane
Crothers and Charles Lockhart, eds. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 5-20.
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C allure, written by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in 1 963.35 After analyzing the
politics office countries, they argue that a nation’s political culture influences the social
and political behavior in that nation by establishing the norms that are followed in a
society. Almond and Verba demonstrated that the cultural characteristics of Anglo-Saxon
democracies differed from those of Italy and Germany. They found greater levels of trust
and subjective political competence in the United States and Britain and linked those
factors to democracy.
After the release of the Civic Culture other scholars adopted similar models to
explain the effect of culture on political behavior. Aaron Wildavsky made a contribution
to our understanding of this relationship by developing a typology of cultures. Wildavsky
borrowed from the work of anthropologist, Mary Douglas, to posit that there are five
types of cultures (egalitarian, hierarchical, individualistic, fatalistic, and hermit).36 Lucian
Pye‘s examination of culture and politics in Asia demonstrated that cultural differences
between the societies resulted in distinct political patterns. 37 Larry Diamond’s edited
volume Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Counties presented extensive
35
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1963); and
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Princeton: Princeton University Press
1979).
36
Aaron Wildavsky, “Change in Political Culture,” Politics 20 (1985): 95-102; Aaron Wildavsky,
“Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,”
American Political Science Review 81, (1987): 3-21; Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis
,
and Aaron
Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).
37 .
Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions ofAuthority (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1985).
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cross-national evidence linking culture and democracy
.
38
Lawrence Harrision’s
controversial. Underdevelopment is a State ofMind- The Latin American Case argued
that the culture in most Latin American countries hampered development
.
39
Working from an understanding of Southern European and Latin American
culture and history, Howard J. Wiarda has long maintained that cultural factors have a
significant explanatory role. Wiarda asserts that to properly understand Latin America or
Southern Europe it is necessary to first understand the historical cultural background and
society of the countries in the region
.
40
In The Soul ofLatin America he argues that the
key to understanding Latin America lies in its distinct political culture. Latin American
political culture has evolved from a corporatist. Catholic, conservative political theory
and tradition
.
41
Similarly, Wiarda and Margaret Macheish Mott ‘s Catholic Roots and
Democratic Flowers examine such ideational features as national identity and Catholic
tradition on the political development of Spain and Portugal
.
42
38
Larry Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).
39
Lawrence E. Harrision, Underdevelopment is a State ofMind- The Latin American Case
(Cambridge, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Lanham MD: University Press of
America, 1985).
40 Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience (Amherst;
University of Massachusetts Press, 1977); Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and National Development in
Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981); and Howard J. Wiarda, Politics and Social Change in
Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
41 Howard J. Wiarda, The Soul ofLatin America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
42 Howard J. Wiarda and Margaret MacLeish Mott, Catholic Roots and Democratic Flowers:
Political Systems in Spain and Portugal (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001).
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Furthermore, Wiarda argues that Western scholars often make the mistake of
assuming that other societies have Anglo-American worldviews and cultural
assumptions. He has also pointed out that the United States’ foreign policy suffers from
ethnocentrism, especially in its dealing with developing regions, and more recently,
Wiarda and others examined the impact of indigenous traditions in social, economic and
political development
.
43
Seymour Martin Lipset, who compares Canadian and American values and their
related behaviors, is another example. Lipset argues, among other things, that Americans
are less elitist and law abiding than their northern neighbors and ties the origins of these
cultural differences to the American Revolution
.
44
In another important study, Robert
Putnam published the results ot a comparative examination of different regions in Italy in
which he concluded that good government depended on a political culture of civic
engaEemenb Though often criticized, scholars of political culture have provided an
important basis tor understanding the roots and influence of these normative factors.
Ronald Inglehart's ongoing empirical research has complemented the work of
political cultural studies. During the last thirty years Inglehart has conducted a series of
extensive surveys in North America and Europe that traced the influence of generational
43 Howard Wiarda, Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World?
(Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985) and Howard J. Wiarda,
ed. Non-western Theories ofDevelopment: Regional Norms versus Global Trends (Fort Worth: Harcourt
Brace, 1999).
44 Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: the values and institutions ofthe United States and
Canada (New York : Routledge, 1990), and Lipset, American exceptionalism : a double-edged sword (Hew
York : W.W. Norton, 1996).
45
Robert Putnam, Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
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change on culture (including political culture) and its effect on the political system.
Inglehart describes the rise of postmateriaiist values in prosperous societies. His survey
data supports the view that more and more people in these countries are caring less about
issues related to economic or physical security and more about values like free speech or
protecting the environment. In Culture Shift he argued that political culture is integral to
both economic and political development.46
Other scholars have discussed the international implications of cultural
differences. In 1993, Samuel P. Huntington hypothesized that culture has a greater
influence on individuals than other variables including economic or political systems. He
argued the cultural differences among civilizations (Western, Islamic, Confucian, Slavic-
Orthodox, Latin American, and Hindu) will produce inevitable conflict.47
However, the study of political culture has had numerous critics. For example, the
civic culture framework came under fire for downplaying the importance of citizen
participation in democracies, ignoring the diversity of culture within nations, and for
being deterministic (political culture as a cause of democracy, not as a result of
democracy) among others. 48
46
Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing values and political style among western
publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Ronald Inglehart, Changing Culture (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989); Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in advanced industrial society
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
47
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72, 3, (1993): 22-49;
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash ofCivilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1996).
48
For example, dependency theory argued that international factors, not political culture,
explained the lack of economic development and democracy in developing countries. See Fernando
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1979).
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Comparative Politics research has not been limited to studies of political culture.
The field has also addressed other ideational variables. Comparative politics research on
identities comes the closest to the type of constructivism employed by International
Relations theorists. In Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism
,
Benedict Anderson describes the rise of nationalism. Anderson argues that
the rise of creative ways of thinking about time and territory, the development of print
capitalism and vernacular languages allowed people to imagine themselves as a
community. He maintains that almost all, but the earliest communities, were imagined.49
In summary, Comparative Politics has long studied a number of ideational
variables; most notably, political culture and its influence on political development.
However, most of these studies have not deeply examined the relationship between these
variables and foreign policy, as we do in this study.
Comparative Foreign Policy
Just as the general Comparative Politics literature has widely
-other than a few notable
exceptions' 0- ignored foreign policy, the scholars that study comparative foreign policy
do not emphasize the importance of cultural or constructivist variables.
Comparative foreign policy as a discipline has only become recognized in the last
40 years. In many respects, James Rosenau was the seminal scholar of the field. He
49
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
50 Some comparative politics scholars such as Howard Wiarda do address both cultural factors and
foreign policy. In American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes he addresses the role of numerous
factors in foreign policy, including political culture.
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argued that the field of foreign policy that had traditionally utilized the single case study
could benefit from the comparative method that was at that time, very popular with
scholars studying domestic level politics. However, he explained in order to conduct
meaningful comparisons, we need to develop general theories. A starting point, he
asserted, was to formulate a pre-theoretical framework that would assess the relative
importance of the numerous variables involved in foreign policy behavior. In this 1966
article he provided readers with an example of a pre-theory that organized variables
important in explaining foreign policy behavior into five categories and then
demonstrated how we could rank the variables in terms of relevance for different types of
states.
51
In the 1970s and 1980s the field of comparative foreign policy emphasized the
behavioral approach. A number of large-scale, cross national research projects such as the
Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) and the Interstate Behavioral
Analysis (IBA) were produced. CREON researchers investigated the influence of a wide
scope of variables ranging from leaders’ personality characteristics to the international
system/ ~ In these studies, cultural and ideational factors were only touched upon, mainly
in discussions of personality types or national attributes, in which “cultural homogeneity”
51
James N. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to
Comparative and International Politics, R. Barry Farrell, ed. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press
1966).
52 CREON produced many articles and books but the most comprehensive summary of the project
is found in Maurice East, Stephen Salmore, and Charles Hermann eds. Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1978). For information about IBA see Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al., Foreign Policy
Behavior: The Interstate Behavioral Analysis Model (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1980).
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was one of the many factors discussed along side others, such as territorial size and level
of development. 53
In the 1980s a subtle shift began to occur in the study of comparative foreign
policy. Laura Neack claims that the blurring of the division between the international
relations and comparative politics fields had an impact on comparative foreign policy.
The field began to rely more on domestic factors studied in comparative politics. 54 More
scholars began to look at the relationship between societal factors such as culture, and
foreign policy. A good example was Robert Dallek’s The American Style ofForeign
Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs
,
written in 1983. However, most of these
studies locused on political culture, reflecting the blurring of the divisions between these
two fields.
By the mid-1990s, the field had undergone a significant transformation, to the
extent that today’s scholarship no longer refers to itself as Comparative Foreign Policy,
but instead as Foreign Policy Analysis.' 5 Some of the main features of the transformed
field include a return to the case study method and the utilization of wider body of
literature, including comparative politics, international relations, political economy, and
psychology.
53
See East et al., Why Nations Act.
54
Laura Neack, Jeanne Hey, and Patrick Haney, “Generational Change in Foreign Policy
Analysis,” in Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, Laura Neack,
Jeanne Hey, and Patrick Haney, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 7.
55
See Neack, et al,. Foreign Policy Analysis for a discussion of the transformation of the field.
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Though the majority of scholars of foreign policy do not utilize the concepts
developed in constructivist research,56 there has been some attempt to integrate these
concepts into the study ot foreign policy. 57 One of the most notable efforts was Judith
Goldstein and Robert Keohane’s edited volume Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions and Political Change?* Goldstein and Keohane and the other contributors
argued that people s beliefs helped to explain foreign policy decisions.
The new literature on comparative foreign policy includes a number of studies
about the role of constructivist concepts like culture, metaphors and cognitive models and
a few others have adopted a self-consciously constructivist approach. For example,
Patrick Haney’s 1997 article, “Soccer Fields and Submarines in Cuba: The Politics of
Problem Definition,” argues that crises are, to a large extent, politically and socially
constructed. In 1970, the United States discovered that the Soviets were building a
submarine base in Cienfuegos, Cuba. Haney uses a constructivist framework to explain
the U.S. reaction. He argues that perceptions determined that the issue would be
considered a non-crisis. Studies like Haney’s are likely to become more numerous since
The bibliography of Foreign Policy Analysis does not include any constructivist scholarship.
However, the chapter by V Spike Peterson, “The Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism,” and the
chapter by Keith L. Shimko, “Foreign Policy Metaphors: ‘Falling Dominos’ and Drug ‘Wars’” utilize
constructivist concepts and ideas (although the Peterson chapter does not address foreign policy).
57
Exceptions include: Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York:
Praeger, 1965); James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and American Values (Itasca, 1L: Peacock
Publishers, 1985) and Wiarda’s American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes.
58
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and
Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
59
Patrick Haney, “Soccer Fields and Submarines in Cuba: The Politics of Problem Definition.”
NWC Review (http://www.navv.mil/press/Review/1997/autumn/art5-a97.htm ) July 7, 2001.
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divisions among the subfields seem to be blurring, reflecting the shared emphasis on
these variables.
In summary, though this is changing, the role of domestic level ideas, perceptions,
identity and other ideational and cultural variables have been largely neglected by both
International Relations and Foreign Policy. In contrast, Comparative Politics has
addressed many of these factors, yet many comparativists do not study foreign policy.
The constructivist IR approach comes the closest to elucidating the relationship between
these vanables and foreign policy, but often neglects the constitutive effects of domestic
ideational factors on foreign policy and international relations.
Thus, this current study endeavors to combine International Relations.
Comparative Foreign Policy and Comparative Politics to account for the dissimilarity in
the American and Canadian approaches to Cuba. I argue that domestic level ideational
variables are mainly responsible for the widely divergent Canadian and American
approaches to Cuba.
Definitions
The key variables that are used to identify ideational influence are defined below:
Identity has been defined as “the state of being similar to some actors and different from
others in a particular circumstance. Identity involves the creation of boundaries that
separate the self and other/'60 Identity can be based on territory, ethnicity, culture or ideas
and international actors (like the rest of us) can have multiple and sometimes conflicting
60
Chafetz et al., viii.
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identities. Identity creates norms that tell us who we are and what we should do in a
particular situation.
Ideas
-are defined as mental constructs, views or beliefs political actors have about some
aspect of the world around them.’ ,6, Shared ideas (or culture) influence identity.
Culture “refers to a set of ideas or beliefs that are institutionalized, persist over time and
are associated with a particular community. Cultures, in other words, adhere to specific
groups by definition and differentiate them from other groups in a system .”62
Constructively speaking, culture is socially shared ideas. Though it can exist
independently, culture is one of the elements of identity.
Perceptions are understandings of people, things, or situations. Perceptions are
immediately formed but often persist over time. Perceptions both construct identities and
are contructed by identities. Perceptions can create and reinforce norms.
Norms are often defined as standards of behavior. “In a descriptive sense, a norm refers
to a behavioral regularity, that is, the way an actor usually behaves, and it often refers to a
pattern of behavior developed over an extended period. In a prescriptive sense, a norm
refers to the way in which an actor ought to behave .”63
61
Ibid.
62
1 am borrowing Sheri Berman’s definition. See Sheri Berman, “Ideas and Culture in Political
Analysis. ” Paper presented at the Ideas, Culture and Political Analysis Workshop, Princeton University,
May 15-16. (https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/ssr01/ssr01ae.html 1998).
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Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining," American
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Interests are “those beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity
needs, “ and '‘are the proximate motivation for behavior.”64
A National Level Theory
Though most constructivist theorizing addresses the systemic level, this study
employs constructivist concepts to explain foreign policy behavior. This study, though
recognizing the importance of force and self-interest in foreign policy formation,
emphasize the role of socially shared ideas and perceptions. Constructivists focus, to
varying degrees, on ideas, identities, cultures and norms.
Constructivism can help explain how states respond differently to the same
international situation or issue. This study will demonstrate that the different responses
arise from the different cultures, ideas, perceptions, and identities of the states in
question. These differences cause states to view, understand, and interpret situations
differently. Wendt explains: “actors need to define the situation before they can choose a
course of action.” He asserts that: “these definitions will be based on at least two
considerations: Their own identities and interests, which reflect beliefs about who they
are in such situations; and what they think others will do, which reflect beliefs about their
identities and interests.” Thus, “when these various beliefs are not shared, when there is
no cultural definition of the situation, then actors are likely to be surprised by each
other’s behavior . . . .”65
64
This is Alexander Wendt’s definition of subjective interests in Social Theory ofInternational
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 232.
65
Wendt, Social Theory, 1 86.
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Much of constructivist theorizing ignores domestic contexts. However, many
scholars allude to national level variables. In passing, Wendt allows that states can have
competing knowledge. He explains '‘states know a lot about each other, and important
parts of this knowledge are shared - not all, to be sure, but important parts nonetheless.
States and scholars alike treat these shared beliefs as the background, taken-for-granted
assumptions that any competent player or student of contemporary world politics must
understand: what a “state" is, what “sovereignty” implies ....”66 But what happens when
knowledge is not shared at the system level? This study looks at Wendt’s “not all”
category- when knowledge isn't shared between states, when states have their own,
competing, taken-for-granted assumptions. Wendt refers to this knowledge as “private.”
He recognizes that, "[pjrivate knowledge consists of beliefs that individual actors hold
that others do not. In the case of states this kind of knowledge will often stem from
domestic or ideological considerations. It can be a key determinant of how states frame
international situations and define their national interests.”67 This study departs from the
mainstream constructivism of scholars like Wendt by focusing on this “private’
knowledge. Competing cultures, ideas and identities are a major source of tension in the
international system and thus are important for a complete understanding of international
relations.
This study is interested in comparative politics, foreign policy and international
relations. The state is the main actor in the international system but to fully understand
66
Ibid, 158.
67
Ibid, 141.
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the “why” of state action it is necessary to open the black box and delve into domestic
level factors. It is not just international culture that constructs a state’s identity and
corresponding behavior but also domestic level culture, identity and ideas. A state’s ideas
about itself and its environment influence the state’s actions and in turn those actions can
reinforce the state’s identity, culture and ideas; thus creating reality as they understand it.
The constructivist adage that “we want what we want because of how we think about it”68
is just as true for national foreign policy formation as it is for system level processes.
Foreign policy is based on norms and interests that are, in turn constituted by identities
(identities are constructed by a combination of ideas, culture and values) and perceptions.
The following schematic illustrates the connections among the variables:
Identity (Includes values/ideas/culture)
—^.Norms/Interests ^.Actions/Policies
For simplicity, this schematic does not reveal all the causal pathways among the
variables. Each variable, to varying degrees, is able to influence the other variables.
However, the solid lines represent the main lines of causality. The following eight
chapters will demonstrate that the United States and Canada have been continually
puzzled by the other’s approach to Castro’s Cuba because of the identity differences and
the lack of ideational and cultural consensus.
Figure 1 : Pathways
Perceptions
68
Ibid, 119.
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Methodolopy
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink discuss the methodology used by
constructivists. They assert constructivists:
judge an interpretation of evidence by comparing it with alternative explanationsThey search for evidence that would confirm alternatives and disconfirm the
explanation being assessed. They ask if an explanation is supported by multiple
streams of data. For example, they examine whether speech acts are consistent
with other kinds of behavior in a case under investigation; whether qualitative
in mgs are supported by or at least consistent with relevant statistical data; and
whether actors explain and justify action in similar ways in different settings (e gin private versus in public).
69 h v
Finnemore and Sikkink list the variety of methods used by constructivists, including:
“discourse analysis, process tracing, genealogy, structured focused comparisons,
interviews, participant observation, and content analysis.”70
This study will utilize many of these methods including comparisons, process
tracing, interviews, and content analysis and will demonstrate that the conclusions drawn
are supported by multiple data streams. One of the main methods used in this study is
process tracing. According to Andrew Bennett and Alexander George the “general
method of process tracing is to generate and analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or
processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative
causes to observed effects .” 71 This involves both narrowing the list of alternative
69
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program
in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Reviews Political Science 4 (2001): 391-416.
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71 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,”
MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, October 17-19, 1997
(http://web.mit.edu/17.802/wvw/Bennett/Process%20Tracina%20CS%20Research.htm ), August 7, 2001.
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explanations and gathering evidence that supports your hypothesis. Bennett and George
acknowledge that “it will be difficult to resolve fully the problem of equifinality, or of
similar outcomes occurring through different causal processes, and to eliminate all
potential rival explanations but one, especially when human agents are involved who may
be doing their best to conceal causal processes. But process tracing forces the investigator
to take equifinality into account ...*’72 I use the following three research tools to link
causal mechanisms to outcomes, in this case to link ideational factors (ideas, values,
culture, perceptions, norms and identities) to each country’s approach and policy toward
Cuba.
Interviews have been conducted with contemporary and past Canadian and
American policymakers, including ambassadors, and other high level officials in both
capitals as well as in Cuba. Similar questions were asked of all people interviewed. My
questions were designed to reveal the interviewee’s basic perceptions of their country’s
relationship with Cuba. All those interviewed were first asked broad open-ended
questions about factors that they felt explained their country’s relationship with the
island. They were also asked more specific questions that addressed alternative
explanations (for example the role of the Cuban-American lobby in the U.S. and the role
of economic factors in the Canadian policy). They were also asked if they thought that
their country s culture, history and international standing (ie a superpower or middle
power) had any influence. In addition, more specific questions about the relationship
were posed that revealed the importance of certain perceptions, ideas and identities. For
72
Ibid.
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example, I was in Havana during the Elian crisis and asked Canadian and American
officials in Cuba for their opinions of the situation.
Second, I have researched archives, primary documents and secondary literature
on both Canadian and American policy toward Cuba. For example, I examined legislation
and speeches for evidence of the beliefs and ideas that dominate the discourse about
relations with Cuba. I have also examined public opinion polls and the content of major
media (newspapers) to determine the general public opinion ofCuba and its relationship
to both countries. 1 demonstrate that norms, identities, and perceptions correlate with
domestic policy statements and debates as well as public opinion. Answers obtained
during confidential interviews were then compared with public statements and documents
(both declassified and public) to further determine the accuracy of the information.
Lastly, I consider alternative explanations of both policies to determine their
relevance and to minimize the possibility that the actors are only responding as though
they were influenced by the constructivist variables under consideration but in reality
their actions and rhetoric were in response to other variables.
Summary
This study uses the constructivist framework but studies a topic more frequently
addressed in the comparative foreign policies scholarship, as it examines the interplay
between domestic factors and foreign policy. It shows that these domestic factors can
have considerable constitutive effects and can, at times, counter strong international
norms.
33
It will demonstrate the connection between ideational variables and foreign policy
by examining the Cuba policies of the United States and Canada. The traditional
explanations do not offer complete accounts of the reasons/or each policy nor can they
explain the difference in the two approaches. I will show that Realism and other theories
examined offer some valuable insights but that they have difficulty explaining crucial
aspects of the policies. This study offers an alternative view of both policies, one that
reveals the importance of culture, norms, values, ideas, perceptions, and identities. Not
only can these variables provide explanations for each approach but they can also explain
why Canadian and American policies continue to diverge, even well after the end of the
cold war.
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CHAPTER 2
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CUBA
Even though Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) was largely correct when he said:
“History is the version of past events that people have decided to agree upon,” we cannot
understand the present without first attempting to understand history. This chapter
provides the historical context for the rest of the study by briefly outlining the history of
Cuba, from the time of the European explorers to the Post Cold War era.
The Colonial Period
Christopher Columbus was the first European to explore Cuba. In the fall of 1492
Columbus landed on the largest island in the Caribbean; totaling 44,218 square miles
(114, 525 square km), 760 miles long and 120 miles wide at its widest, it is about the size
of England. He had found an island that would prove to be very attractive to the
Europeans. Cuba’s location at the entrance to the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico
made it an excellent port ot call on the journeys between Latin America and Spain.
Conquistadores such as Heman Cortes visited Cuba in the early 1500s on their way to
and from the continent.
Given the favorable climate and landscape, it was not long before other
Europeans began to look toward Cuba as more than a way-station. Cuba seemed to have
the perfect climate- warm, but not too hot, with an average temperature of 27°C /81°F in
the summer and 22°C /72°F in the winter months, blessed by cooling northeast trade
winds and ocean currents. Furthermore, the island has adequate rainfall and relatively flat
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plains suitable for agricultural production. 1 In 151 1, another Spaniard, Diego Velazquez,
established the first European permanent settlement on the eastern end of the island. As
Governor of Cuba until 1 524, Velazquez expanded the Spanish hold over the island by
fighting the indigenous peoples (the Tainaos, Ciboneys and Guanahatabeyes were almost
completely wiped out soon after the arrival of the Europeans) and settling Spaniards into
the newly created towns. 2
Havana, one of the settlements established by Diego Velazquez, became an
important port. Havana was established around a naturally deep harbor and was
considered the ideal meeting point for Spanish ships returning to Spain. After collecting
cargo from various Latin American colonies the ships would meet and fonn a flotilla in
Havana, returning to Spain together. The harbor was well protected by the Spanish built
torts and by the heavy chain that was placed across the entrance to the harbor. The chain
was installed each evening to prevent enemies from attacking the ships under the cover of
darkness. The well-fortified city soon became center of European life in Cuba, despite
being destroyed by fire twice in its first fifty years.
The rich soil and the promise of mineral wealth (which never really materialized)
soon led to the influx of another group; Europeans brought African slaves to Cuba in the
mid- 1520s. In this early period, slaves worked in the gold mines, in early industries or
1
The three mountain ranges- the Sierra Maestra, the Tridad Mountains and the Sierra de los
Organos comprise approximately 25% of the land area.
2 Much of this information was drawn from Jaime Suchlicki, Historical Dictionary ofCuba
(Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1988).
J
The forts built to protect Havana were the Castillo de los Tres Reyes del Morro and Castillo de
San Salvador de la Punta.
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as servants in Havana households. In contrast to systems of slavery in other New World
colonies, many of the slaves brought to Cuba were eventually freed, especially those
working in Havana. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the significant
number of freed slaves distinguished Cuba from other colonial holdings in the region at
this time.
4
Cuba remained in Spanish hands for most of the following four centuries. At
various points during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, Spanish
control over Cuba was challenged by French and Dutch pirates as well as by
representatives of the English throne. Cuba fell to the English in 1762 but was, once
again, under Spanish control by 1763.' However, in that short period, the British had an
enormous influence over the island. British merchants flocked to Havana, opening up the
Cuban market to foreigners. They also dramatically increased the number of slaves on the
island.
6
The Catholic Church played an important role in early Cuban life. Initially
devoted to converting the indigenous populations, the church soon insinuated itself into
all aspects of the Cuban society and economy, even owning and operating their own
4
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sugar mills. Even so, the church in Cuba never achieved the control it did in other Latin
American countries during this same period.
During the eighteenth century tobacco was Cuba’s primary export crop. However,
it was soon discovered that the island was perfect for growing sugar, especially after the
Haitian revolt (1795-1805) ruled out sugar production there. By the beginning of the
nineteenth century the island economy had become structured around the production and
export of this commodity, foreshadowing Cuba’s life-long reliance on foreign markets
and the havoc that this type of dependency would wreak on the economy. Even in the
early eighteen hundreds, Cuba’s economy suffered from the unreliable nature of a mono-
crop economy reliant on foreign markets. In 1807, the United States, the largest market
for Cuban sugar, had refused to trade with any of the belligerents of the Napoleonic wars.
Spain s involvement in the wars effectively eliminated the American demand for Cuban
sugar. Consequently, only one-third of the sugar produced on the island was sold that
year.
The Napoleonic wars also strained Spain’s control over the colonies. Spain was
much too busy fighting European enemies and the Spanish fleet too crippled, to maintain
Spain’s heretofore secure reign over the island. The people of Cuba, aware of the
successful American and French revolutions and of revolts in other Latin American
colonies, began to think about launching their own attempt for independence. Thus,
7
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Cuba's first of many unsuccessful bids for independence from colonial control erupted in
revolt in 1809.9
After the Napoleonic wars the Spanish re-established firm control over their
Cuban colony. Moving forty thousand troops into Cuba and refusing repeated offers by
the Americans to purchase the island, Spain was determined not to lose another valuable
colonial holding in the Americas. 10 By 1815 Cuba’s population had reached almost
600,000." Cuba was becoming a very profitable colony, exporting sugar as well as
coffee, rum and tobacco. The many Cuban towns and cities were thriving as the
surrounding lands were consumed by agricultural production. Spain was determined to
hang onto the colony at all costs.
Writings of this period in Cuban history describe a rich and beautiful country. For
example, one visitor to Cuba in the mid-nineteenth century wrote: “Passing the suburbs
of the city... the road breaks out into the beautiful open country, threading its narrow way
through rich plantations and thriving farms, whose vegetable treasures of every
description can scarcely be paralleled on the face of the earth.” 12 In addition, a
substantial infrastructure was evolving to support the flourishing agricultural production.
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For example, the first railroad in the Caribbean and Latin America was built in Cuba in
1837 to transport sugar cane. 13
Despite economic success, the idea of Cuban independence continued to percolate
under the surface of Cuban economic and political life. By the middle of the nineteenth
century this idea was once again gaining strength. The high taxes imposed by Spain, the
lack of control over their own government and bureaucracy, increasing discrimination by
the Spaniards in Cuba, and the failure of Spain and other European powers to conquer
other independence movements in the region, contributed to support for independence.
The push for independence came to a boiling point in 1867 when the proposals of the
Junta de Informat ion
,
an elected body of Cuban, Puerto Rican and Philippine
representatives created to discuss reforms in the colonies, were ignored by the Spanish
government. 14 This insult added to the resentment caused by the recent economic decline
and the injustices of the Spanish government, and created a renewed wave of interest in
independence.
Consequently, in 1 868 a group led by a sugar planter, Carlos Manuel de
Cespedes, freed their slaves and formed a rebel army. They issued the ‘Grito de Yara’
that declared Cuban independence and started the Ten Years War (1868-1878). Though
the rebels eventually lost this war, the Cuban sense of nationality that was solidified
during the ten-year struggle, inspired future attempts to achieve independence.
13
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The war and the failure of the rebel forces led to the creation of the Autonomist
party. This political party was dedicated to the goal of Cuban autonomy, but not
necessarily independence, and to achieving that end by peaceful means only. The
Autonomist party enjoyed considerable support for awhile, but since they were not able
to gain many concessions from the Spanish government, their voice was eventually
drowned out by Jose Marti’ s Cuban Revolutionary party that was formed in 1 892.
To this day, Jose Marti is revered in Cuba as the father of the nation. Marti
devoted his life to the cause of Cuban independence. As a young man he was deported to
Spain in 1 870 for being critical of the Spanish government. After living in Europe.
Mexico, Guatemala and Venezuela, he moved to New York, where he organized the
various Cuban exile groups and planned for a war to free his homeland.
The economy once again helped spark rebellion. The Ten Years War struck a
serious blow to the landed aristocracy, forcing many of them sell their land and sugar
mills, often to rich Americans. 15 Though the United States already had considerable
influence over the Cuban economy, over the next few decades, the American
involvement in the Cuban economy continued to grow. 16 Consequently, in 1895, when
the United States imposed the Wilson Tariff on sugar, dramatically reducing the amount
of Cuban sugar being purchased by Americans, the Cuban economy took a serious
downturn. The economic crisis initiated by the Wilson Tariff gave Jose Marti’s
movement the impetus it needed.
15
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Jose Marti planned a fast and powerful rebellion that would oeeur simultaneously
throughout the country. However, before he could launch his rebellion the United States
government discovered his plans, and confiscated his arms and ships. Since Spain had
become aware of his plot, Marti was forced to follow through with the planned rebellion,
minus the confiscated war materials, before the Spanish authorities had time to clamp
down on the rebels in Cuba. Thus, on February 24, 1895, Marti’ s bands rose in
opposition in five regions of the country. Spain did not have a problem initially
overpowering the insurgents in the western areas of Matanzas and Havana. The rebels
had better luck in the eastern regions of the country where they took on much smaller
Spanish forces. 17
In April ot 1 895 the Spanish struck a blow to the revolutionaries when Marti was
killed in battle. The leadership of the rebellion was assumed by General Jose Miguel
Gomez and Captain Antonio Maceo. They set up a government council and drafted a
constitution. Salvador Cisneros Betancourt was named president. Yet, the war continued
to rage, killing thousands, including Maceo, and destroying property. Cubans who were
not personally fighting on either side were corralled into compounds, often without
enough food. Herding people into these concentration camps also completely destroyed
the economy. It wasn't long before news of the brutality of the war and its economic
consequences reached an international audience, including Americans, who were
emotionally and financially invested in Cuba. 18
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LLS- Involvement: 1 898 and the Aftermath
Thus, in 1 898 the Americans, under the pretext that the U.S. battleship Maine was
destroyed in the Havana harbor inserted themselves into the conflict. Under the
leadership of President McKinley, the Americans fought against the Spanish but
distanced themselves from the Cuban rebels and ignored the rebel government. 19 After
defeating the Spanish, American forces occupied the island and a peace treaty that ended
Spanish control over Cuba was signed without Cuban participation. The American
occupation lasted from 1899 until 1902. In 1901, the U.S. Congress added the Platt
Amendment to the Cuban Constitution which gave Cuba the status of an American
protectorate, allowing the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of the island.
Cuba had substituted one “colonial” master for another.
The sheer magnitude ofUS involvement and Cuba’s history of frustrated
nationalism laid the groundwork for the tension in Cuban-American relations that would
dominate the bilateral relationship for much of the next century and beyond. The failure
of the Cubans to achieve independence in 1815, in the 1860s, and again in 1895
contributed to an unfulfilled sense of nationalism. Thus, when the Cubans were finally rid
of the Spanish they were loathed to accept domination by another power. 20
Despite the Cuban desire for economic and political independence, American
influence was felt throughout Cuba. The tobacco industry, the railways and public
utilities soon became, like the sugar industry, dominated by American capital. The
19
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Reciprocity Treaty of 1903 solidified the rapidly growing economic ties between the two
countries. By 1909 the United States controlled almost half of all foreign investment in
Cuba. 21
After the war, the political situation in Cuba deteriorated as corruption, patronage
and electoral fraud removed any legitimacy of the new government, increasing cynicism
and prompting another rebellion in 1906. The President, Estrada Palma, asked the United
States to step in to put down the rebellion. However, to Palma’s surprise, Washington’s
solution was to replace Palma with a United States governor. The U.S. remained in
control of the island until 1909 when they installed a new electoral system and oversaw
the election of Jose Miguel Gomez as president. In 1913 Mario Garcia Menocal, who led
Cuba until 1921, replaced Gomez. Menocal was followed by Alfredo Zayas, who ruled
Cuba with the assistance of an American special envoy, General Enoch Crowder, until
1925.
The Liberal Party candidate, Gerardo Machado was elected in 1924 on a platform
of “water, roads and schools.”22 He followed through on many of his campaign promises
during his first term. For example, Machado completed the construction of the Central
Highway from Havana to Santiago de Cuba and expanded the University of Havana.
However, arguing that he needed more time to meet his economic goals, Machado had
the Constitutional Assembly extend presidential terms to six years and offer him the
chance to run for re-election, unopposed.
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This turn toward dictatorship, Machado’s growing use of repression, and the
Great Depression, which had a devastating effect on the Cuban economy, sparked
resistance to Machado’s rule. 21 Resistance to the regime became widespread and violent
as opposition groups turned to terrorist tactics to fight the regime, prompting firrther
repression from the state. University students, members of the middle class, intellectuals
and professionals all joined opposition leaders, Mario Garcia Menocal, Cuba’s third
president, and Colonel Carlos Mendieta. The resistance lead to an uprising against the
Machado regime in 1 93 1 , which was quickly subdued by Machado’s forces. Though this
uprising was contained, opposition to the regime continued. The cycle of state repression
and opposition violence did not abate. The United States, attempting to avoid another
revolution in Cuba, stepped in again in 1933.
Batista’s Cuba: 1 933-1959
In 1933, Washington sent Bejamin Sumner Welles to Havana to mediate between the
regime and the opposition. Welles soon became convinced of the need to remove
Machado from power. The American contingent assisted Carlos Manuel de Cespedes to
assume power.
24
However, Cespedes lacked the support of the troops. 25 After less than a
month in power, Cespedes was overthrown by the army sergeants, led by Fulgencio F.
23
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24
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Batista Zaldivar. Ramon Grau San Martin was appointed President but much of the
power was held by one of his ministers, Antonio Guiteras. The new revolutionary
government abrogated the Platt Amendment and reduced the influence of Americans in
the Cuban economy. Given these changes, the United States, and a number of groups
within the Cuban population including business leaders, grew to oppose the new
government.
With American support, Batista stepped in to again alter the political landscape.
He forced the revolutionary government to resign. The abrupt end of the 1933 revolution
with its nationalist goals had serious consequences for Cuba’s future. The frustrated
nationalism of the pervious century was reawakened. Furthermore, the events of 1933
solidified the influence of Batista and the army over Cuban politics. As such, Jaime
Suchlicki argues 1933 was “a turning point in Cuba’s history.”26
Batista appointed Carlos Mendieta president in 1934. However, opposition to the
Mendieta regime was strong and was voiced in a general strike in 1935. Though
immediately unsuccessful, the strike weakened Mendieta and led to his resignation within
months. But the strike did not take down the real source of power behind the regime-
Batista and the army. Batista appointed a series of presidents throughout the rest of the
decade but power remained in his hands. This period in Cuban history was characterized
by corruption and some repression but also by economic growth and reduced unrest.
In 1940 a new constitution was adopted, finally replacing the constitution created
under the American occupation that contained the Platt Amendment. The new
constitution provided for universal suffrage, free elections, prohibited discrimination, and
26
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mandated public education, as well as many other similar provisions. However, most of
these provisions were not applied.
The election ofl940 was one exception. That year Batista was elected president
in what was reported to be an unusually fair election.27 Now a civilian authority along
with his role as army chief, Batista transferred power back to the office of the president,
reducing the size and power of the Cuban military. 28 Batista also brought back the
political patronage machine. Corruption, bribery, and political violence characterized the
Batista government and the regimes of the next two presidents, Ramon Grau (1944-1948)
and Carlos Prio (1948-1952), both of the Autentico Party. Though the Autenticos
attempted to respect democratic processes, they were unable to secure democracy and
soon their own party became dominated by corruption. 29
The Cuban economy prospered in this period. Yet, the prosperity only served to
obscure the deeper problems of the Cuban economy- reliance on a single export,
corruption and mismanagement — and did not have a long-term positive influence on
Cuban development. When the economy began to fail in the late 1940s, the Autenticos
were unable to meet the challenge, creating an ever-growing sense of disillusionment
with their political and economic management of the country.
Consequently, when Batista wanted, once again, to reinsert himself back into
power, it was relatively simple for him to do so. In 1952 he engineered a quick military
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coup that put him and the army in power and ended this most recent experiment with
constitutional government. But Batista was unable to cure Cuba’s economic ills and
political crises. Wealth was not evenly distributed, the economy was still reliant on the
export of a single crop, foreigners (mainly Americans) owned a large percentage of
industry and Cubans, comparing their economic progress to the United States, were
frustrated. Politically, Batista ruled by repression. He became increasingly dictatorial.
Yet, neither of the Autentico nor Ortodoxo political parties was strong enough to
organize an effective resistance.
A number of smaller groups formed in opposition to the Batista regime. Among
them was Fidel Castro’s Twenty-Sixth of July movement. When his forces attacked the
Moncada army garrison in July of 1953, he was captured. However, Castro used his
arrest as an opportunity to present his case against the government, to demand a return to
constitutional rule, and to advocate for social and economic reform. Upon his release,
after one year in prison, Castro began to organize another uprising. During this period
many groups staged small rebellions or demonstrations against Batista. Thus, while
Castro’s group was gaining strength and staging attacks on the government’s rural guards
in the Sierra Maestra mountains, others were resisting the regime in the cities. In 1958
these groups came together to oppose Batista, and Fidel Castro emerged as their leader.
The United States, seeing that Batista had lost support of key elements of society as well
as the backing of a large percentage of his armed forces, withdrew their support from
their former ally. As 1959 entered its first day, Batista and his supporters fled Havana. 30
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Fidel Castro's Cuba
In January of 1959, Fidel Castro and his rebel army assumed power and began to
dismantle the “old” Cuba. On February 16, Fidel Castro became Prime Minister of Cuba.
The first President of the new regime, Manuel Urrutia, was forced out within a few
months and he was replaced by Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado (1959-1976), whose role was
limited essentially to ceremonial functions, leaving Castro to rule alone. The main
political parties were disbanded. Castro quickly set out to punish members of Batista’s
circle. Many were put on trial, imprisoned or executed.
One of the first measures passed by the new government was the Agrarian
Reform Law. This act prevented large-scale land ownership by limiting the maximum
any one person or corporation could own to 1,000 acres. Under this law, millions of acres
of land became state-owned. In 1963 this limit was reduced to 165 acres and many more
acres fell under state control. 31
Castro also reorganized the education and health systems on the island. The
number of schools was dramatically increased, enrollment doubled and literacy rates rose
to levels characteristic of developed regions. State money poured into the health system
as an elementary level of health care was provided to all citizens. The number of health
care workers, hospitals and clinics rose to meet the increased demand. Life expectancy
and infant mortality figures improved. 32 In addition, the government took over the banks,
31
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transportation companies, and communication systems on the island. The size of the
bureaucracy ballooned to manage it all. Many Cubans, especially the poor, were happy
about these changes but the wealthier Cubans, realizing that they stood to lose greatly
from Castro’s polices, began ,o leave the country. Most of these exiles sought, what they
thought to be temporary refuge, in Florida.
Castro also made considerable changes to Cuban foreign policy. Relations with
the United States changed most dramatically. Even before the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion,
U.S.
-Cuban relations had deteriorated. Castro had imposed the Agrarian Reform Law that
significantly reduced the American holdings on the island. Tensions were further
heightened when Castro nationalized most foreign companies operating in Cuba and re-
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
As Cuban-American relations deteriorated, Castro continued to strengthen
economic and political ties to the Soviet Union. A new, enlarged Communist Party that
included the 26th of July Movement was formed. Then in April of 1961, the Cubans who
had fled the island when Castro assumed power, invaded with the assistance of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The rebel invasion was quickly put down by Castro’s
forces. Tension between Havana and Washington further escalated. In December 1961,
Castro announced that he was a Marxist-Leninist and asserted that the Cuban revolution
was a socialist revolution.
U.S.- Cuban hostilities reached a fever pitch in 1962 when the United States
discovered that the Soviets had installed missiles, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, in
Cuba. In response, on October 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy set up a naval
blockade of Cuba. These thirteen days were the closest the United States and the Soviet
50
Union came to a nuclear showdown during the Cold War. Nuclear war was averted when
the Soviets agreed to remove the weapons, which they did even before consulting with
Castro, and the United States pledged not to invade Cuba. 33
State ownership over the economy proceeded throughout the 1960s. By the late
1960s, most businesses were state controlled. Even though almost everyone was
employed, the Cuban economy did not do very well in the early years after the
revolution. The economy was inefficient and average Cubans struggled to improve their
lot. Consequently, Castro turned to his new ally, the Soviets, who provided Cuba with
massive military and economic aid. For example, the Soviets allowed Cuba to trade sugar
for oil at preferential prices. The economy benefited immensely from Soviet support. In
1969 Castro called their contribution “inestimable and decisive.”34 In 1972 Cuba formally
became a member ofCOMECON, the Eastern Bloc’s economic group.
Yet, the Castro regime was disturbed by its persistent trade deficit with the Soviet
Union. In an effort to reduce the deficit, Castro abandoned his efforts to diversify the
Cuban economy and attempted to capitalize on Cuba’s comparative advantage in sugar. 35
Castro never met his goal to produce 10 million tons of sugar in 1970. However, he did
manage to raise sugar production to its highest level, producing 8.5 million tons that
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year.
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Consequently, when world sugar prices soared in the early 1970s Cuba was able
to take full advantage. 33 Fetching top dollar for sugar on the world market and benefiting
from low fixed prices for Soviet oil during the oil crisis, the Cuban economy was
prosperous in the early 1970s.
Dunng the late 1970s, Castro allowed some liberalization of the economy. 38 For
example, private financial transactions were allowed in some sectors, wages were
allowed to fluctuate based on merit, and in 1982, restrictions on foreign investment were
partially lifted. However, by the 1980s, due to factors such as declining sugar prices and
economic woes in the Soviet Union, the Cuban economy was falling into another
recession. In 1986 Castro put the blame on the market reforms he had allowed and began
“rectification” which overturned many of the early liberalizations.
Cuba s foreign policy also underwent a series of changes between the 1960s and
1980s. In the 1960s Castro had aligned his regime with the USSR but was at times
critical of Soviet policies, especially their decision to trade with countries Castro
considered enemies.39 Castro considered Cuba to be a truer example of a communist
society than the Soviet Union. In 1 968 Cuban- Soviet tension escalated over a number of
issues including the reduction of Soviet petroleum deliveries to Cuba, Castro’s criticism
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of Soviet-style communism, and charges that some Soviets were attempting to undermine
the Cuban revolution. 40 However, by the mid-1970s, the Soviet-Cuban relationship had
been mended. Cuba collaborated with the USSR in Africa, sending Cuban troops to the
continent.
The African involvement was the culmination of Cuba’s efforts to spread
rebellion and assist communist groups in other countries. After being expelled from the
Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962, Castro issued the “Second Declaration
of Havana” in which he urged the peoples of other countries to follow Cuba’s example
and use guerrilla warfare against their oppressors. 41 Though limited, Cuban resources
would be used over the next few decades to aid revolutionary movements in Latin
America and Africa. By 1974 Cuba was supporting Communist groups in a number of
African countries. In 1975 it became known that Cuban troops were assisting the MPLA
in Angola and by 1976 Cuban troops had also become involved in the conflict in
Ethiopia. The Castro regime was also implicated in Latin American revolutionary
struggles. Cuban advisers assisted the consolidation of the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua, assisted the guerrilla movements in El Salvador, and provided some arms and
technical support to revolutionary Grenada. Cuba’s participation in these conflicts
complicated Cuba’s relationship with western countries and, what Castro did not know at
the time was, that soon, Cuba would need friends in the West more than he could ever
imagine.
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The End of the Cold War and Cuba
The world changed dramatically at the end of the 1980s as the Soviet Union,
almost overnight, went from a superpower to nonexistence. This transformation had a
profound impact on all aspects of life in Cuba. Prior to 1989, before Mikhail Gorbachev
began the economic and political transformations (known as perestroika and glasnost) of
the Soviet Union, Cuba’s economy, financial system and military power were heavily
dependent on the USSR and its allies. 4 '' For example, prior to the collapse of the Eastern
Bloc 85 percent of Cuba’s trade was with the Soviet Union.43 Consequently, as reforms
increased in the Warsaw Pact countries, Cuba’s trade with those countries declined
substantially, weakening the Cuban economy.
Castro was forced to institute austerity measures as Soviet aid and subsidies were
terminated. Emphasizing the temporary nature of these measures, he referred to this time
as the “Special Period in Time of Peace.” From 1989 to 1993 Cuba’s GDP declined by 35
percent.
44
Massive economic ills and resulting shortages of most goods and services
caused an increase in political dissent and growing efforts by the regime to suppress it.
In an attempt to halt the free-fall, Castro began another round of economic
liberalizations after 1993. Changes included allowing the existence of small-scale private
companies, legalizing the U.S. dollar, freezing wages, reducing the state bureaucracy,
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instituting personal income tax on independent activities and taxes on luxury items such
as liquor and tobacco. These changes helped to turn the economy around. In 1993 the
state had a budget deficit of 33.5 percent but by 1994 it was operating with a 7.4 percent
surplus. 5 The economy continued to recover, but anemically, throughout the 1990s.
However, these changes have had side-affects. Tourism, no longer sugar, is
Cuba’s primary source of hard currency. Remittances from relatives in the U.S. and
foreign investment help to fill the void left by the end of transfers from the Soviet
Union. Ten years later Cuba was still experiencing unemployment and increasing
income disparities due to the legalization of the dollar and the introduction of market-
based features. It is now common for well
-educated doctors and teachers to earn
significantly less than the waiters and chamber-maids working in the tourist hotels. Thus,
directly and indirectly the demise of the Soviet Union led to profound changes in the
society as well as the economy.
Other areas of Cuban society also underwent meaningful changes during this
turbulent period. The end of Soviet military aid catalyzed changes in Cuba’s military and
foreign policies. The number of people in the armed forces declined both because the
regime could no longer afford them and because Cuba was no longer participating in
foreign conflicts.
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Civil society has also changed in Cuba. The church has regained some of its
status. Even by the late 1980s the conflict between the Castro regime and the church had
diminished. By the early 1990s the regime had eliminated its policy of official atheism.
This process was amplified during the preparations for the visit of Pope John Paul II in
1998. In the lead-up to the visit, Castro allowed the Church to communicate directly with
the people of Cuba on television and in the newspapers for the first time in over three
decades. He made other concessions including giving his permission for direct charter
flights originating in the United States to touch down on the island, providing some
additional transportation for Cubans wishing to go to a papal mass and allowing more
priests and nuns to transfer to Cuba.49 Despite these changes, the tension between the
Catholic Church and the Castro regime remains, as many of the restrictions on religious
freedoms in Cuba have not been eliminated. 50
Conclusion
A number of themes recur throughout Cuban history. The numerous failed bids
lor independence have contributed to a strong sense of frustrated nationalism on the
island. The defeat of Cuban independence efforts in 1815, the 1860s, in 1895, and again
in 1933 have made the Cubans intensely protective of their sovereignty. The repeated
American interventions heighten their resolve. Yet, even after Fidel Castro took power,
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the island remained very vulnerable to forces beyond its borders. In an attempt to purge
American influence Castro threw Cuba into the hands of the Soviets, inadvertently
placing Cuba in the center of great power politics and attracting the attention of the
world. Though, only a small country, Cuba has garnered more attention than many larger
and more powerful countries, making Cuban independence that much more difficult to
maintain.
Many scholars have described and analyzed Cuban history. Some have written
thousands of pages about this island. In contrast, this chapter has presented a very brief
synopsis of Cuba’s long and complex history. However, most students of Cuban history
will agree that this island s past has been profoundly influenced by peoples beyond its
borders. The next chapter looks at the history of Cuba’s relationship with two of the
countries that have influenced the course of Cuban history.
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CHAPTER 3
U.S. AND CANADIAN RELATIONS WITH CUBA:
A HISTORY OF DIFFERENCES
Introduction
From the earliest points in Canadian and American history, these two countries
have had very different relationships with Cuba. Even prior to the 1898 war the United
States was actively involved in domestic level Cuban politics and was heavily invested
financially in the island. In contrast, though always having a presence of one sort or
another in Cuba. Canadian involvement was, in comparison, minimal and understated.
This chapter begins by chronicling the long and tumultuous relationship between the
United States and Cuba. It then reviews the quiet, yet often controversial, relationship
between Canada and the island nation. This chapter provides the background to the
analyses of both bilateral relationships undertaken in the rest of this study.
U.S. -Cuban Relations: A Short History
Extremes of closeness and animosity have characterized U.S.- Cuban relations.
Even when Cuba was a Spanish colony, the U.S. was developing ties to the island.
During the American War of Independence, trade flourished between Cuba and the
United States. Over the next one hundred years, commercial ties between the Spanish
colony and the U.S. broadened. Americans became involved in many sectors of the
Cuban economy. For example, Americans participated in almost all aspects of the
construction of the Cuban railroad in 1 830s. By the middle of the nineteenth century the
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volume of Cuba’s trade with the United States had surpassed trade with Spain, and most
of the island’s main export crop, sugar, was destined for the American market. 1
The United States was also interested in closer political and strategic ties with this
Spanish colony and attempted to purchase Cuba from Spain beginning in the early 1 800s.
In 1808 President Jefferson offered to buy the island because the United States believed
that Spain, embroiled in the Napoleonic wars, could not maintain adequate control over
the colony. The southern states were particularly interested in adding Cuba to the union
since Cuba was obviously pro-slavery. The idea of annexation to the United States grew
popular with Cuban planters in the mid- 1800s because they thought the institution of
slavery, and consequently, their wealth, would be protected if Cuba joined the United
States. This movement in Cuba coincided with a campaign in the United States, urging
the government to obtain Cuba under the rubric of manifest destiny. Cuba became an
issue in the 1848 presidential election. During this period, the United States made
numerous offers to purchase the island from Spain.2
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the American people and their
government were heavily invested in Cuba. American interest in Cuba had grown
throughout the century. American jingoism was directed toward the island. Annexation
was frequently put forth as not only a possibility but often presented as a natural
evolution of the relationship and U.S. investors saw their future in the expanding Cuban
economy.
1
See Leland Hamilton Jenks, Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar (New York: Vanguard Press,
1928), 18-40, and Michael Kryzanek, U.S. - Latin American Relations, 3rd ed. (Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger Publishers, 1996), 40.
2
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This interest culminated in the American involvement in Cuba's war with Spain
in 1898. The struggle for independence that began in 1895 destroyed property in Cuba
without regard for the citizenship of the owner. It was also catastrophic in human terms.3
By 1898, reports of the devastation appeared daily in American newspapers.4 Though
annexation was debated in the United States, the McKinley government stopped short of
outright annexation. That option was effectively removed by the Teller Amendment to
the American declaration of war, that stated that Cuba would not become a U.S. colony,
leading the United States to pull out of Cuba in 1902.
However, the influence of the United States on the island did not abate and
annexation was considered a likely possibility. In fact, the American settlers in Cuba
counted on it. Many had based their decision to come to the island on the belief that Cuba
would soon become a state. Carmen Diana Deere explains that the number of American
colonies in Cuba almost doubled between 1903 and 1913. The sixty-four American
colonies present on the island in 1913 were for the most part dedicated to growing fruit
and vegetables sold to the United States. 5
Furthermore, Cuban economic dependence on the United States continued to
grow. The United States-Cuban Reciprocity Treaty gave Cuban exports to the U.S. a
trade advantage by reducing tariffs on goods from Cuba by 20 percent. The treaty
3
Jenks, 43-45.
4
Jenks, 50.
5 Carmen Diana Deere, “Here Come the Yankees! The Rise and Decline of the United States
Colonies in Cuba, 1 898-1930,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 78 4 (November 1998): 729-765.
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influenced further American investment in the sugar industry. 6 Within ten years of the
treaty American investment in Cuba made up almost 20 percent of the total of American
investment in all of Latin America, and most of that was invested in Cuban sugar. 7 The
United States also had investments in other areas such as produce, tobacco, cattle and
railroads, among others. 8
During the occupation the U.S. government had attached the Platt Amendment to
the Cuban constitution, which gave Cuba the status of an American protectorate. The
United States intervened again in 1906 in order to suppress a rebellion. Washington
remained officially in control of Cuba until 1909 but American influence over the
political affairs of the island continued unabated after the end of this second intervention.
For example, an American General, Enoch Crowder, was one of the most influential
people in Cuban politics during the first quarter of the century. He established the
electoral system put in place in 1909 and, as the U.S. envoy to the island a decade later,
he had considerable influence over the government of President Alfredo Zayas (1921-
1925). Crowder forced Zayas to reorganize his cabinet and appoint people acceptable to
Crowder and the United States. 9
The United States played an integral role in the fall of President Machado in 1933
and in the rise of General Fulgencio E. Batista y Zaldivar. Philip Dur and Christopher
6
Deere, 738.
7
Thomas, 536.
8
Jenks, 162.
See Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change,
1920-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001) for an in-depth account of this
period in Cuba history.
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Gilcrease maintain that the American Ambassador, Sumner Welles, was the architect of
the events of 1933 and 1934 in Cuba. For example, they argue that Welles engineered the
overthrow of Machado and hand picked Cespedes as the next president. 10
After 1933, power in Cuba belonged to General Batista, who had secured the
support of the United States early in his political career. Though he was only
intermittently Cuba’s president, Batista and the army controlled Cuban politics from then
until Castro’s forces removed him from power in 1959.
Under Batista, American political and economic influence in Cuba was enormous.
The Cold War increased Batista’s value in Washington since he was an ardent
anticommunist and consistently supported American foreign policy goals. In 1958, the
American Embassy in Havana reported that the Batista government, “has a record of
excellent cooperation and solidarity with the United States in the international field on all
issues of major importance. Cuban representatives have on occasion taken the lead in
opposing Communism and in advocating policies and courses of action desired by the
United States.” 11
Just as his regime was pro-American in politics, Batista’s Cuba was also friendly
to American economic interests. During the first half of the twentieth century, Americans
owned large tracts of real estate, including as many as half of the sugar plantations. 12 The
Great Depression had dramatically diminished trade between the two countries and
10
Philip Dur and Christopher Gilcrease, “US Diplomacy and the Downfall of a Cuban Dictator:
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1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 47
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reduced American economic ties to Cuba. Under Batista, the United States sought to
regain those losses.
Though the economic connections never reached the earlier levels, much was
done to strengthen the ties. Tariffs were lowered to permit increased trade, raising the
value of U.S. imports from under 23 million in 1933, to 81 million in 1940. 13 By that
time, almost 65 percent of Cuba’s imports came from the United States. 14 Due to low
tariffs on Cuban sugar and the American decision to allot Cuba a large percentage of the
US sugar market at a premium price, Cuban sugar exports became highly dependent on
the American market. 15 Similarly, though the amount of American investment in Cuba
was lower than it was three decades earlier, it was also on the rise in the 1950s. Batista’s
regime was particularly generous to American firms, exempting them from many of the
taxes paid by investors. 16 In 1959, Americans had one billion dollars invested in Cuba. 17
Although officially sovereign, Cuba was, for economic purposes, just as dependent on the
United States in this era as it was when American forces occupied the island after the
Cuban war of independence.
13
Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-
1940 (Chapel Hill: The University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2001), 135.
' 4
Juan M. Del Aguila, “Development, Revolution, and Decay in Cuba,” in Latin American Politics
and Development, 4th ed. Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 383.
Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safefor Revolution: Cuba 's Foreign Policy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 18989), 9.
16
Morley, 50.
17
Juan M. Del Aguila, Cuba: Dilemmas ofa Revolution , 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994),
55.
63
While the American government eventually became concerned about Batista’s
abuse of power, they did not support the revolution led by Fidel Castro. Consequently,
they greeted Castro’s early months in office with apprehension. The initial relationship,
while strained, was not openly antagonistic. On January 7, 1959 the United States
recognized the Cuban government but had serious reservations about Fidel Castro. 18
Philip Bonsai, who had replaced Earl T. Smith as the new ambassador in Havana, was
instructed by the State Department to be “cool and distant” to the new regime. 19
Events such as the 1959 agrarian reform and the warming of Cuban- Soviet
relations from 1960 onwards were viewed with increasing suspicion in the United States.
After American companies in Cuba refused to process crude oil that the regime had
bought from the Soviet Union, Castro responded by expropriating the companies. The
nationalization of U.S. owned oil companies worsened an already tense situation. The
U.S. response, to suspend Cuba’s sugar quota, was regarded by Castro as an act of
economic war. In retaliation, he nationalized the remaining American assets. 20 By this
time the rhetoric between Havana and Washington had become fairly confrontational as
the U.S. accused Castro of Communist leanings and he claimed the U.S. was behind an
explosion on a ship in the Havana harbor that was full of arms purchased by his regime. 21
18
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In October of 1960, the United States imposed an economic embargo on Cuba,
restricting trade on all products except for food and medicine. This measure became the
cornerstone of American policy during this early period. Referred to as a “program of
economic dental,” the embargo sought to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of
“keeping” Cuba in their alliance, make it difficult for Castro to export revolution and to
demonstrate to the Cuban people that communism was not a viable option for their
country. The United States closed their Havana embassy in January 1961. The table
below demonstrates the effect of the embargo on US-Cuban trade by comparing it to
Canadian trade with Cuba for the same years.
Table 1 : Canadian and American Merchandise Trade with Cuba
1955 1960 1970 1980 1990
United States (US $)
Exports to Cuba 458 million 225 million 0 0 1 .4 million
Imports from Cuba 422 million 357 million 0 0 0
Canada (CDN $)
Exports to Cuba 14 million 13 million 59 million 163.5 million 170 million
Imports from Cuba 10 million 7 million 9.5 million 416.5 million 130 million
, o ~ * vii uuu i iviv^rvcima, u unciClu-^ UOu
Relations (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997); and The Canadian-American Committee of the
Private Planning Association of Canada and the National Planning Association, USA. “Canada’s Trade
with Cuba and Canadian-American Relations.” (February 6, 1961).
Between 1959 and 1962, approximately 250,000 Cubans who were outraged by
Castro’s reforms, left the island to live in the United States. 23 While tensions were
escalating between Washington and Havana these exiles had begun a campaign against
22
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the Castro regime, which included bombing targets in Cuba from planes launched from
Florida. Castro’s accusation that the United States supported the exiles was accurate. As
the tension increased between Washington and Havana, the CIA, under President
Eisenhower, had begun to aid the exiles by providing arms, supplies, and training.24 With
U.S. assistance the leaders of the different Cuban groups formed the Cuban
Revolutionary Council. Since Washington wanted Castro overthrown but did not want
Amencan troops involved, they assisted the exiles to plan and execute the invasion that
would take place in April of 1961. On April 17, the exile army landed at a beach on the
Bay of Pigs but were quickly defeated by the Cuban army led by Castro.
Despite the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA continued its efforts to
oust Castro from power. However, they never again attempted an invasion, replacing
military force with covert measures including attempting to assassinate Fidel Castro on
multiple occasions. The Alliance for Progress (an extensive economic and military aid
program directed at Latin America) was another major tool in the Kennedy
administration's Cuba policy. This program sought to limit the influence of Cuba in Latin
America with massive infusions of aid to countries in the region.
In 1962, when the Americans discovered that the Soviets had installed medium-
range missiles in Cuba, the island became the center of an intense superpower
confrontation. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, after a
tense 13 days, resolved the crisis without any consultation with Castro. President
Kennedy said that the U.S. would refrain from invading Cuba, end the naval blockade,
~4 Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit ofFreedom (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971),
1301.
66
and remove the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey25 and Khrushchev agreed to
remove the missiles from Cuba. Nevertheless, the United States tightened the embargo,
preventing Americans from visiting Cuba and forbidding all trade with the island.
However, the embargo did not prevent Cubans from coming to the United States.
The 1 966 Cuban Adjustment Act made it easier for Cubans to become legal U.S.
residents. The U.S. government also aided the Cuban exiles economically. Money, often
from the CIA, was given to assist Cuban businesses and to provide for families of the
men fighting Castro.
26 Cuban immigrants were also the beneficiaries of a special refttgee
program that included food and financial assistance. 27 Over the next decade, hundreds of
thousands of Cubans made their way to the United States. They came by boat and via the
Freedom Flights program that lasted until 1973.
In the mid-1970s, it appeared as though change in U.S.-Cuban relations was
imminent. The Ford administration began secret talks with the Castro government.
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William Rogers, and the
Assistant to the Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleberger, met with Cuban officials on
numerous occasions in an attempt to normalize relations. However, in 1975 the talks
broke off over Cuba’s military and financial support of the Neto government of Angola. 28
25
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President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) was particularly interested in rapprochement
and made numerous moves toward warming the relationship. His administration halted
reconnaissance flights over Cuba, negotiated fishing and maritime agreements with the
regime, and once again, permitted Americans to travel to the island.29 In 1977, Cuba and
the United States opened interest sections in each other’s countries. However, it was not
long before the relationship began to cool off because of the regime’s continued
involvement in African conflicts.30 Any movement toward normalization was put on
hold.
The 1980 mass migration of over one hundred thousand Cubans to the United
States, referred to as the Mariel exodus, increased the tension between Havana and
Washington. The exodus was the result of disillusionment with the economic
difficulties of life on the island, especially when compared to the lives of their friends and
relatives living in Florida. During the prior year, almost one hundred thousand Cuban
Americans had visited the island, bringing with them stories of a good life in the United
States and gifts of consumer goods unavailable to average Cubans.
The exodus was sparked by an incident at the Peruvian embassy in Havana. Peru
granted asylum to a group of Cubans who, in their attempt to enter the embassy, had shot
39 W. Raymond Duncan, “Cuba-U.S. Relations and Political Contradictions in Cuba,” in Conflict
and Change in Cuba, Enrique A. Baloyra and James A. Morris, eds. (Albuquerque, NM: University ofNew
Mexico Press, 1993), 215-241.
30 A senior US government official with the Carter administration told the author that President
Carter was very interested in normalization. He stated that the administration’s subsequent focus on Cuban
involvement in Africa was the result of pressure from those within the government who did not want to see
warming of relations between the US and Cuba. Confidential interview conducted by the author in
Washington DC, 2000.
31
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1 987) for an interesting and informative discussion of the Mariel exodus.
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a Cuban guard. The Castro government retaliated by removing the guards around the
Peruvian embassy, essentially allowing Cubans to leave the country via Peru’s embassy.
Thousands of Cubans made their way to the embassy, overwhelming the Peruvian
authorities. The numbers also surprised the regime and created an intolerable situation for
the Cuban government. The ten thousand Cubans that descended on the compound
created havoc in Havana. The government had promised the people they could leave.
They began an airlift but, according to Wayne Smith, the head of the U.S. Interest
Section at the time, that seemed to play into the hands of the Americans as they could use
the refugees as evidence of the dissatisfaction in Cuba but not have to deal with the
human flood themselves.
The decision to open the port of Mariel to small boats was also in retaliation for
the American refusal to condemn marine hijackings began in October 1979 by Cubans
attempting to secure a way to Florida. The Cuban government had asked that the United
States prosecute the Cuban hijackers. Washington had refused and allowed the hijackers
to enter the United States as ‘normal' Cuban immigrants. More hijackings occurred. The
United States continued to welcome the hijackers as immigrants. The Cubans warned the
United States that inaction on this issue might result in opening a port for Cubans bound
for the United States. Washington had still not taken action when the Peruvian embassy
was flooded with Cubans in April of 1980. Washington had further aggravated the Cuban
government by using the affair as further evidence of the political and economic failures
ot the Cuban regime. Thus, Havana ended the airlift and announced that small boats
could come to the port of Mariel to transport Cubans to the United States. The resulting
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exodus that lasted until September of 1980 brought 120,000 additional Cubans to the
United States.
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought even more tension to the bilateral
relationship. Washington’s approach toward Cuba under the Reagan, and subsequent
Bush, administration remained antagonistic. In an effort to communicate directly with the
Cuban populace, the Reagan administration approved Radio Marti in 1985. Based on
Voice of America, it broadcast anti-Castro, pro-American radio programming into Cuba.
In 1990 the Bush administration followed with TV Marti.32
The next major milestone in U.S.-Cuban relations came in 1992 with the passage
of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). This act, also known as the Torricelli Bill,
contained both positive and negative inducements for change in Cuba. It tightened the
embargo by attempting to prevent subsidiaries of American companies located in other
countries from doing business with Cuba; prevented ships that had stopped in Cuba in the
past 180 days from entering U.S. ports; and made it difficult for any country providing
aid to Cuba to receive American aid or to qualify for free trade deals with the United
States; and increased the disincentives for Americans to illegally visit the island.33 It also
contained provisions to increase “people-to-people” contact between Americans and
Cubans and to strengthen Cuban civil society. Known as Track II, this part of the
Torricelli Bill authorized the resumption of telephone and direct mails services with the
32
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island, allowed private entities to deliver medicine and food to Cuba, as well as ensured
additional support for TV and Radio Marti.
During his election campaign, William Clinton had pledged support for the CDA.
and for the first couple of years of his administration he did not attempt to alter the basic
framework established under the act. Soon after he assumed office, immigration issues
took center stage in the relationship. In the spring and summer of 1994, numerous
Cubans, determined to immigrate to the United States due to the severe economic crisis
in Cuba, resorted to hijacking boats visiting Cuban ports. Castro, frustrated by his
inability to guarantee the safety of ships in the Bay of Havana and by the apparent refusal
of the United States to discourage these departures, removed restrictions on Cubans
leaving the country. As he expected, this prompted thousands to take to boats and rafts
and set out for U.S. shores.
This influx of Cubans now threatened to become a major American immigration
fiasco along the lines of the 1980 Mariel exodus. The Clinton administration, attempting
to put a lid on the growing crisis in Florida, announced a major change to a long
entrenched immigration policy. Under the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans
attempting to reach the U.S. were automatically granted asylum. After the repeal of this
act by Clinton, the Coast Guard no longer assisted Cuban rafters to reach the United
States. Instead they began to intercept them at sea and transport them to the U.S. naval
base at Guantanamo. The outcome of this crisis was a new immigration agreement
between the U.S. and Cuba. Under this 1994 accord, the Castro regime agreed to prevent
Cubans from setting out for American shores and the U.S. agreed to accept a minimum of
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20,000 Cubans each year. Another agreement, signed in 1995, stipulated that from then
on the United States would return Cuban rafters intercepted at sea.
Cuban Americans were upset with the new immigration policy and after a
meeting with representatives of the Cuban American community, the Clinton
administration announced a series of changes to the policy that would mollify the
community. These included greater restrictions on travel and cash remittances to the
island as well as increased support for Radio and TV Marti broadcasts. 34
Despite these changes it appeared as though policy toward Cuba would emphasize
measures contained in Track II of the CDA. In 1995, Clinton chose Richard Nuccio,
Torricelli s former aide, as special advisor on Cuban affairs to both the State Department
and the White House. Nuccio, who drafted the CDA for Torricelli, was the driving force
behind the innovative provisions to strengthen Cuban civil society. 35 Also in 1995,
Clinton announced changes to Cuba policy that would strengthen the links between
American and Cuban civil societies. 36
At this time, the Clinton administration opposed tightening the embargo,
including the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (also known as the
Helms-Burton bill) making its way through Congress. In an interview on CNN on April
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13, 199^ the President stated that he thought that Helms-Burton was unnecessary.37 As
the year began to draw to a close, the administration became more vocal against the bill.
According to Dan Fisk, Clinton instructed the State Department to attempt to kill the bill
before it reached his office. Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, conveyed his
opposition to the bill to the House Speaker, Newt Gingrich.38 It seemed as though the bill
did not have much of a chance.
However, the events ot February 24, 1996, changed the outlook for the bill. On
that day, Cuban planes shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes. Four members of
this Miami-based, Cuban American group that had been conducting flights over Cuba to
distribute anti-Castro flyers were killed in the downing. In response, the Clinton
administration announced it would support Helms-Burton. Thus, the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity {Libertad) Act was signed into law on March 12, 1996. This act
authorizes penalties on foreign companies that conduct business in Cuba; allows U.S.
citizens to sue foreigners for attempting to profit from property that was owned by
Americans prior to it being seized by the Castro regime; and prohibits those foreigners
from entering the United States. The provision to sue foreigners has been consistently
suspended by Presidents Clinton and Bush every six months.
In 1998, following the visit of Pope John Paul II to Cuba, President Clinton
authorized the resurrection of the licensing of direct humanitarian flights between the two
countries, re-instated remittances at 1994 levels, and made it easier to sell medicine to
37
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Cuba.” In 1999, Washington implemented farther changes to the policy. President
Clinton permitted all U.S. residents, not just those with family in Cuba, to send money to
Cuban citizens; sanctioned more direct flights to Cuba from additional American airports;
allowed the resumption of direct mail service between the U.S. and Cuba; increased the
categories of groups allowed to participate in two-way exchanges with Cubans; and
authorized food sales to nongovernment groups in Cuba.40
In 1999, the focus of U.S.-Cuban relations took a detour. The plight of Elian
Gonzalez, a small boy who lost his mother and the other Cubans he was traveling with
when his boat sank off the coast of Florida in November, had gained international
attention and became the symbol of U.S.-Cuban enmity. Elian Gonzalez was turned over
by U.S. Immigration (INS) to his relatives living in Miami, causing an international
custody incident that would wage well into the next year. The decision of Attorney
General Janet Reno to support the INS decision to return the boy to his father in Cuba,
caused a rift between the Cuban-American community and the Clinton administration.
Reverberations from this decision continued to have consequences for the bilateral
relationship over the next few years.
Since 2000 there have been further developments in U.S.-Cuban relations. The
crucial role of Florida in the 2000 presidential election; the election of a Republican
President; the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington; the charges that Cuba
supports bioterrorism; and former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to the island, are among
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the events that have continued to shape the relationship between these two countries since
2000. The relevance of these recent developments will be discussed in subsequent
chapters and what they mean for the future of U.S.-Cuban relations will be addressed in
the conclusion.
Canada’s Cuba Policy: A Brief History
Canada s early relationship with Cuba mirrored its relationships with most Latin
American countries at the time. Since the British officially controlled Canadian foreign
policy until 1931, Canada could not direct its political affairs with the states in the
hemisphere. Consequently, Canada’s initial interactions with the countries of Latin
America were dominated by economic exchanges.
In comparison to the U.S.-Cuban relationship, Canada’s relationship with Cuba
has enjoyed a rather quiet history. That is not to say that Canadians do not have a long
history with Cuba. Samuel de Champlain spent a few months exploring Cuba in 1601
before he went on to found New France (present day Quebec). Canadians fought in the
ten years war and in the 1 895-1898 war of independence. 41 One Canadian, William
Ryan, was appointed brigadier general in the ten years war. He transported men and war
materials between New York and Cuba, and after being captured in 1873, was executed
by the Spanish. 42
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Though the number of Canadians in Cuba and the level of involvement of
Canadians in the Cuban economy paled in comparison to the intensity and scope of the
American connection to the island, Canadians did have an interest in Cuba prior to
Castro s revolution. Canadians, along with Americans, Germans, English and
Scandinavian, were among the many farmers who settled in Cuba in the early nineteenth
century.
43
For example, in the 1920s a large group of Canadian farmers moved to Cuba to
grow tropical fruit. Their colony lasted until a hurricane hit the island in 1926. Canadians
had also invested in Cuban sugar. For example, in 1915 one of the three new centrales,
the large social and economic hubs surrounding sugar production and distribution formed
by the union of large plantations, was Canadian. 44 Canadian financial institutions were
also active in Cuba prior to the revolution. Both the Royal Bank and the Bank ofNova
Scotia had many branches in Cuba. The Royal Bank was the largest commercial bank in
Cuba in 1950. Also by the 1950s, Canadian insurance companies held a majority of
Cuban insurance policies.45
Trade considerations dominated the relationship in its early period. Cuban rum
and sugar were traded for Canadian lumber and other natural resources. After
Confederation trade between the countries continued. Overall, trade increased steadily in
the first quarter of the twentieth century. In 1902 Canada exported US$265,000 worth of
goods to Cuba and imported US$396,000 in Cuban goods from the island. By 1910 these
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figures were US$1,871,000 and US$1,259,000 and by 1925 they had reached
US$8,619,000 and US$6,455,000 respectively.46 The depression years and Canadian
sugar protectionism in the 1930s resulted in a decline in trade. However, the disruption in
European exports caused by the Second World War once again increased bilateral trade
between the two countries. By 1950, the value of Canada’s exports to Cuba had reached
Cnd$17.5 million.47
Canada established diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1945 and exchanged
ambassadors in 1950. When Fidel Castro’s rebel movement overthrew the government
of Fulgencio Batista in 1959, the Canadian government was clearly surprised. Reports
from the Canadian embassy prior to the revolution describe Castro as somewhat mad, his
group as relatively weak and the government as “virtually impregnable.”48 Despite these
inaccurate assessments and Ottawa’s apparent willingness to discount Castro, officially
the Canadian government recognized his revolution as legitimate and consequently
maintained normal relations with the new regime.
Canadian economic interests were treated very favorably by the Castro regime.
Cuban officials cited the “excellent political, social and economic relations between
Canada and the Cuban revolutionary government,” as a reason for exempting many
46
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Canadian companies and individuals from the expropriations
.
49
John Kirk and Peter
McKenna believe the preferential treatment was “ in essence because the revolutionary
government needed to retain a link with the West and obtain badly needed spare parts for
Cuban machinery. Thus, while American companies were being nationalized and U.S.
property was being expropriated, Canadian assets in Cuba were often protected or
mutually satisfying agreements were reached between the regime and Canadians. For
example, many Canadian property holders were not held to the limits of the Agrarian
Reform legislation. In addition, when all foreign banks were nationalized only two banks,
both of them Canadian, were exempted
.
51 One wealthy Cuban, recognizing the apparent
preferential treatment accorded to Canadians, asked the Canadian embassy to lease his
home to prevent it from being confiscated by the regime
.
52
Despite this preferential treatment, Canadian - Cuban relations were not overly
warm during this period. The Canadian government made it clear to the Cubans that their
loyalties were with the Americans and other NATO allies
.
53
Ottawa’s official policy was
to treat Cuba as a sovereign state.
49 Quoted in Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations, 46.
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Tension between Canada and the United States over Cuba grew as the hostility
between Washington and Havana increased. Ottawa was critical of the Bay of Pigs
invasion and did not believe Washington’s claim to be completely uninvolved in the
affair. The strain in Canadian-American relations about Cuba came to a head during the
Cuban missile crisis. When the United States discovered that the Soviets were installing
missiles in Cuba, Kennedy ordered Livingston Merchant, the American ambassador to
Canada, to obtain assurances from Prime Minister Diefenbaker (1957-1963) that Canada
would follow the NORAD agreement. Merchant wanted to be guaranteed that Canadian
forces would automatically reflect the level of readiness assumed by the American forces.
Diefenbaker and his cabinet refused to place the Canadian forces on the same
level of alert. The External Affairs Minister claimed that if Canada agreed to this U.S.
request then Canadians would “be their vassals forever.”54 Furthermore, Prime Minister
Diefenbaker implied that the American version of events was possibly unreliable and
recommended that the United Nations investigate to determine the actual facts.
At this time, Canada and Mexico were the only countries in the Americas that did
not acquiesce to U.S. demands to sever relations with Cuba in accord with the
hemispheric vote at Punta del Este in 1962. Canada’s next Prime Minister, Lester Pearson
(1963-1968), was much more willing to follow the American lead on other matters but
refused to significantly alter Canada’s policy toward Cuba. Pearson was careful not to
alter Canada’s official relationship with Cuba but he also did not encourage a closer
54
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relationship with Havana. Pearson’s relationship with Cuba has been characterized as
‘coldly correct.’ 55
In contrast. Prime Minister Trudeau (1968-1979; 1980-1984) was very interested
in warming relations between Havana and Ottawa. He was the first leader of a U.S. ally
to officially visit Castro in Cuba. 56 Castro and Trudeau developed a close relationship
that could be considered a friendship. After Trudeau’s death in 2000, Fidel Castro said, “I
remember him as one of the most decent men and one of the most outstanding statesmen
that I have met and I have met a lot of people. And the regard I felt towards him was like
that towards a member of the family. I didn’t just like him, I was very fond of him.”57
Prime Minister Trudeau was instrumental in expanding trade with the island. He
strongly believed that the transition to democracy in Cuba and elsewhere could be
furthered through trade. He developed trading connections with many Latin American
countries, which included right wing dictatorships as well as Cuba during his early years
in office. As a result, Canadian -Latin American trade expanded much during the 1970s.
In 1970 Canada exported $500 million worth of goods to Latin America. By 1980 this
figure had risen to $3,493 million. 58 Cuba was definitely part of this trend. Canadian
55
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exports to Cuba had increased from $58.9 million in 1970 to $421.8 million in 1980.59 By
1981 Cuba looked to Canada as its main non-Communist trading partner.60
Despite early attempts by Trudeau to move Canada and Cuba closer, the warming
trend could not weather the storm growing in Canada over Cuba’s involvement in Africa.
Trudeau came under increasing criticism from other quarters of the Canadian government
for maintaining his friendship with Castro while Cuban troops were involved in Angola.
Though Trudeau had repeatedly voiced his concern to Castro about Cuba’s role in the
African conflicts, he was pressured to make a change in official policy to register
Canada’s disapproval. After months of debate, it was finally decided that Canada would
suspend their aid program in Cuba to underscore Ottawa’s objection to the presence of
Cuban troops in Africa.
Prime Minister Mulroney (1984-1993) oversaw a shift in Canadian foreign policy
toward Latin America. At the urging of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe
Clark, Canada finally joined the Organization of American States, initiated more high-
level visits to the region and provided considerable funding to the Canada-Latin America
Forum (FOCAL). 61
However, Mulroney was widely recognized as being the most pro-American
Canadian Prime Minister. Mulroney’s oft-quoted line that: “Good relations, super
relations with the United States of America will be the cornerstone of our foreign policy”
59
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characterized his leadership. 62 Consequently, Cuba did not benefit from the increased
attention paid to the region by Ottawa. Mulroney’s approach toward Cuba was somewhat
reminiscent of Lester Pearson’s policy toward the island. He maintained diplomatic and
trade ties with Cuba while very carefhlly sending the message to Havana that Canada was
foremost an American ally. In 1989, a Canadian diplomat, Richard Gorham, described
Canada’s relationship with Cuba as:
correct, cordial and as close as can be expected for two such countries with
different outlooks and systems and security concerns... We are an ally of the
United States against possible threats from the Soviet Union - we are not
unaligned. 63
Thus, under Mulroney, Canadian-Cuban relations remained distant. However, after Jean
Chretien’s Liberal Party trounced the Conservative Party in the 1993 election, Ottawa’s
policy toward Cuba was one of the many policies the new government believed it had a
mandate to change.
The Canadian-Cuban relationship warmed during the first few years of Prime
Minister Jean Chretien’s (1993-) Liberal government. Official development assistance to
the island was reinstated in 1994. According to a 2002 Canadian government report,
since 1994 the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had granted almost
$65 million to Cuba in multilateral and bilateral initiatives. CIDA supports a large
6
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number of civil society-based ties including connections between Canadian and Cuban
universities and community organizations.64
Also, for the first time in decades, high-level Canadian officials visited Cuba. The
Speaker of the House of Commons, Gilbert Parent, personally took medical aid to Cuba
in 1 995. Lloyd Axworthy, Prime Minister Chretien’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs,
made a highly publicized trip to the island in early 1997. Then in 1998 the Prime Minister
himself met with Castro in Havana.
Trade between Canada and Cuba increased after the Liberal government came to
power in 1993. Trade between the two countries rose to Cnd $753 million in 2001, a
Table 2: Trade with Cuba. 1993-2002
Year
Canadian Total Exports
($ CND)
U.S. Total Exports
($ CND)
Canadian Total Imports
($ CND)
U.S Total
Imports
($ CND)
1993 146,210,248 3,206,518 171,501,193 0
1994 124,871,430 6,294,833 194,417,592 0
1995 279,375,855 8,023,822 320,914,410 0
1996 291,990,504 7,456,934 401,164,558 0
1997 364,054,484 13,142,477 353,126,763 0
1998 481,192,778 5,129,562 333,464,942 0
1999 396,911,298 6,648,792 305,201,552 964,770
2000 333,128,405 10,227,958 408,515,143 479,864
2001 394,325,217 10,619,949 361,275,529 8,617
2002 276,431,269 226,759,653 325,050,525 489,952
Source: Industry Canada, Trade Data Online (http://strategis.ic.gc.ca )
64
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Cnd $12 million increase from the year earlier, though less than the Cnd $817 million
traded in 1998. 65 Table 2 compares Canadian and American trade with Cuba from 1993
to 2002.
Canadian companies are especially active in the travel and tourism industry.
Canadian hotel and restaurant chains are common on the island, as are Canadian food and
beverages. Ottawa reports that Canadians are the single largest group of tourists in Cuba.
In 2001, 400,000 Canadian tourists visited Cuba. 66 Mining companies have also heavily
invested in the country. For example, Canadian Sherritt International, a nickel and cobalt
refining company, is one of the largest foreign investors in Cuba and consequently, was
one of the companies targeted by the American Helms-Burton legislation. 67 Overall,
Canada remains one of the top sources of foreign investment in Cuba. 68 See table 3 below
for the top investors in Cuba during the 1990s.
Trade was not the only focus of Canadian policy in the 1990s. The Chretien
government maintained that their policy of “constructive engagement” is the most
effective way to foster change in Cuba. This policy attempts to create linkages between
the people and government of Cuba and their Canadian counterparts in order to influence
65
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Cuba to open their economy, to give greater respect to human rights, and to encourage
the development of representative government. 69 In 1997, Ottawa and Havana signed a
Joint Declaration, which established cooperation between the two governments in a
number of areas including on human rights and good governance issues. 70
Table 3: Foreign Direct Investment in Cuba ($ U.S.)
Country Direct Investment in Cuba from 1 990 to March
1999
Canada
Mexico
Italy
Australia
South Africa
1.807.000.
000
1.806.000.
000
599.000.
000
500.000.
000
400.000.
000
Source: U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc. “Foreign Investment in Cuba”.
However, after the 1998 visit by Prime Minister Chretien to Cuba, relations
between Havana and Ottawa took a downturn. During that visit, the Canadian Prime
Minister personally raised the case of four dissidents that were scheduled to be tried in
Cuba. Castro ignored the Prime Minister’s request which lead to a suspension of visits
between the countries’ highest officials. Relations continued to deteriorate at the 1999
PanAmerican games held in Winnipeg. Fidel Castro accused the Canadian officials of
69
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many things including trying to disadvantage Cuba's teams and allowing sports scouts to
promote the defection of Cuban athletes. 71 In addition, some Cuban students attending
Canadian universities defected, C1DA programs in Cuba began to eneounter difficulties
and Canadian investment in the island started to decline.
Since 2000 there have been further developments in the Canadian-Cuban
relationship including Castro’s visit to Ottawa in 2000 for Pierre Trudeau’s funeral; the
rift between the two countries over Cuba’s exclusion from the Summit of the Americas
meeting in Quebec in 2001; and the visit in November 2002 by Denis Paradis, Secretary
of State for Latin America, Africa and La Francophonie, to Havana. These and other
recent developments will be highlighted in the concluding chapter of this study.
Conclusion
The previous two chapters have reviewed hundreds of years of history. Cuba, the
United States and Canada have changed enormously over the last few hundred years.
Canada and the United States have gone from colonial outposts to modem states. Cuba’s
history and development has been much more rocky and uneven than its’ northern
neighbors but the island has also dramatically transformed itself.
Though each country’s relationship with Cuba stretches back to the period when
all three were mere colonial holdings, it is possible to see foreshadows of the current
policies. For example, the repeated attempts of the United States to annex Cuba, their
involvement in Cuba’s war with Spain, and the Platt Amendment are evidence of the
71
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American perception of Cuban sovereignty and foretell much of the contemporary
approach including the Helms-Burton bill. The Canadian exemptions from many of
Castro’s first expropriations demonstrate the long history of amicable relations between
Havana and Ottawa. Likewise, the reasons for Canada’s decision not to support an
isolationist approach toward the regime in the 1960s are still relevant today. Though this
chapter has mainly served to provide a historical backdrop to the rest of the study, it also
demonstrates that parts of the contemporary policies have historical roots.
Both countries would like to see greater respect for human rights and democracy
on the island, but they have chosen very different means to that end. The United States
has used their economic and military power to attempt to force the end of Castro’s
“socialist experiment.” In contrast, Canada has used their ‘soft power” resources to
encourage a change within the Castro regime.
The Americans have economically and politically isolated the regime, sponsored
various plots to overthrow or assassinate Castro, and tried to pressure other countries to
impose sanctions on the regime. In contrast, Canada has sponsored numerous meetings
with Cuban officials to discuss the issues, actively pressed for academic and cultural
exchanges, given financial aid to the regime to support projects that they hope will lead to
improvements on the island, sponsored readmitting Cuba to international organizations,
and attempted to mediate between the United States and Cuba. Though especially
noticeable since 1959, the differences in approaches stretch back many years because, as
the next chapters will reveal, the two policies go to the heart of the identities and cultures
of the nations involved.
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CHAPTER 4
AMERICAN IDENTITY AND VALUES AND THEIR
INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY
Introduction
Scholars have studied the American identity for centuries but it has not received
the attention it deserves as an explanation for American actions on the world stage.
However, by definition, a state’s identity is integral to its policies toward others, since
identity “is the mechanism that provides individuals with a sense of self and the means
for comprehending the relationship ol the self to the external environment.” 1 All societies
have certain collective identities through which individuals in that society give their
actions meaning and through which they make sense of international and domestic
situations. Identities produce certain patterns of thinking and help construct behavior and
policy.
Scholars are now recognizing the connection between American identity and
foreign policy. Samuel Huntington, writing about American foreign policy asserts
“Efforts to define national interests presuppose agreement on the nature of the country
whose interests are to be defined. National interest derives from national identity. We
have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are.”2 John G. Ruggie
argues that American identity shaped America’s decisions regarding NATO security
1
Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, “Introduction: Tracing the Influence of
Identity on Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 8, 2/3 (Winter 1998/1999- Spring 1999), xi.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76, 5
(September/October 1997), 28.
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commitments, the features of the United Nations and US support for the European
Defense Community, among other things
.
3
Identity is now widely understood to have
influence over major American foreign policy decisions.
Americans generally see their country as not only the best country in the world
but, also as the embodiment of democracy, the champion of freedom and human rights
and the leader of the West. These representations are accepted as obvious and natural in
American foreign policy circles. This chapter will describe these crucial elements of
American identity and demonstrate how they have influenced US foreign policy. Many of
these elements of American identity are encompassed within the idea of American
exceptionalism.
The United States as an Exceptional Nation
The origins of the exceptionalist identity have been addressed by many scholars.
Louis Hartz argued that the American isolation from Europe and the lack of religious and
class conflict during the founding period created an American political culture that
emphasized individual liberty, equal rights, and government by consent. Fredrick
Jackson Turner argued that the American frontier that allowed individualism to flourish
was the basis of the American democratic tradition. Others have pointed out that religion
played a crucial role in the creation of the unique American identity. The first European
settlers in the United States had strong religious beliefs. These Puritans and other
Christians, believing that it was a state’s duty to enforce morality, built institutions with
3
John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utlitarianism and the Social
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52,4 (Autumn 1998); 855-885.
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religious overtones. Their conviction that the United States was favored by God,
contributed to the idea that the U.S. had a mission to spread its God-given values to
others. Theories about America’s historical experience, religious basis, and frontier past,
offer insight into the foundation of American political culture and identity.
Regardless of its origins, the belief that the United States is an exceptional nation
is firmly entrenched within the American self-consciousness and has contributed to the
development of U.S. foreign policy. One of the best articulations of exceptionalism was
voiced by John O Sullivan, a journalist and the author of Mainfest Destiny. The
following, written in 1845, encapsulates the most accepted ideas of exceptionalism:
Yes, we are the nation of progress, of individual freedom, of universal
enfranchisement. Equality of rights is the cynosure of our union of States, the
grand exemplar of the correlative equality of individuals; and while truth sheds its
effulgence, we cannot retrograde, without dissolving the one and subverting the
other. We must onward to the ful filment of our mission — to the entire
development of the principle of our organization ~ freedom of conscience,
freedom of person, freedom of trade and business pursuits, universality of
freedom and equality. This is our high destiny, and in nature's eternal, inevitable
decree of cause and effect we must accomplish it. All this will be our future
history, to establish on earth the moral dignity and salvation of man - the
immutable truth and beneficence of God. For this blessed mission to the nations
of the world, which are shut out from the life-giving light of truth, has America
been chosen; and her high example shall smite unto death the tyranny of kings,
hierarchs, and oligarchs, and carry the glad tidings of peace and good will where
myriads now endure an existence scarcely more enviable than that of beasts of the
field. Who, then, can doubt that our country is destined to be the great nation of
futurity?
4
To John O’Sullivan and many Americans since, the United States represents the best of
what a nation could aspire to be and was destined to lead other, lesser, nations.
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American exceptionalism asserts that the United States is unique and superior to
other countries due to its political system, economy, society, culture and values. This
identity contains a number of elements, including: that democracy and related values
such as freedom and other political rights are among the most important principles that
can be held by a state; and that the United States has achieved unparalleled success in
these areas. Exceptionalism also contains a missionary norm. It asserts that since the
United States is superior it has special rights and duties associated with promoting these
values internationally. The next part of this chapter highlights the relationship between
the elements of exceptionalism and foreign policy.
The United States as Superior
Alexis de Tocqueville first coined the term exceptionalism, but the notion that
America was unique and superior has roots in early American history. The first settlers
that arrived in present day New England believed they were creating a new, superior
society. In the seventeenth century, John Winthrop declared that this new world was a
City on a Hill, a model that others should follow. The people of America turned to
these ideas during their bid for independence. In Common Sense Tom Paine wrote: “We
have it in our power to begin the world over again.” These sentiments appear over and
over in documents from early American history.
Though most revolutionaries believe that they will create a superior society, these
sentiments are still articulated by American policy makers of the twentieth and twenty-
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first centuries. Before he was president,5 Woodrow Wilson contrasted the people of the
Philippines with Americans. He said “They are children and we are men in these deep
matters of government and justice. If we have not learned the substance of these things no
nation is ever likely to learn it...” President Ronald Reagan’s inaugural address quoted
John Winthrop's famous words. Reagan said that the United States was “shining city
upon a hill.”6 President George H. W. Bush Sr. declared that the Gulf War
demonstrated our special role as the world’s preeminent moral, political, economic, and
military power.” 7 This belief, bom in the days of John Winthrop, remains a stable
element of the American identity in the twenty-first century. The United States believes
that it is a special nation, superior to others, and consequently, that the U.S. has the
authority to judge other countries’ social, economic and political systems.
Democracy, Freedom and Human Rights
Americans are especially convinced that their political system is superior. This
belief has been embraced by all policy makers, regardless of political party. For example,
Republican President George Bush Sr. said, “For two centuries, America has served the
world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy.” In his 1993 Inaugural
Address, Democratic President William Clinton told Americans: “our greatest strength is
5 Woodrow Wilson, “The Ideals of America 1902,” in The American Intellectual Tradition : A
Sourcebook Volume II: 1865 to the Present (4
th
ed.) David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper, eds. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 123-130.
6
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7
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the power of our ideas, which are still new in many lands. Across the world, we see them
embraced, and we rejoice. Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every
continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause.”8
Michael Cox argues that Clinton’s focus on democracy promotion was in part, based on:
the American experience and the widely shared belief that the United States was
not just a successful democracy but a shining example for others to follow,
mton, in fact, was quite adamant that the character of a nation’s foreign policy
ad to reflect its core values: and there was nothing more important in the
American value system, he believed, than the principle of democracy.
9
The belief that the United States is the best example of democracy is firmly rooted in the
American identity and has furthered the emphasis on democracy and human rights in
foreign policy.
Democracy and freedom are considered important goals ofUS foreign policy by
Washington insiders and policy makers. Though also important to average Americans,
survey data indicates that support for democracy promotion does not trump most other
goals of American foreign policy. 0 However, democracy and human rights are not
dismissed by the public as unimportant foreign policy priorities. A 1995 survey asked:
“Here is an argument tor and against emphasizing democracy and human rights in our
8
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foreign policy. These values are what we stand for as a people and we must uphold them
in foreign policy. How close does this come to your own view?” Eight-four percent
answered that this came very or somewhat close to their view." Similarly, a 2003 Gallup
poll found that 86 percent of Americans said that they thought “promoting and defending
human rights in other countries” was a very important or somewhat important foreign
policy goal. That same poll also found that 75 percent of those asked said that “building
democracy in other countries” was a very important or somewhat important goal of
American foreign policy. 13 A June 2002, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR)
survey revealed that 90 percent said that “promoting and defending human rights in other
countries” should be an important goal. Forty-seven percent of those asked said this
should be a “very important” goal. 14 Thus, even though goals such as fighting terrorism
or preventing the spread of nuclear weapons rank higher than spreading democracy and
defending human rights, these goals are still important to the American public.
Democracy and its related values have been guiding principles of American
foreign policy for centuries. According to Tony Smith, since the United States intervened
in Cuba’s war with Spain in 1898, “no theme has figured more prominently in American
11
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foreign policy than the repeated presidential calls to promote the creation of democratic
governance abroad .” 15 Since the end of the Cold War and what is perceived to be the
triumph of American democracy, the United States has further embraced this element of
its identity
.
16
Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi agree that democracy
has become even more central to American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.
They state, “democracy promotion has rather neatly filled the missionary gap left behind
by the collapse of international communism.” 17 Thus, the perception is that as a superior
example of democracy, the US has a responsibility to promote the development of
democracy in other countries.
American Democracy: Liberalism and Open Markets
The American understanding of democracy, not surprisingly, resembles US style
liberal democracy. According to Tony Smith the “distinguishing mark of American
liberal democracy (even by comparison with other liberal democracies) has been a state
limited by strongly organized social forces acting through freely organized political
15 Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Strugglefor Democracy
in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
16
For a thorough treatment of the role of democracy in American foreign policy see Cox,
Ikenberry and Inoguehi eds. American Democracy Promotion.
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University Press, 2000), 1-17.
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parties.”
18 Tony Smith continues “[I]t is inevitable that the meaning of liberal democracy
in domestic American life should deeply mark the conduct of its foreign policy.” 19
Further, the United States sees democracy as intimately connected with free trade
and open markets. American foreign policy has historically espoused a laissez-faire
approach toward trade. Open economies are seen as incompatible with authoritarian
political systems. Economic and political development are thought to go together. In
1959 Seymour Martin Lipset argued that economic development resulted in a more
educated populace and a larger middle class, both of which he said were important to
democracy. 20 Though many of the assumptions made by the modernization school have
been called into question, the relationship between economic and political development
remains widely accepted by the architects of American foreign policy. American
democracy promotion, thus, attempts to encourage open economies and free trade along
side democratic institutions and values. The perception that true democracy does not vary
greatly from the American model, shapes U.S. foreign policy.
Exceptionalism in Action: A Missionary Foreign Policy
Both the importance placed on democracy and freedom, and the idea that the
United States represents the apex of these and other values, contributes to the norm that
18
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,
17.
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the United States is on an international mission to assist others to adopt similar political
and economic systems and values.
Since WWII Americans have consistently supported an active role for the United
States in world affairs. Though there have been periods when isolationism has been
preferred, polls as far back as the early 1950s reveal a preference for an active foreign
policy.
21
Recent polls indicate continued support for American involvement in world
affairs. In 2000, 78 percent of Americans agreed with the statement that “[bjecause the
world is so interconnected today, the US should participate in efforts to maintain peace,
protect human rights, and economic development.”22 In 2002, the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations asked “Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we
take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs.” Seventy-one
percent of those polled advocated that the United States take an active part in world
affairs.
23
The belief that the United States has a responsibility beyond its borders has been
contested by many leading figures. One of the most well-known advocates of
isolationism was John Quincy Adams, who in 1823, warned that the United States
should not go “abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.” He continued “[s]he is the well-
wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only
21
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of her own. Though contested by Adams and other prominent Americans such as
Henry Kissinger, much of the history of American foreign policy has been dominated by
an internationalist, missionary sentiment.
Americans perceive that it is their duty as the superior state to lead others. The
1950 articulation of U.S. Cold War policy, the then top secret, NSC 68, declares that the
United States has, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the
attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means
consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy.”25 Fifty years later, Secretary of
State, Madeleine Albright, reaffirmed that the United States had a “responsibility, as the
world's leading democracy, ... to work in partnership with others to help nations in
transition move to a higher stage of democratic development.”26 In 2003, President
George Bush told the American public:
Americas duty is familiar— Once again, this nation and all our friends are all
that stand between a world at peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm.
Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of all
mankind. And we accept this responsibility.27
The United States continues to believe it has a responsibility to lead, to assist other
countries to democratize and enhance human rights.
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A Recent History: Exceptionalism and Foreign Policy
These ideas encompassed by exceptionalism that were prevalent in the doctrines
and foreign policies of past centuries, have been just as relevant to the foreign policies of
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This section will briefly highlight the influence
of this identity and its related values and norms on American foreign policy over the last
one hundred years.
The decision of the United States to join the allies in World War I was, like most
major foreign policy decisions, based on numerous factors. However, there is
considerable evidence that American exceptionalism played a crucial role. It was
certainly used to justify American involvement. For example, in his War Message,
President Woodrow Wilson declared: “...we shall fight for the things which we have
always carried nearest to our hearts- for democracy, for the right of those who submit to
authority to have a voice in their own governments... the day has come when America is
privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth. .. God
helping her she can do no other.”28 He later argued that “America is necessary to the
peace of the world .”29 Though the United States entered an isolationist period after WWI
the values and beliefs inherent in exceptionalism remained influential (for example, the
United States still saw itself as a model for the rest of the world). After WWII American
28
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foreign policy again became charaeterized by a preference for active international
leadership.
Although Cold War policies were often dominated by other material and realist
goals, the ideas embodied by exceptionalism played a significant role in the period. The
American perception of their country as the leader of the “free world” and as the
exemplar of democratic governance translated into the foreign policy arena. Almost by
definition, American foreign policy championed democracy and defended freedom.
Many scholars have described the influence of these ideas on American foreign
policy during this period. Siobhan McEvoy-Levy argues that “[b]oth orthodox and
revisionist theories of the origins of the Cold War contain at their cores a conception of
American exceptionalism. In the orthodox view, the United States’ cause was the
righteous and inevitable one. Revisionist historians contended that exceptionalism was a
large part of the motivation for the United States’ aggressive expansion abroad.”30 The
editor of the World Policy Journal, James Chace wrote:
The other America, equally though often quixotically moral, is the America of
Woodrow Wilson and John Foster Dulles, the crusader nation prepared in 1917 to
"make the world safe for democracy" or to roll back communism by liberating
Eastern Europe in the Eisenhower-Dulles years. Even as the United States grew
from 13 colonies into creating a global imperium, with military bases flung far
across the world, American leaders could with some justification view this as the
fulfillment of Jefferson's "empire of liberty." True, the United States departed
time and again from moral behavior—covert action to ensure that governments
friendly to us did not become communist reached its apogee in the Eisenhower
years—but always our actions could be justified by appealing to the larger cause
of overthrowing Soviet oppression. Whatever wrongs we committed, surely, we
believed, they were in the service of a higher end—the establishment of
democracy and free markets, which would bring about prosperity for all and
Immanuel Kant's ideal of perpetual peace.
30
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In his analysis of American foreign policy, Howard Wiarda, maintains that in this period
the United States had three basic goals, one of which was to “stand firmly for democracy
and freedom.”31 In his analysis of American involvement in the Vietnam War Loren
Baritz writes “The myth of the city on a hill became the foundation for the ritualistic
thinking of later generations of Americans. This myth helped to establish nationalistic
orthodoxy in America. It began to set an American dogma, to fix the limits of thought for
Americans about themselves and about the rest of the world, and offered a choice about
the appropriate relationship between us and them.”32
These ideas appear over and over in both the public and classified documents and
in the rhetoric of the period. In 1945 President Truman declared that: “Whether we like it
or not, we must all recognize that the victory which we have won has placed upon the
American people the continued burden of responsibility for world leadership.”33 The
NSC 68 of 1950, then highly classified, refers to the “American responsibility” and
democracy and freedom.”34 The ideas of American exceptionalism were repeated in
similar documents and speeches throughout the early Cold War period.
31
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However, the Vietnam War raised serious doubts about the guiding principles
behind the conduct of the United States abroad. McEvoy-Levy argues that Vietnam
eroded the American belief in their exceptional character and in their desire to spread
their vision and “save the world.”35 Many other scholars have also described the effect of
Vietnam on U.S. policy in similar ways. Howard Wiarda asserts that, “Vietnam destroyed
the Cold War consensus and undermined the possibilities for an effective American
foreign policy... The result was a severe questioning of the basic foreign policy premises
that had drawn the United States into the war in the first place. Was it really democracy
and freedom that the United States was standing for in Vietnam?”36
The break with these ideas most clearly occurred during the Nixon and Ford
administrations. Henry Kissinger (1969-1977) believed that the United States should not
attempt to export its values but recognized that these ideas have had considerable
influence over American foreign policy. He explained:
...the singularies that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have
produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that
America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as
a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that America’s values impose on it
an obligation to crusade for them around the world.”37
Kissinger was convinced that the United States should limit itself to the first option. The
United States was still seen as a model for others to follow but Kissinger’ s views
35
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reflected the strong push for isolationism in the United States during this period. The
American failure in Vietnam drove foreign policy in that direction during the Nixon and
Ford presidencies.
However, it was not long before all the ideas embodied by American
exceptionalism reasserted themselves. Though many of the consequences of Vietnam
were long lasting, the break with exceptionalist thought was not permanent. Tony Smith
writes:
By the mid-1960s, following the setbacks in Indochina and the evident failure of
the Alliance for Progress, the voices calling for the promotion of democracy
abroad were momentarily stilled. By 1973, congressional opposition to what
many termed the ^morality’ of the foreign policy crafted by President Richard
Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, led to demands that
democratization be fostered in a variety of areas.... 38
McEvoy-Levy argues that President Carter renewed the idea of exceptionalism that was
eroded by the Vietnam War. He quotes Cartels May 1977 speech at Notre Dame. Carter
said, through failure [of Vietnam] we have now found our way back to our own
principles and values, and we have regained lost confidence.”39 Similarly in his 1977
inaugural address. Carter declared:
Ours was the first society openly to define itself in terms of both spirituality and
of human liberty. It is that unique self-definition which has given us an
exceptional appeal, but it also imposes on us a special obligation, to take on those
moral duties which, when assumed, seem invariably to be in our own best
interests.... The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there
can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of
a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane.
We are a strong nation, and we will maintain strength so sufficient that it need not
38
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be proven in combat-a quiet strength based
but on the nobility of ideas.40
not merely on the size of an arsenal.
Carter brought the ideas of American exceptionalism back into the American
consciousness and they quickly regained influence in foreign policy.
Though the results were dramatically different, President Ronald Reagan’s
policies were also informed by the idea of American exceptionalism. In his 1981
inaugural address. President Reagan, echoing Winthrop, referred to the United States as a
shining city upon a hill ’ that could “remake the world all over again.”41 The former U.S
Ambassador to the United Nations and one of the most important foreign policy
architects of the Reagan era, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, has described the intimate connection
between exceptionalism and foreign policy during this period. She asserted, “American
exceptionalism expresses the conviction that the U.S. has a moral mission which flows
out of its identity and which should guide its policies. Our exceptional character, which
was originally used to justify disdaining alliances and quarrels of the so-called old world,
has often been cited as the grounds to improve the world.
”
4
“ Tony Smith argued: “no
administration since Wilson’s has been as vigorous or as consistent in its dedication to
the promotion of democracy abroad as that of Ronald Reagan.”43
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The idea that the United States is an exceptional country and a leader of
democratic nations did not fade with the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Soviet
Union buttressed the notion of American exceptionalism. As Ole Holsti points out both
Presidents Bush and Clinton were devoted to America’s moral mission to expand
democracy. Holsti claims that these two presidents used their State of the Union
addresses and other means to direct American foreign policy in this direction. Both
believed that the United States should be committed to advancing democracy
worldwide. President George Bush Sr. told Americans on the eve of the Gulf War, that:
For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of
freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to
preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And, today, in a rapidly changing
world, American leadership is indispensable, Americans know that leadership
brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn
to us. We are Americans. We have an unique responsibility to do the hard work of
freedom. As Americans, we know there are times when we must step forward and
accept our responsibilities to lead the world away from the dark chaos of
dictators, toward the brighter promise of a better day . 45
James Baker, President Bush’s Secretary of State, called American foreign policy:
the compass of American ideals and values—Freedom, democracy, equal rights,
respect for human dignity, fair play - the principles to which I adhere... Finally
and above all, I believe, like Lincoln, that the United States has a special role in
this world, a special contribution to make—as he put it, “the last, best hope for
earth.”
46
Like many presidents before him, George H.W. Bush committed the United States to
these goals. Though his rhetoric often out paced many of his foreign policy decisions, his
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polices toward many countries including those of Eastern Europe reflected this
emphasis.47
The Clinton administration was also focused on the American mission. President
Bill Clinton claimed: “In an era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be
to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies.’’48
The ideas, values, and norms encapsulated by exceptionalism influenced a great deal of
American foreign policy during the twentieth century.
As the twenty-first century begins it appears as though these ideas will endure. In
2003 President George W. Bush declared:
Like other generations of Americans, we will meet the responsibility of defending
human liberty against violence and aggression. By our resolve, we will give
strength to others. By our courage, we will give hope to others. And by our
actions we will secure peace and lead the world to a better day.49
As the Head of U.S. Delegation to the Commission on Human Rights in 2003, Jeanne
Kirpatrick stated:
Why should we care that everyone has a right to life, liberty and security of
person that is respected by his government, that no one should be subjected to
arbitrary or brutal intrusions into his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to mendacious attacks on his honor or reputation? Why do we believe that
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, speech, conscience, religion,
including the right to change his religion or teach it to others? We believe in
these principles because they are the principles on which the United States of
America was founded, and by which we have lived and thrived. We believe they
are right for individuals and right for states.... Our Declaration states a dream and
47
See chapter eleven in Smith, America’s Mission for a discussion of the Bush presidency.
48
Bill Clinton, September 27, 1993. Quoted in Smith, America’s Mission, 311.
49
U.S. White House, “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat,” October 7, 2002
(www.whitehouse.gov ) March 16, 2003.
106
a doctrine of government by consent. An important part of the history of the
United States has been devoted to making a reality of this dream for all
Americans. As the world has shrunk, we have sought to share the dream beyond
our borders. For the United States, the enjoyment and protection of the rights
stipulated in our Declaration of Independence and institutionalized in our
Constitution lie at the heart of our identity as a nation. 50
Throughout American history the same themes have been echoed in American foreign
policy. The United States, as a special nation, politically, economically and socially
superior to others, has additional rights, and feels a responsibility to further democracy
and freedom worldwide.
The Missionary Zeal in the Western Hemisphere: A Special Case
The American missionary zeal has particularly shaped the course of U.S.- Latin
American relations. The countries of the Western Hemisphere are understood to be part
of the U.S. sphere of influence and are thus of special concern to the United States. The
rights and duties of the U.S., as expressed by exceptionalism, are intensified in this
sphere of influence. The Monroe Doctrine, delivered to Congress on December 2, 1 823
by the fifth president of the United States, declared that the American hemisphere was off
limits to European powers. President James Monroe justified this policy on the basis that
European countries were monarchies and thus could only have evil designs on the newly
independent countries of Latin America. In contrast, President Monroe asserted that since
the United States was a republic it did not pose a threat to its southern neighbors.
50
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In 1904, President Roosevelt reinterpreted Monroe’s message, giving the United
States the role of policeman in the hemisphere. The Roosevelt Corollary was the
embodiment of many of the elements of exceptionalism. It declared:
it follows that a self-respecting, just, and far-seeing nation should on the one
hand endeavor by every means to aid in the development of the various
movements which tend to provide substitutes for war, which tend to render
nations in their actions toward one another, and indeed toward their own peoples
more responsive to the general sentiment of humane and civilized mankind; and
on the other hand that it should keep prepared, while scrupulously avoiding
wrongdoing itself, to repel any wrong, and in exceptional cases to take action
which in a more advanced stage of international relations would come under the
head of the exercise of the international police. A great free people owes it to
itself and to all mankind not to sink into helplessness before the powers of evil. 51
As such the United States was the judge that determined that if:
a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in
social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear
no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence
which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in
America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation,
and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe
Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of
such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. 52
Thus, the United States was the civilized nation that had a duty to lead other nations,
especially its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.
Not only are Latin American countries within the ‘sphere of influence’ but
historically, they have also been considered inferior and thus, in need of U.S. guidance.
In Beneath the United States Lars Schoultz argues that “[a] belief in Latin American
51
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inferiority is the essential core of United States policy toward Latin America...”53 This
view has influenced American policy toward the region and has most certainly influenced
the history of U.S. interventionism in the region. The United States has consistently used
its foreign policy in an attempt to mold Latin America in its own image. For example, the
United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID) pressed for birth control
in these countnes (contrary to the Catholic tradition) during the 1970s and open markets
in 1980s.
54
Lars Schoultz explains the “U.S. Agency for international Development is
paying to install U.S. style adversarial criminal procedures in four different Latin
American countries.” He goes on to point out that creating Latin America in its own
image and seeing Latin America as inferior are two sides of the same American coin.
Schoultz illustrates “the government-funded National Endowment for democracy is
prepared to assist any Latin American country to hold a clean election, while no Latin
American country has ever offered to help the United States boost its low voter
turnout...”
55
The Americans have attempted to reconfigure Latin American political systems
into American style democracies although democracy means different things to Latin
Americans. Howard Wiarda points out the differences. For example, he shows that
welfarism is the most important feature of democracy in Uruguay and that strong
Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), xv.
1 Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, An Introduction to Latin American Politics and
Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 165.
55
Schoultz, xiii.
109
government often defines many conceptions of democracy in the region. Wiarda reminds
us that, “those, to North American ears, are very strange definitions of democracy and
smack of the statist, mercantilist, top-down, and paternalistic regimes of the past .”56 Steve
Smith similarly explains, “[o]ne of the main limitations ofUS democracy promotion is
that the policy has been accepted as universally applicable when in fact it is a culturally
and historically specific version of what democracy means.”57 Wiarda also points out that
the Western
-style elements of democracy that were imported or imposed on Latin
America by the United States and others, are encountering difficulty and putting much of
the region’s experiment with democracy in jeopardy.
Conclusion
Certainly, many other states espouse democracy and freedom and many believe
that their political and social systems are excellent, if not superior. However, the degree
to which these values and ideas influence US policy is unique. Henry Nau explains: “the
United States is not unique because its domestic democratic ideals influence its foreign
policy. It may be unique because its foreign policy promotes domestic ideals more self-
consciously than the foreign policy of other countries.”58 Nau continues, “...while the
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United States tends to moralize in foreign policy, Europe has a penchant to ideologize,
and Japan to commercialize foreign issues.”59 Owen Harries, an Australian diplomat, and
founder of an American foreign policy journal. The National Interest, compares the
influence of these ideas in the United States with similar ideas in other countries. He
writes:
What it translates into is the doctrine of American Exceptionalism: the belief that
America is exceptional, in the double sense that it is superior and that it is
different, not only in degree but in kind. This has been and is a powerful force in
the country.... One could multiply such examples over and over. Now it is true of
course, that other countries—France, Britain, Russia—have from time to time in
their history felt a sense of mission, of carrying their civilisation to other peoples
and territories. But in their cases it has been episodic and not deeply rooted—
usually limited to when their power was at its zenith and usually clearly
recognisable as a rationalisation for what they were doing for other reasons. In the
case of the United States, it has been constant and central
.
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From era of Alexis de Tocqueville to time of George W. Bush, exceptionalism has been a
constant and central element in American foreign policy.
The identity and role of the United States in the world as understood by
Americans has an indisputable influence over U.S. actions throughout the globe.
Americans see themselves as an exceptional country with special rights particularly in the
Western Hemisphere, but also globally. Foreign policy documents and official and
unofficial rhetoric repeatedly stress these same themes. Obviously, the United States
chooses to take certain actions on the world stage for many reasons, some decisions are
based primarily on strategic calculations or economic motives and have little do to with
59
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the ideas or values inherent in exceptionalism. However, scholars that emphasize these
factors and dismiss the influential role played by ideational variables are missing a
crucial piece of the puzzle. The next chapter will argue that this identity and the ideas,
cultures, values, and norms within it are crucial to the understanding of American policy
toward Cuba.
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CHAPTER 5
US CUBA POLICY
Introduction
A decade after the end of the Cold War the American relationship with Cuba
appears to be one of the last vestiges of this bygone era. Despite the much diminished
security threat posed by Cuba, this island country continues to be thought of as an enemy
of the United States and relations between the two countries remain tense. Although
having gone through various modifications since the early 1990s American policy toward
Cuba has remained, in its essence, the same approach adopted by President Kennedy at
the height of the Cold War. U.S. public opinion continues to have a significantly negative
association with Cuba. A 2001 Gallup poll showed that almost 70 percent of Americans
had an unfavorable opinion of Cuba. 1
This chapter explores the reasons why the United States’ policy toward Cuba has
developed in this way. To fully understand this policy it is necessary to problematize
many elements of the U.S.- Cuban relationship including Cuba’s status as a threat and the
power of the Cuban American community. Adopting a constructivist approach and
applying methods used by comparative politics scholars I will demonstrate that social
context matters.
Constructivists claim that we make or construct our realities. It is easy to see how
many things exist simply because humans have given them meaning. Concepts like
1
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marriage and sovereignty exist because we act like they do
.
2
John Searle refers to these
as social facts .
3
Other things are more than social facts. They exist in a physical reality.
For example, cars, fields, buildings, or guns have a physical existence beyond any
meaning we might give them. But Constructivists demonstrate that the significance
people or whole societies give these things have great relevance and make them much
more than their physical existence. Money is more than printed paper and stamped metal,
and a flag assumes significance beyond its cloth. Constructivists point out that different
people or societies give different meanings to the same things and thus treat those things
very differently. More and more scholars are beginning to look at relations between states
through a constructivist lens. They are discovering that how and why states interact with
each other often emerges from the perceptions shared by policy makers of their state’s
role in the world and their perceptions of other international actors.
Jutta Weldes argues “state officials do not approach international politics with a
blank slate on to which meanings are written only as a result of actions among states.
Instead, they approach international politics with an already quite comprehensive and
elaborate appreciation of the world, of the international system and of their place within
it. This appreciation, in turn, is necessarily rooted in meanings already produced, at least
in part, in domestic political and cultural contexts .”4
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The United States does not have a blank slate upon which to understand Cuba. 1
will reveal that the American interpretation of “Cuba" has had a significant impact on
foreign policy toward the island country. This interpretation is rooted in a particular
American identity and the set of ideas, values, norms, and perceptions that contextualize
the relationship.
The American exceptionalist identity has influenced the course and content of
U.S. policy toward Cuba in numerous ways. First, exceptionalism asserts that the United
States is not only special but superior to other nations. From the earliest times, the United
States has thought of Cuba as inferior. Secondly, exceptionalism influenced the
development of the Monroe Doctrine and helped to perpetuate its longevity. This doctrine
implies that the United States has additional interests, rights and duties in the hemisphere
because of the geographic proximity of the countries to the United States. Cuba is not
only within this “American sphere of influence” but is especially close to America’s
shores. This idea has affected the relationship between the United States and Cuba since
the government of President Monroe, often implying that intervention in Cuban affairs
was considered an American right or obligation. Thirdly, the American emphasis on the
values of democracy and freedom and their desire to influence the development of
American-style democratic institutions and values in other countries have had an
especially important influence on the relationship, especially since the Cuban revolution.
After 1959 Cuba was seen to be an anathema to everything the United States represented.
The American self-identification as the guardian of freedom and democracy and their
contrasting images of Cuba helped to construct American policy.
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In this chapter, I will also examine the conventional explanations for the
continuation of U.S. policy. Both traditional realist and domestic politieal/interest group
explanations have been advanced to explain the U.S. relationship with Cuba. Both have
provided considerable insight into this policy question, but, I argue they are incomplete
because they ignore the weight of ideational factors such as ideas, perceptions, identity
and norms. Thus, I will both causally link these norms and ideas to actual policy
outcomes and show how the traditional explanations are incomplete.
U.S. Identity and Cuba Policy
U.S. policy toward Cuba emerges from the way American officials and more
generally, American society, understand what it means to be “American.” This policy is
also influenced by their understanding of Cuba and their perception of the American-
Cuban relationship. Cuba policy is constructed by foreign policy officials in the State
Department, White House, Congress, and in the various other agencies involved in
making foreign policy decisions
.
5
It is also heavily influenced by the large and electorally
powerful Cuban American community, based primarily in Miami and represented by the
Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Each of these decision-makers make
sense of the Cuban- American relationship within a context that contains certain
assumptions and worldviews. One of these worldviews revolves around the notion of
what it means to be American.
The American perception of the United States as an exceptional nation, and as
such, the protector of democracy and freedom and as a world leader has had a major
5
See Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes (New York:
HarperCollins College Publishers, 1999) for a discussion of the myriad number of different government
agencies involved in the construction of foreign policy.
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impact upon their approach toward Cuba. In the early days of the US-Cuban relationship
American exceptionahsm influenced the US approach toward the island. For centuries,
the United States has been intimately involved in Cuban affairs. Elements of American
exceptionahsm were, even prior to the Spanish-American War, seen to be a factor behind
the U.S. interest in the island. Jose Marti, the revered father of Cuban independence said
that the United States is “a nation that, due to geographic morality, has proclaimed its
right to crown itself ruler of the continent and has announced... that it is entitled to all of
North America and that its imperial right should be acknowledged...”6 Senator Albert
Beveridge justified American involvement in the 1898 war because God has made
Americans “the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns.
He has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savage
and senile peoples..
. He has marked the American people as His Chosen nation finally to
lead in the regeneration of the world...” 7 Woodrow Wilson echoed these same
sentiments. In 1902 in a speech about the Spanish American War and American
responsibilities in Cuba and the Philippines he referred to Americans as “apostles of
liberty and self-government” and to the Filipinos and Cubans as children. 8 These
6
Jose Marti, “Congrreso intemacional en Washington (II) “La Nacion (Buenos Aires), completas,
vol 6 (Havana: Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 1975): 56-62. Quoted in Rafael Hernandez, “Cuba and The
United States: Political Values and Interests in a Changing International System,” in U.S.-Cuban Relations
in the 1990s, Jorge Dominguez and Rafael Hernandez, eds. (boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 34.
7 Quoted in Stephen W. Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of
Three Cold Warriors (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 22.
8 Woodrow Wilson, “The Ideals of America.” (1902) in The Liberal Intellectual Tradtion, David
Hollinger and Charles Capper, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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elements of the American identity have continued to influence foreign policy toward
Cuba ever since.
Democracy and Freedom
Within the exceptional^ identity is an emphasis on democracy and freedom and a
belief that the United States represents the embodiment of these ideals. When combined
with the American missionary spirit, the United States assumes an identity as the
defender of democracy and freedom, especially in its own ‘backyard.’ This identity has
considerable influence over American policy toward Cuba.
References to democracy and freedom appear consistently in documents.
speeches, interviews, and other public declarations of policy toward Cuba. More
importantly, they also appear in confidential documents, and were repeatedly mentioned
during confidential interviews. This identity and its related norms have been
institutionalized in American policies and actions.
The perception that Cuba is antithetical to the values of democracy and freedom
influence the content and intensity ofUS statements and policies toward the island. Cuba
is represented as an enemy of democracy and freedom in U.S. legislation, official
speeches and most media reports. President George W. Bush emphasized these images in
a July 13, 2001 speech. He stated that the Cuban government:
routinely stifles all the freedoms that make us human. The United States stands
opposed to such tyranny and will oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against
the Castro regime until it respects the basic human rights of its citizens, frees
political prisoners, holds democratic free elections, and allows free speech.”9
9
Department of State, “The United States and Cuba,” Speech by President George W. Bush, July
13, 2001, (http:// usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/), August 20, 2001.
How the US sees itself and how the US sees Cuba go hand in hand, each reinforcing the
other identity. Policy toward the island is constructed in a large part by these images and
identities that are taken for granted. 10
The American perception of human rights under Castro is consistently more
critical than any other state. Most countries perceive that human rights are not fully
respected in Cuba but they disagree on the extent of the violations. The American
comments on this matter are almost always more vehement than other countries. Helms-
Burton describes the human rights abuses in Cuba as “massive, systematic, and
extraordinary.” 1
1
The United States has, by far, been the most critical and outspoken
opponent of the Castro government’s human rights record.
In 1998, it appeared to many that the human rights situation in Cuba was
improving. For example, that year the Organization of American States reported that
“some positive steps have also been taken on human rights [in Cuba].” The OAS report
listed eight categories of positive change including greater religious freedom and
advances in press freedom, among others. 12 Similarly, Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian
Foreign Minister, defended Cuba, stating that there have been “major changes” in the
10
Just as important, for the bilateral Cuban-American relationship is how Cubans perceive the
United States. However, that is beyond the scope of this work.
"
“Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996,” P.L. 104-1 14.
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm) August 26, 200
12
Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1998 Annual
Report (http://www.oas.oru/cidh/annualrep/98emz/chapter%20iv%20cuba.htm l (March 24, 2003).
human rights situation in Cuba. 13 Though the United States recognized some of these
changes, they were much more skeptical of the developments, declaring:
The Government's human rights record remained poor. It continued
systematically to violate fundamental civil and political rights of its citizens
The Government denied citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and”
association. It limited the distribution of foreign publications and news to selected
party faithful and maintained strict censorship of news and information to the
public. The Government restricts some religious activities but permits others. It
allowed a visit by Pope John Paul II, permitted some public processions on feast
days, and reinstated Christmas as an official holiday, but has not responded to the
Papal appeal that the Church be allowed to play a greater role in Cuban
society...
The American perception of the democracy and human rights situation in Cuba is
generally more adamant and critical than other countries’ perceptions of the island. Cuba
is consistently represented as the antithesis of everything the United States represents.
Official policy decisions and statements faithfully reflect the values and ideas
contained in the American exceptionalist identity. According to the U.S. Interests Section
in Havana: “U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S. policy
toward Cuba - to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island.” 15
Vicki Huddleston, then Principal Officer at the US Interests Section in Havana asserts:
“there are three pillars of United States policy: 1- The promotion of human rights,
13
Jeff Sallot, “Cuba Policy Gives Ottawa Leverage for Change, PM Says,” The Globe and Mail,
March 17, 1999.
14
U.S. Department of State, Cuba Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998
(http://www.state.gov/www/global/human rights/1 998_hrp_report/cuba.html) March 24, 2003.
15
U.S. Departmnet of State. RL30806: Cuba: Background and Current Issuesfor Congress
January 17, 2001 Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division and Maureen Taft-Morales, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense,
and Trade Division ( http://usembassv.state.gOv/posts/cul/wwwhcrs.html# 1 2 ) March 22, 2001.
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democracy and the rule of law-, 2- The promotion ofopen economic and
communications systems; and 3- A reduction of global scourges to the environment of
disease, terrorism and crime around the world.” 16 A January 1997 government document
declares: “Once Cuba has a transition government - that is, a government committed to
the establishment of a fully democratic, pluralistic society - the United States will be
prepared to begin normalizing relations and provide assistance to support Cuba's
transition.” 17
American government officials both publicly and privately emphasize that
democracy and freedom (including respect for human rights) are among the top, if not the
top priority of their policy toward the island. State Department officials in Washington
and American diplomats in Havana emphasized the importance of democracy promotion
in US policy toward Cuba during interviews conducted by the author in 1999 and 2000. 18
Michael Kozak, a former head of the U.S. Interest Section in Cuba began a recent speech
with “I have spent major portions of the past 20 years working on the problem of how to
bring about a transition to a democratic Cuba.” 19 Richard Nuccio, the top advisor on
Cuban affairs during the first Clinton administration, maintains that democracy is a top
Vicki Huddleston, U.S.-Cuban Relations After Elian Gonzalez” The Commonwealth
,
June 5,
2000 ( http://iisembassy.state.gov/posts/cul/wvvwhhiid.html ) March 22, 2001
.
I7
U.S. Interests Section Havana, Cuba January 1998 “Basic Policy: To Support Peaceful Change
from Within,” (http://usembassy.state.gov/havana/wwwh0012.htmn March 24, 2003
18
Confidential interviews with senior government officials, 1999-2000.
19
Michael Kozak, “Doing Business in Post-Castro Cuba.” Ambassador Kozak gave the author a
copy of this speech he delivered in Miami. It was not dated.
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priority of U.S. policy.20 Daniel W. Fisk, a senior staff member of the Council of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that drafted the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, has
explained: “US foreign policy contains a “democracy agenda,” especially in the its
relations towards the Western Hemisphere.”21 Jeffrey Davidow, the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs stated: “It is Cuba’s implacable hostility to the
concepts of democracy and freedom that make our relationship with the Cuban
government so different from our relationship with the other nations of the hemisphere.
The Cuban government actively opposes the aspiration of its people to democracy.”22
Democracy and human rights are slated as a top priority in almost every major
post-cold war American document concerned with Cuba. The promotion of democracy is
listed as one of the top US goals in the region as stated by the Presidential Review
Directive process (PRD-21) for the Latin American and Caribbean region. The Americas
Free Trade Act introduced in the Senate on January 22, 2001 to authorize negotiation of
free trade agreements with the countries of the Americas heavily emphasizes these
factors. The Act states that Cuba will remain an exception to free trade until:
freedom has been restored in Cuba, for purpose of subsection (a), unless the
President determines that—
20
Richard Nuccio, “Cuba; A U.S. Perspective,” in Trans-Atlantic Tensions; The United States,
Europe, and Problem Countries, Richard Haass, ed. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999),
Daniel W. Fisk, “Cuba in US Policy: An American Congressional Perspective,” in Canada, the
US and Cuba Helms-Burton and Its Aftermath, Heather N. Nicol, ed. (Kingston, ON: Centre for
International Relations, Queens University, 1999), 46.
22
Jeffrey Davidow, “The U.S. Vision: Cuba and Hemisphere Policy,” Remarks to the American
Enterprise Institute and Friedrich Hayek University (Cuba Vision Series) (Washington DC, July 28, 1997)
(http://www.state.tzov/www/reuionsAvha7970728-davidow.htmI (April 19, 1999).
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(1)
?
constitutionally guaranteed democratic government has been
established in Cuba with leaders chosen through free and fair elections-
(2
J
he n
f
hts of individuals to private property have been restored and are
effectively protected and broadly exercised inCuba;
(3) Cuba has a currency that is fully convertible domestically and
internationally;
(4) all political prisoners have been released in Cuba; and
(5) the rights of free speech and freedom of the press in Cuba are
effectively guaranteed. 23
Similarly, bills that aim to remove restrictions on trade with Cuba also emphasize human
rights and democracy promotion. For example, the Free Trade with Cuba Act, introduced
in the Senate on February 22, 2001 states that “the United States can best support
democratic change in Cuba by promoting trade and commerce, travel, communications,
and cultural, academic, and scientific exchanges.”"4 These types of statements and
corresponding policy decisions reflect the American exceptionalist identity and its
emphasis on these values.
This is more than just a desire to see Cuba democratize. The United States’
foreign policy establishment considers it a duty to ensure that Cuba democratizes. This is
where US policy, particularly, stands out. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act) declares “The United States has
shown a deep commitment, and considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter of the United
23
U.S. Senate, America’s Free Trade Act, January 22, 2001 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c 107:1 1 :./temp/~clQ7usOUxu ) March 22, 2001.
24
United States Senate, Free Trade with Cuba Act, February 22, 2001.
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Nations and in the Universal declaration of Human Rights.”25 Helms-Burton also
declares: “The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner to end the
tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 years, and the continued failure to do so
constitutes ethically improper conduct by the international community."26 Daniel Fisk
explained US policy toward Cuba this way. He said many accounts of the policy totally
miss an essential element of American foreign policy, that is, the views of a significant
segment of the foreign policy elite of America’s mission in the world and how this
‘mission’ is played out through the structure and interaction of the policy-making
institutions.”27 The United States considers itself to be on a moral mission in Cuba.
Americans feel obligated to promote democracy and freedom in Cuba.
Democracy promotion and its related values has been an important element of
American policy toward Cuba for the past half century reflecting the American identity
and their corresponding duty to advance freedom and democracy. Democracy promotion
in Cuba is more than just a means to another end. However, when these values are
combined with other elements in American exceptionalism it becomes even more
apparent how they work together to direct this US policy. The next two subsections will
demonstrate how these values, in combination with additional elements of
25
“Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996,” P.L. 104-1 14.
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm) August 26, 2001. The Helms-Burton Act
was a tightening of the embargo. Among other things it expanded the categories of parties that were targets
of sanctions including foreign individuals and companies. It also sets out the conditions that Cuba must
meet before the U.S. can re-engage with Cuba including the ouster of Fidel and Raul Castro. The Act also
codifies these regulations and thus removes the President’s power to significantly alter U.S.-Cuban policy.
26
Ibid.
27
Fisk, 45.
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exceptionalism, account for the content and intensity of the American approach toward
Cuba.
The United States as Superior
The belief that the United States is politically, socially, economically and morally
superior is fundamental to exceptionalism. The closer a state is to the United States’
model the better (and less inferior) it is. Cuba, for most of its history, has been considered
distant from the United States in all these categories and thus seen as quite inferior.For
centuries the Cubans were looked upon as well meaning children in need of tutelage.
Prior to the revolution Cubans (and other Latin Americans) were portrayed as a naive,
uncivilized and child-like people who required American guidance. For example.
President McKinley said that Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico were a “great trust”
that the United States taken on under the providence of God and in the name of human
progress and civilization.”28 Cartoons as late as the 1950s portrayed Cubans as children in
need of American guardianship. 29 Even as Castro assumed power this image was alive
and well. At this time, senior Washington statesmen viewed Cuba’s leader as a wayward
child. Nixon talked about needing to lead Castro “in the right direction.”30
The American view of human rights and democracy in Cuba is re-inforced by the
comparison between the US and Cuba. For example, in 1984 the Chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, Dante Fascell asserted “just come to my State and look
‘ 8 Quoted in M. Hunt Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987),
38.
29
Ibid, 6.
30 Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 257.
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at the smiling, happy faces of almost 1 million people who came from Cuba to the land of
freedom, and I’m sure many others in Cuba would like to do the same thing if they had
the opportunity.”31 More recently, Vikki Huddleston, the Chief of the American Mission
in Havana from 1999 until 2002 remarked that “[i]t is fundamental that Cubans begin to
learn how to govern themselves.”32
Surveys of the American public reveal that they also believe that Cuba is inferior.
A 2000 poll asked “Generally speaking, is the US system of economics and government
morally superior to the Cuban system of economics and government?” Sixty-three
percent said yes, another 28 percent answered that they were not sure and only nine
percent disagreed with the statement. 33 Another survey asked respondents to compare
Fidel Castro to “Adolph Hitler, when he was dictator in Germany during World War II.”
Over 43 percent said Castro was as bad as Hitler and an additional 12.5 percent said he
was worse than Hitler. 34
American policy makers and the US public share the opinion that in numerous
categories, Cuba is inferior to the United States. This contributes to the sense that the
United States knows what is best for the island and the corresponding policies that
31 US House of Representatives, Human Rights in Cuba: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on
Human Rights and International Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98 th Congress, second session (June 27, 1984), 2.
3
~Vicki Huddleston, “US-Cuba Relations After Elian Gonzalez.”
13
Polling the Nations (1986 through 2001), Portrait ofAmerica (Matthews, NC: Rasmussen
Research, 2000).
34 Howard W. Odum Institute for Research in Social Science, Survey Collection: Harris/ 1643,
IRSS Study Number: S1643 (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (http://veblen.irss.unc.edu )
August 17, 2001.
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attempt to dictate Cuba's future. The idea that Cuba is intimately tied to the United States
strengthens the "US knows best" attitude. The next section will address the role of this
factor in American Cuba policy.
Cuba is Within U.S. Sphere of Influence
American foreign policy makers have historically conceptualized the western
hemisphere as being within their own “sphere of influence.” This is both a perception and
a norm as it encapsulates consequential behavior. Behavior that would be considered
inappropriate in other areas of the globe is considered normal within the western
hemisphere. The reference to Latin America and the Caribbean as America’s “backyard”
reflects the American perception that these countries are not wholly independent.
Consequently, the United States government believes they have latitude to intervene in
the internal affairs of the countries in the region. This attitude was officially expressed in
1823, when President Monroe warned European powers that Latin America and the
Caribbean were the exclusive concern of the United States of America. This policy,
known as the Monroe Doctrine, marked the beginning of an historical pattern that has
characterized U.S. policy toward the region ever since. The American annexation of the
territories now known as Texas, New Mexico, and California from Mexico in the first
half of the nineteenth century, and the confrontation with the British over the Venezuelan
border, after the American civil war, were early examples of the Monroe Doctrine in
action.
Cuba, by virtue of it proximity and historically close ties to the United States is
perceived to be even more within the American sphere of influence and in need of
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American guidance.35 In fact, a former senior U.S. government official asserted that
“Geography was the most important factor determining U.S.-Cuban relations.”36
Americans were interested in the island as early as the colonial period when they traded
with Cubans. Once Florida was purchased from Spain in 1819 American leaders became
even more aware of the island. Strategic concerns over Cuba were complemented by the
growing perception that Cuba would one day become part of the U.S. and that Cubans
needed American guidance. President Martin Van Buren thought that Cuba should be tied
to Spam or to the United States because Cubans were incapable of governing the island
themselves. 37 Consequently, the U.S. made repeated attempts to purchase Cuba from
Spain.
38
When the U.S. intervened in Cuba’s war with Spain in 1898, President McKinley
declared that the U.S. was carrying out its duty because the island “is right at our door.”39
American intervention ended the war that same year, but the United States continued to
occupy Cuba until 1 902. The Platt Amendment, which the U.S. government
subsequently attached to the Cuban constitution, listed numerous conditions under which
the Cuban government should operate and stated that the United States had a right to
35
Jorge Dominguez makes the argument that U.S.-Cuba policy is a continuation of a pattern going
back to the Monroe Doctrine in his paper, “US-Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War.”
Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World Affairs 39, 3 (Fall 1997): 49-73.
36
Confidential interview with senior US government official, 2000.
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Louis A. Perez, Jr. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988), 109.
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intervene in Cuban affairs.40 American leaders fully believed in this right and continued
to exercise immense influence on the island. By 1906, the U.S. military was once again in
control of Cuba. This second intervention only lasted three years, but it reinforced the
American attitude that Cubans could not govern themselves. 41
Americans continued to view Cuban sovereignty as pliable. For example, in 1933,
the U.S. refused to recognize the new nationalist government that declared the Platt
Amendment invalid and initiated reforms that would reduce American influence and
holdings on the island. 42 In 1934, the United States assisted the more conservative and
pro-American faction in the revolutionary coalition, lead by Fulgencio Batista, to assume
power.
During the first half of the twentieth century American economic and political
influence in Cuba was enormous. At this time, Americans controlled all of the oil
refineries, ninety percent of the mines and eighty percent of Cuban public utilities.43
Although investment in Cuba was on the decline from its height in the early 1920s, by
1959, Americans still had one billion dollars invested in Cuba.44 The statement made by
the American Secretary of War, Elihu Root, in 1902 remained relevant in Batista’s Cuba,
40
Juan Del Aguila, “Development, Revolution, and Decay in Cuba,” in Latin American Politics
and Development, Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 378.
41
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fifty years later. He said. “Although [Cuba] is technically a foreign country, practically
and morally it occupies an intermediate position.”45 Cuba by virtue of its’ location and
Its history of ties to the United States was seen to be intimately connected to the United
States. Since the end of Spanish domination, the United States had looked upon Cuba as
a parent would an irrational child, in need of U.S. control for its own good.
The American norm that Cuba was in its sphere of influence continued to
influence U.S. policy even after Fidel Castro tore the island away from the U.S. fold in
the early 1960s. When Castro challenged American domination of Cuba, it was natural
for the United States to assume they could buy Castro off and, when that failed, to oppose
him. Castro came to power touting Cuban sovereignty and denouncing American
interference. The perception that Cuba was not wholly independent from the United
States is revealed by the language used to describe Cuba and US-Cuban relations at the
time. Government officials frequently spoke of the “loss” of Cuba. Consequently, tension
characterized even the earliest relationship between the United States and Castro’s
regime.
Castro’s challenge to the U.S. perception that Cuba was firmly within the
American sphere of influence intensified the growing animosity between Havana and
Washington. In 1960 Congressman Mendel Rivers (D-SC) told Congress “We should
assert the Monroe Doctrine. We should threaten Castro with Blockade. We should, if
necessary, and, if conditions demand it, occupy Cuba.”46 During the Cuban missile crisis
45Quoted in Paterson, Contesting Castro, 5.
46
David Dent, The Legacy ofthe Monroe Doctrine (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 125.
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the United States policy makers turned back to the Monroe Doctrine asserting that it “is
just as valid in 1962 as it was in 1823, though the old imperialism of Western Europe has
been replaced by the new and far more menacing political and ideological imperialism of
international communism.” 47
Not understanding the strong support within Cuba for independence from their
northern neighbors, American leaders thought that the Cuban people would welcome a
U.S. invasion. Consequently, President Kennedy and his advisers were shocked when the
Cuban people supported Castro during the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion. Even after the
Bay of Pigs, American policy makers still believed they had a special relationship with
Cuba that entitled them to intervene in Cuban affairs. Yet, throughout the rest of the Cold
War, Castro remained ardently protective of Cuban sovereignty and continued to
challenge the American perception of U.S.-Cuban relations. These different perceptions
go to the heart of the U.S.-Cuba hostility. Each side is convinced that they occupy the
moral high ground. To many Americans, Cuba is a state run by an evil totalitarian
dictator who threatens his own people and American values. They believe it is their duty
to protect Cuba from Castro. To many Cubans, the U.S. is an imperial power that wants
to control their island and reduce Cuba to a dependent position.
The norm that Cuba should be under American influence, that it did not have a
legitimate right to complete sovereignty, continued to influence the American approach
toward Cuba after the end of the Cold War. Cuba is still considered to be within the
American sphere of influence. Jeffrey Davidow told an audience in 1997 that the
47 US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1962, 6. Quoted in Weldes, “The Cultural
Production,” 43.
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“repression and hardship is happening just 90 miles from our shores to, among others, the
parents, brothers, and sisters of U.S. citizens in a country of 1 1 million people.”48 The
end of the Cold War has done nothing to erase this long held perception of Cuba within
the United States.
Cuba s location, and all that it implies, continues to influence policy. The Helms-
Burton Act, more strongly than any American document of the Cold War era,
demonstrates that the United States still believes it has a right to dictate Cuban affairs.49
Section 205 states that Cuba will have a transitional government when the Cuban
government releases all political prisoners, makes all political activity legal, and
establishes tree and fair elections. In addition, Helms-Burton also states that both Fidel
and Raul Castro must be absent from the new Cuban government. 50 Essentially, if the
Cuban people chose Fidel Castro as their leader in a free and fair election, the United
States, under Helms-Burton, would automatically declare the election invalid. According
to Helms-Burton, the new government must also allow for the unfettered transmission of
Radio and TV Marti. Furthermore, this Act dictates that Cuba give up its socialist system
and return property to American citizens.^ 1 Jorge Dominguez, a well-respected expert in
Cuban affairs at Harvard University, asserts that:
48
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all of these desiderata go well beyond any internationally recognized
catena for the determination of democratic or transitional democratizing
governments under the charters of the United Nations or the Organization
of American States. Mandating them in US legislation as defining
characteristics of a democratic or transitional Cuban government makes a
mockery of the pledge to respect Cuban sovereignty .' 2
In many respects, Helms-Burton takes the United States- Cuban relationship back to the
pre-Castro days when the United States openly violated Cuban sovereignty. The
American perception that the United States has a right to interfere in Cuban domestic
affairs has greatly influenced the course of policy toward Cuba. Castro’s challenge to
these elements inherent in American identity is one of the reasons behind the American
perception of Castro’s regime.
The United States does not approach its decisions regarding policy toward Cuba
with a clean slate. American exceptionalism with its emphasis on democracy, freedom,
and human rights has an influence on the policy. In addition, the belief that the United
States is superior to Cuba and has special rights in the region contributes to the belief that
the United States knows what is best for Cuba. These factors have influenced the
direction of this foreign policy for many years despite considerable international pressure
to normalize relations. The next section will demonstrate that the norms directing US
Cuba policy have become institutionalized, thereby ensuring the longevity of the
approach.
52
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Norm Institutionalization
The institutionalization of norms increases their power and longevity. Robert
Keohane and Judith Goldstein explain:
Regardless of how a particular set of beliefs comes into influence politics use ofthose ideas over time implies changes in existing rules and norms...Once ideashave influenced organizational design, their influence will be reflected in the
incentives of those in the organization and those whose interests are served by
them
SenSC ldeaS Can haVG ^ impact even when no one generally believes in
According to Jeffrey Checkel, norms have become institutionalized when they become
embedded in organizations (bureaucratic measure) and when they become incorporated
into judicial codes, laws or constitutions (legal measure).
Using both measures and Keohane and Goldstein’s description it is clear that the
world-view shared by the foreign policy community and CANF has been
institutionalized. The acceptance of these ideas for so many decades has constrained
policy debate. American policy toward Cuba has remained relatively unchanged for forty
years. One senior American official admitted that “there was a fair amount of inertia”
involved in the continuation of the current policy . 54
These ideas have become institutionalized in legislation. For example, the Cuban
Democracy Act and the Cuban Liberty and Democracy and Solidarity Act (also known as
the Helms- Burton Act) embody these ideas and norms about the U.S.-Cuban relationship
and make it more difficult to change the American approach to Cuba. Helms-Burton itself
5
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furthers the longevity of this approach since the Act removes the President’s power to lift
the embargo.
They have also become institutionalized through the acceptance of the Cuban
American National Foundation as an expert in U.S. - Cuban relations. CANF, and
consequently, their norms and ideas, have been able to gain and wield influence in some
ways similar to how epistemic communities extend their influence. Peter Haas and
Emanuel Alder explain that epistemic communities wield influence by “diffusing ideas
and influencing the positions adopted by a wide range of actors, including domestic and
international agencies, government bureaucrats and decision makers, legislative and
corporate bodies, and the public.’ ' While epistemic communities are normally thought
of as international communities and as the above definition indicates influence
international agencies, and although CANF is an American lobby group, they are able to
sway policy formulation in a similar fashion.
This lobby group has become accepted as the expert on Cuban affairs in
Washington. According to the CANF’s website:
For two decades CANF has worked tirelessly to forge a broad bipartisan
consensus on U.S. policy toward Cuba and has built bridges of close
communication with the executive and legislative branches. Our influence extends
internationally, where we raise awareness of Cuba's plight with world leaders and
in capitals around the globe. CANF's research, education, and information efforts
are designed to enlighten the media, academia, policy makers, and public opinion
- domestically and abroad - on Cuban issues. These efforts have led Hispanic
Business magazine to call CANF "the leading clearinghouse for information
devoted solely to Cuba."' 6
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CANF’s ideas have penetrated a number of key institutions involved in formulating
Cuba policy. For example, CANF officials are frequently given the floor during
congressional hearings where they are granted a chance to present their opinion and
counter opposing testimony. For example, the then Vice Chairman of CANF, Jorge Mas
Canosa testified before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs on March 24, 1999. He countered the proposals to allow the sale of
food and medicine to Cuba. He stated “Mr. Chairman, selling Castro food and medicine
unconditionally, as some are suggesting, is not the answer... We simply cannot allow
it.”
57
Their version of events is often accepted without question. 58 The perception of
Castro s Cuba as an enemy to the values of democracy and freedom and subsequently an
enemy of the United States has become institutionalized. Their hard line approach,
including their support tor the embargo, has likewise become institutionalized thereby,
making it more difficult to change policy.
International Nonns
The strength of these domestic ideational factors enabled the U.S. to resist strong
international norms that favor open relations with Cuba. Clearly, the United States has
felt those pressures. Other states, have and continue to, voice their opposition to this
American policy within international forums like the United Nations, the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), amongst others. The
United Nations has frequently condemned the U.S. approach toward Cuba. In 1992 the
^“Testimony of Jorge Mas, Vice-Chairman, Before the House International Relations
Subcommittee On Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington D.C. March 24, 1999,” For the Record, The
Cuban American National Foundation.
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UN General Assembly adopted resolution 19/47 that called for the end of the embargo
against Cuba. That year 59 states voted for the resolution, 3 against and 74 others
abstained. Each year since, the UN has passed a similar resolution calling for an end to
the American embargo. In 2000, 167 nations voted in favor of the resolution, 3 were
against it and 4 states abstained. American friends and allies have voiced their opposition
to the policy. In 2000, the EU representative to the General Assembly declared:
The European Union noted with concern the findings of United Nations agencies
and programmes in situ, and deplored the adverse and often dramatic effects of
the United States economic embargo on Cuba’s population, in particular, on
women and children Members of the Union would unanimously vote in favour of
the draft resolution. 9
Though Cuba policy is generally not a top priority of visiting heads of states, many
senior officials have subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, raised their opposition to the
embargo and especially to the Helms- Burton Act with American policymakers. 60 For
example, Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian foreign minister, was especially critical of the
U.S. embargo. He stated “the whole embargo and the Helms-Burton bill is totally
counterproductive... It just doesn’t work.”61 The United States has not changed their
approach toward Cuba despite considerable pressure to end the embargo from numerous
allies and international organizations.
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Furthermore, the moral issues raised by Pope John Paul II during his visit to Cuba
in 1998 and, since then, other religious leaders as well, have come to bear on the
American ideational factors that influence the continuation of the embargo. Unlike the
numerous UN resolutions, the pressure from religious leaders has had some impact on
American policy toward Cuba. US foreign policy so closely tied to a notion of a “moral
mission” could not completely ignore calls from the Pope. Consequently, there was some
change in Amencan policy, most specifically resulting in the series of measures enacted
in March of 1998. 62
However, in its essence, U.S. policy has remained unchanged despite these
international pressures. Gordon Griffin, a US Ambassador to Canada, emphasized that
the Pope s visit did not result in any serious change to American policy toward the island.
He stated: “The fact is we’ve seen no material change (within Cuba) since (the Pope)
left. American officials assert that the sanctions will continue until they see
considerable change in Cuba’s political, social and economic systems. President George
W. Bush announced in the summer of 2001, that his administration would apply more
pressure on the Cuban regime. 64 In 2002, the Chief of the US Mission in Havana stated
that before any change is US policy is considered “there needs to be fundamental change
6
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in Cuba," including democratic elections and human rights improvements.65 In 2002, the
Bush team ordered a review of Cuba policy but continued to maintain that improvement
in relations between the US and Cuba '‘will only be possible when Cuba moves to a more
democratic system and a market economy.”66 Thus, despite international norms and some
domestic pressures to relax tensions with Cuba, the embargo remains the cornerstone of
U.S. policy, a reflection ot the degree to which the domestic norms and ideas have been
ingrained.
Alternative Explanations
The literature on U.S. foreign policy to Cuba is extensive. However, explanations
for this policy have generally fallen within one of two categories. During the Cold War
the Realist national security paradigm was prominent and in many quarters remains the
dominant interpretation of this approach. However, the most popular explanation since
the end of the Cold War has been the role of the Cuban American community. This
section addresses both these models, demonstrating that neither offers a complete
account.
The Domestic Interest Group Explanation
Most of the current scholarship that examines the U.S. - Cuban relationship
stresses the importance of the Cuban American community in the development and
continuation of the embargo. Indeed, this large ethnic group has become one of the most
electorally powerful groups in American politics, consistently voting as a bloc, managing
65
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to sway the outcomes of elections in Florida, which as the 2000 election proved, is a
crucial swing state in national elections. Furthermore, they are represented by a well-
connected interest group, that has access to many prominent Washington officials,
including the President and Congress members. They have consistently out-maneuvered
many other powerful groups that want to establish normal relations with Cuba, including
many business and agricultural lobbies, and the Chamber of Commerce.
How has this group been able to wield this much power? I argue that
constructivist concepts go a long way toward explaining how Cuban Americans managed
to become so influential in Washington. The American perception of Cuba and ideas
espoused by Cuban exiles help explain their disproportionate influence.
Following the revolution, Cuban exiles were given preferential treatment by the
U.S. government because their ideas resonated with, and reinforced, the US approach
toward the Castro regime. The American identity as the “beacon of democracy” and the
image of Cuba as the enemy of those values have influenced the United States approach
toward Cuba. These contrasting identities have influenced the American perception of
Cuban immigrants and consequently have had a significant influence over policy.
The first wave that arrived in the United States just after Fidel Castro assumed
control of the island were characterized as political refugees or exiles who fled Cuba
because they were persecuted for their political opinions. They were engaged in a fight
for freedom. Indeed, many of the Cubans who left after Castro took over were likely
motivated by fear of political persecution. Yet, the American image of these "refugees
from communism" or “freedom fighters”obscured their other reasons for leaving the
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island. They were the wealthiest Cubans and lost the most financially when Castro set his
socialist plan in motion.
The later arrivals have proven to be even less politically motivated. Maria de los
Angeles Torres reports that the exiles that arrived during the 1980s, the Marielitos:
generally held a more balanced view of Castro’s programs, often praising its
systems of healthcare and education, its sports programs, and its gutsy
nationalism... they parted ways with Cuba’s leadership because of its inefficient
governance and poor economic performance... They wanted more- more
economic and educational opportunities, more consumer goods, more sexual
freedom, more liberty to travel. 67
Furthermore, the search for a better economic future continues to motivate the most
recent arrivals. The increase in the number of rafters during the “the special period” after
Soviet subsidies dried up and the Cuban standard of living plummeted, indicates that in
general, the more recent arrivals are not as much fleeing from fear of political persecution
as they are running toward a better economic situation. However, for decades their
economic motives for leaving were overshadowed by their political image which
influenced and then reinforced the American response to the Castro regime.
The American perception of Cubans as political refugees was one of the main
sources of their influence over U.S. foreign policy. It gave the community credibility and
access to the highest levels of policymakers. Maria de los Angeles Torres in her analysis
of Cuban exile politics in the United States asserted:
In the first instance the political incorporation of postrevolution Cuban emigres
into the United States resulted from their symbolic and political utility... the
political development of Cuban exiles has not followed the typical path of other
immigrant communities that first obtained political power at the local level in
67
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order to gain access to resources such as jobs and service.
... Cuban exiles
S^l^“^fiCmCe ^ thC f°reign P0HCy rCalm flFSt and in the d0mestic
Jorge Dominguez asserts that “the U.S. government promoted virtually unrestricted
migration from Cuba, suspending parts of the U.S. immigration statutes because these
were “refugees from communism .’” 69 Because Cubans shared with American
policymakers a similar perception of Castro’s Cuba and were perceived as on the side of
democracy and freedom they were admitted to the U.S. as political refugees, not
immigrants, allowing them to bypass many of the normal restrictions placed on other
immigrants. As a result, Cubans became permanent residents and then citizens faster than
other immigrant groups, facilitating the rapid growth of the Cuban American population
in Florida and their subsequent ability to wield major influence over election results. The
American perception of Cuba as a communist enemy in the American backyard and the
Cubans as exiles, freedom fighters, or political refugees led to the special status accorded
to Cuban migrants and consequently, contributed to their domestic political power.
The U.S. government also facilitated the organization of the Cuban population
into a focused and powerful group. When Castro assumed power, the Cuban exiles in
Florida believed that he was a short-term dictator who lacked the support of the general
populace. They were eager to push him out of Cuba. This view was also the accepted
wisdom on Capitol Hill and within government agencies. The Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations, believing that Castro’s regime did not have the support of the Cuban
68
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people, authorized the training and organization of Cuban exiles in Florida to take part in
the Bay of Pigs invasion. This shared perception led directly to the invasion and gave the
Cuban exiles access to the highest levels of government for the first time.
The influence of Cuban Americans increased significantly under President Ronald
Reagan who encouraged the establishment of the Cuban American National Foundation
(CANF ). 70 Reagan understood that the Cuban American perceptions and ideas
complemented his own perception of Cuba. According to Patrick Haney and Walt
Vanderbush “the Reagan administration’s approach to Latin America coincided almost
perfectly with their [the CANF leadership] own worldview.” 71He wanted to give further
credibility to his own ideas and also saw the group as an ally in his war against
communism and Castro.
CANF still receives federal funding, through the National Endowment for
Democracy and other programs. The government has allowed the Foundation to run both
Radio and T.V. Marti and was given funding to help Cuban Americans resettle in
Florida. “ Members are frequently called to Capitol Hill to provide testimony on Cuba
issues. The Cuban American National Foundation was given money and influence by the
policy makers because their ideas and perceptions of Cuba resonated with American
leaders.
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Even though CANF has a large base of support in the Miami area and is able to
mobilize votes, there is a significant element within the Cuban community that oppose
CANF. They are represented by other Cuban American groups such as the Cuban-
Amencan Committee, the Cuban-American Pro-Family Reunification Committee and the
Cuban-American Coalition, which in contrast, advocate dialogue with Cuba. These
groups have not garnered much influence despite having at times significant bases of
support with the Cuban-American community. As Torres points out three thousand
people attended a breakfast meeting during the 1988 presidential race held by the Pro-
Family Reunification Committee. Torres argues that Clinton would have gained a greater
percentage of the Cuban-American vote in Florida in the 1992 presidential election if he
had altered his policy vis-a-vis Cuba and came down solidly for improved relations. 77
Despite the potential number of votes available, presidential candidates have not
attempted to tap into the pro-dialogue segments of the community nor have those Cuban
Americans been given a voice in policy decisions. Given the potential votes from the pro-
normalization segment of the community, CANF’s influence must derive from more than
the group’s electoral base. Their influence has been institutionalized and will remain so
as long as policy makers and CANF share the same perceptions of the U.S. -Cuban
relationship. American policy makers continue to support CANF’s influence because of
these shared perceptions.
Furthermore, even though CANF has a comparatively large influence over policy
formation, many of the government officials I interviewed in Washington and in Flavana
said that the community’s influence is often exaggerated, that the power over this policy
73
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remains firmly in the hands of Washington policymakers. They said that elements within
the government have used the Cuban American lobby to push for policies that they want
to see enacted. When former Cubans attest to the atrocities in Cuba and push for certain
policies they make it difficult for opponents of the policies. It is hard for someone bom in
the United States to argue facts or policy about Cuba with someone from the island. The
Cubans automatically have more credibility and thus are valuable to pro-embargo policy
makers. In short, Cuban Americans do have a voice but not because they have demanded
that power. To a great degree they are influential because a significant number of policy
makers want the Cuban American view to be heard.
Richard Allen told Patrick Haney that the lobby was created by Reagan’s people
to be used “as an effective tool to promote the President’s aggressive Latin American
policy .”74 Haney and Vanderbush also point out that “[t]he Reagan team and some
Cuban-Americans ... were both faced with the need to shift public perceptions on related
issues at a similar period of time. From the beginning, the role of Cuba was an integral
part of the Reagan explanation of security threats in Central America and the
Caribbean. Torres explains that the exiles “fulfilled the ideological functions of
providing evidence that communism is a repressive system; they had shown that they
preferred to flee to a free country .”
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One senior official put it this way: “the influence of the Cuban-American lobby is
overblown. Their job is one of reminding the government of the reason for their policy
toward Cuba.” 77 Another senior official explained that the government chooses when to
consult with the community. This was especially true before CANF was created by the
Reagan administration. An official who had worked in the Carter administration
explained that although the Cuban Americans were regularly consulted by the
administration before decisions were made, Carter’s people did not consult with the
community when they knew that the Cuban Americans would oppose their decision. For
example, the administration did not confer with the community in advance of an
important meeting with the Cuban government over maritime issues. Only after an
agreement was reached between the two countries did the administration inform the
Cuban American community. Carter knew the community would be opposed and wanted
to present it to them as afait accompli , 78 The Clinton administration’s return of Elian
Gonzalez, the Cuban boy that was the center of an international incident for months, is a
more recent and public example of the government going against the expressed wishes of
the community.
Thus, although the Cuban American lobby is powerful and does hold some sway
over policy toward Cuba their influence is a product of shared ideas and agreement on
policy toward Cuba. The Cuban American community gained preferential treatment and
access to the upper echelons of the government because they reinforced the perceptions,
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beliets and ideas of a significant segment of the government. Their power was most
dramatically increased under Reagan, the President whose view of Cuba most closely
matched their own. The Reagan administration was instrumental in the creation and rise
of the Cuban American National Foundation and successive administrations have
frequently used the lobby as a tool to advance their policy goals.
Additionally, although the lobby is able to exert considerable influence on their
own, independent of the preferential treatment given to them on Capitol Hill, they are not
always successful. Certainly, many of their ideas and influence have been
institutionalized as they are regarded as experts on Cuba matters and given access to top-
level officials and committees. These ideas and perceptions are found widely in most
Cuba bills that are eventually passed into law. Yet, the government does not always
consult with the community and occasionally takes a stance contrary to their stated policy
goals.
The root and continued power of the community is directly a result of the ideas
that were held in common by influential Cuban Americans and the policy community.
They would not have the power or the ability to sway policy if they did not share ideas
and perceptions with the foreign policy establishment. Contrary to popular beliefCANF
has not held the U.S. government hostage. Thus, the scholarship that purports to explain
policy toward Cuba solely on the basis of the effectiveness of the Cuban American lobby
not only exaggerates their power but often neglects to explain why and how they are able
to exert influence. A constructivist examination reveals the missing link.
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The Security Explanation
Both classical Realism and Neorealism paint a picture of a perpetually anarchic
and insecure world where power and security interests are paramount
.
79
Constructivists
maintain that this ‘’world” should not be taken as a given because it is socially
constructed, a product of our culture, identities, norms, ideas and perceptions. It is.
according to Nicholas Onuf, “a world of our making.”80 Constructivists have made a
habit out of challenging Realism. They have shown that Realism cannot explain a wide
variety of state actions including, but far from limited to, the end of the Cold War, the
continuation ot NATO, and the existence of nuclear capable states that refuse to develop
nuclear weapons.
The Cubans have never been able to understand the American perception that
Cuba is a threat. According to a leading Cuban scholar “-that Cuba constitutes a threat to
U.S. security or that it pretends to change the U.S. regime- is unbelievable for most
Cubans...Why the United States is more hostile toward Cuba than toward any other
nation-excepting only those countries against which it has waged wars, such as Korea or
Viet Nam? Why is it more recalcitrant against Cuba than against the Soviet Union or
China?” The focus of successive American administrations on the “Cuban threat” is not
See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The strugglefor power andpeace (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1979).
80
Nicholas Onuf, World ofOur Making (University of South Carolina Press, 1989).
81
Rafael Hernandez, “Cuba and the United States: Political Values and Interests in a Changing
International System,” in
. U.S.-Cuban Relation in the 1990s Jorge Dominguez and Rafael Hemhndez,eds.
40.
148
only unbelievable to Cubans but poses a problem for Realism, especially in a post Cold
War world.
The Realist explanation tor US-Cuban relations was given serious attention by
scholars and the public alike during the height of the Cold War when Cuba was portrayed
as a significant threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere. The Realist emphasis on
secunty naturally resonated with scholars during this period of history. There is much to
be said for the Realist explanation during that era. Indeed, this theory does help explain a
great deal of US policy toward Cuba during the Cold War.
Though the Cuban military alone was not a significant threat, with Soviet support
Soviet support and under Soviet protection, Cuba could marshal the capabilities to mount
a serious challenge to American security during the Cold War. 82 However, at that time
most scholars and policy makers thought Cuba presented a greater a security threat to
American allies or interests in other parts of Latin America. As Gregory Treverton
argues though Cuba “did not pose a direct threat to the territory of the United States... in
unusual circumstances [it could] pose such a threat to Mexican or Venezuelan oil fields
of interest to the United States.” In the late 1980s he stated “the U.S. security concern is
hypothetical but not out of the question.” 83
82Though Cuba did represent a security concern, the magnitude of the threat, without massive
Soviet support, was comparatively small. In 1985 Cuba had 297,000 people in the armed forces and spent
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had 2,244,000 people in the armed forces and spent $2,58200 million on their military, which equaled 6.4%
of their GNP. Thus, though Cuba did represent a security concern the magnitude of the threat was
comparatively small to warrant the emphasis received in the US government. See Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,”
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As the Cold War began to wane in the late 1980s, there was a recognition that
Cuba's threat was exaggerated. Howard J. Wiarda, a well-known expert in U.S.- Latin
American affairs who often acts in an advisory capacity to the American government,
demonstrated at the time: “the Cuban threat seemed very real indeed, and had to be
resisted. In retrospect, it seems clear that the threat was vastly overstated. Cuba was-and
ls-a small, weak, dependent, underdeveloped country, incapable of destabilizing Latin
America.”84
Since Realism emphasizes actual material capabilities and downplays perception
it has some difficulty accounting for American policy during this period. A Realist’s
account of the relationship during the Cold War would benefit from acknowledging the
role of perception. Since policy makers assumed that Cuba was a significant security
threat they acted accordingly. Once perception is factored into the equation, Realism
otters considerable insight into the events during this period. Yet, perceptions are crucial
to the explanation of US policy toward Cuba in the period. Furthermore, the American
identity (leader of the west and on the side of freedom) and images of Cuba (during the
Cold War Cuba was seen as a Soviet puppet and as an exporter of revolution) reinforced
the perception of threat.
Though Realism offers considerable insight into the Cold War US- Cuban
relationship, as an explanation for this relationship after the fall of the Soviet Union,
Realism loses most of its explanatory power. Cuba became, to an even greater extent, a
small state with limited resources after it lost its Soviet support. It was quite clear that
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they were no longer able to support any external military effort in either Latin America or
Africa. Most of the states in the Western Hemisphere by that time had democratized and
were in very little danger of succumbing to a communist revolution, and given the Cuban
economy, the regime was not capable of that type of support in any case. After the Cold
War it became apparent to even the most ardent anti-Castroites that Cuba no longer
presented much of a security threat in the traditional sense. This was confirmed by the
Pentagon in 1998. According to a Defense Intelligence Agency report issued that year
Cuba no longer manifests a serious threat to the United States. 85
Realism, itself, with its focus on material capabilities and corresponding
definitions of threat would no longer consider Cuba a threat. How can a Realist explain
the continued policy? Some scholars would maintain that Cuba represents a threat in
nontraditional ways- such as through a migration crisis or as a drug trafficker.
There has been some concern about Cuba s role in the Caribbean narcotic trade
but there is no solid evidence to indicate that Fidel Castro is involved or even complicit in
the drug trade. The spokesman for the Federal Drug Administration in Miami, John
Fernandez, explained after the 1989 drug smuggling scandal within the Cuban
government that there was “no reason to believe that Fidel Castro or people (in) the
presidential palace were in sympathy with the smugglers.”86 In 1989 Jorge Dominguez
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stated that the strong opposition of both Cuba and the United States to drug trafficking
could be a possible basis for future US-Cuban cooperation. He stated “With regard to
narcotics, the US and Cuban governments are firmly on record against the individual
consumption of drugs; their laws and practices severely punish drug traffickers that are
caught.’’
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The threat posed to the U.S. by Cuba’s involvement in the narcotic trade
appears to be relatively minor.
Clearly, Cuba could cause a problem in Florida if it encouraged or aided its
citizens to take to the boats. The migration danger is more real and immediate but it
would most likely arise from instability in Cuba, for example after the death of Fidel
Castro.
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Yet, the magnitude of these potential threats remains small compared to other
security threats and even smaller compared to the danger Cuba posed during the Cold
War. Yet, the most hard-line Cuba policy to pass through Congress was approved well
after the Cold War was considered history. In addition, as threats to security drugs and
migration are of traditionally little concern to Realists and even less concern to
Neorealists.
That said, one security issue is likely to become central to U.S.-Cuban relations.
Since September 1 1, 2001, Cuba s place on the American list of countries that sponsor
terrorism is bound to dominate discussions of U.S. policy toward the island. Prior to the
horrific events in New York and Washington, this status was essentially ignored because
as Vicki Huddleston, the head of the United States’ Interest Section in Havana
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acknowledged “Cuba is on the terrorist list for acts committed some 20 years ago. and it
continues to be on that list because it still harbors some terrorists... But the issue is
principally what happened in the past, and not the present.”89 Yet, until Cuba is removed
from this list, it is bound to affect U.S.-Cuban relations as the United States and the rest
of the West tries to grapple with the devastating events of September 1 1, 2001. Even
though terrorism has become the most serious threat to American security it does not
explain American policy toward Cuba in the past or in the present.
The Constructivist argument is also open to criticism since not only has the actual
threat declined, the perception of threat has diminished, and yet the United States
maintains its ardently anti-Castro policy. However, even though the Cold War ended and
the perception ot Cuba as a military threat did decline, the other constructivist elements at
work that portrayed Cuba as an undemocratic enemy, as a human rights violator, as an
insult to the American way of life only ninety miles from the coast of Florida, among
others have not changed and continue to have a major influence over the way Americans
make sense of their relationship with Cuba.
Thus, the Realist explanation of this particular foreign policy has a number of
important failings. While we shouldn’t entirely dismiss Realism’s contributions to our
understanding of the relationship, it is only through identity, images, norms and ideas can
we pave the way toward a richer and more complete explanation of U.S. policy toward
the island of Cuba.
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See Vicki Huddleston, “US Cuban Relations After Elian Gonzalez”
(http://usembassv.state.gov/posts/cul/wwwlihud.html ) March 22, 2001
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Conclusions
In conclusion, although Realism and the domestic interest group explanation do
offer insight into the formation of Cuba policy they either ignore or take for granted
elements that are problematized by constructivism and, as such, cannot explain key
events and issues in U.S. Cuba policy.
The United States approaches Cuba policy with a number of ingrained
perceptions, norms, and images. These are not simply byproducts of the relationship but
are fundamental to the development of the relationship itself. Furthermore, how the
United States understands its own role in the world is just as important to the relationship.
Just as our identity molds everything we do and influences how we see the world, the
identity of states, do the same. These factors can explain why the United States has not
fundamentally changed their policy toward Cuba despite the end of the Cold War and the
recognition that Cuba is no longer a threat. Not only do these variables explain the
anomalies not accounted for by Realism and other similar gaps in the “Cuba story” but
Constructivist variables also illuminate the whole narrative. For example, they offer a
coherent account of how the Cuban American National Foundation became to be
regarded as one of the most powerful interest groups in the country. Thus, to understand
the U.S. approach to Cuba from the time of the Monroe Doctrine to the Elian saga we
need to turn to the power of perceptions, images, ideas, norms and identities.
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CHAPTER 6
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES:
DRIVEN BY IDENTITY
Introduction
The Canadian identity has preoccupied Canadians for generations. Caught
somewhere in between the Americans and the British, Canadians have often felt rather
insignificant, yet in some ways, superior. In fact, for years, Canadians felt their country
lacked an identity. In 1967, Lester Pearson said: “We moved from British influence to
American influence without much feeling of purely national identity in between.” In
1974, John Holmes, the well known Canadian diplomat and political scientist, wrote: “It
is still Canada’s problem to convince foreigners- and to some extent its own people—
that it is for real.”
1
However, Pearson and Holmes’ successors would argue that since their
predecessors uttered those words, the Canadian identity has matured. This chapter will
demonstrate that Canadians do have a unique identity that reflects a particular set of
values. This chapter looks at the Canadian identity and its influence on foreign policy.
Canadian Values and Identities
Canadians traditionally place a heavy emphasis on the values of peace, order,
moderation, compromise, and social justice. The importance of these values to Canadians
has been well documented by scholars who trace the Canadian identity to Canada’s
Both quotes are from David Olive, Canada Inside Out: How we see ourselves and how others
see us (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd, 1996).
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historical experience.2 Canadian political culture has been understood to be primarily
influenced by a combination of Lockean liberalism and tory conservatism. Scholars such
as Gad Horowitz, who, building on the work of Louis Hartz, argued that the root of
toryism can be traced to the United Empire Loyalists. These scholars maintain that when
the Loyalists rejected the American revolution and fled north, they brought an emphasis
on the common good with them to Canada, which today manifests itself in a greater
acceptance of socialist ideas and values such as peace, order and stability. 3
Much of the scholarship on Canadian identity has developed in a comparative
manner, contrasting Canadian and American history and values. For example. S.M.
Lipset compared the two societies in Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of
the United States and Canada. Lipset concludes: “Canada and the United States continue
to differ considerably. America reflects the influence of its classically liberal Whig,
individualistic, antistatist, populist, ideological origins. Canada, at least from a
comparative North American perspective, can still be seen as Tory-mercantilist, group-
oriented, statist, deferential to authority..."4 The Economist agrees. A March 2003 article
explains: “Canada is thus the land of the Tories, the counter-revolutionaries who jibbed at
the American Whigs’ revolt. While the American Declaration of Independence celebrates
2
See for example: Gad Horowitz, “Tories, Socialists, and the Demise of Canada,” Canadian
Dimension 2, 4 (1965): 12-15; William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in
Canada, 3
r
ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990); and Denis Stairs, “The political culture of
Canadian foreign policy,” Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science 15 (December, 1982): 667-90.
3
See Gad Horowitz, “Tories, Socialists,”; Gad Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and
Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation,” Canadian Journal ofEconomics and Political Science 32, no. 1
(1966): 143-71. See also Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding ofNew Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc.), 1964.
4 Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and
Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990), 212.
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'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’, Canada’s founding document promises ‘peace,
order and good government ."' 5 Lipset maintains that these differences produced
“disparate Weltanschauung (world view) ideology.... Americans more than other western
peoples, tend to view international politics in nonnegotiable moralistic and ideological
terms. Canadians, like Europeans, are more disposed to perceive international conflicts as
reflections of interest differences and, therefore, subject to negotiation and
compromise .”6
Regardless of whether one agrees with Horowitz, Lipset, or other scholars of
Canadian value orientations, surveys reveal that Canadians do place a greater emphasis
on compromise, social justice, and international law than most other nationalities. The
World Values Survey compared materialist and post-materialist values in many countries.
Materialist values are those that emphasize economic and physical security including
such things as strong military and economic growth. Post-materialist values are those that
give a “heavier emphasis on belonging, self-expression, and the quality of life.”7 The
World Values Survey reveals that Canadians have exceptionally strong post-materialist
values, outranking all of the more than forty countries in the survey, except Finland and
the Netherlands
.
8
“These quality of life issues include a greater concern for the
5
“The Awkward Couple,” Economist.com (March 13, 2003) (http://www.economist.com) (March
23, 2003).
6
Lipset, 220.
7
Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990), 66.
8
Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodemization: Cultural, Economic and Political
Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 157.
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environment and issues like human rights when weighed against more materialist values
such as economic growth or a strong defense.
Values and Canadian Foreign Policy
Scholars have tied these values to Canadian international actions. Neil Nevitte’s
analysis of the Canadian responses to the World Values Survey links postmaterialism and
cosmopolitanism. Those individuals with a strong cosmopolitan attitude identify less
strongly with their local communities and see themselves as belonging to a wider, even
global, community. Nevitte argues that “postmaterialists are about three times more
likely than materialists to have these cosmopolitan identifications and are much less
likely to have subnational identifications.”9 An interesting study done by Erin Carrierre,
Marc O Reilly and Richard Vengrofftie the Canadian postmaterialist and cosmopolitan
outlook to Canadian internationalism and commitment to peacekeeping. 10
Canadians are interested in the wider world and support an active role for Canada
in the international arena." A poll taken in 1998 reported that:
The public s democratic moralism is so powerful that Canadians are quite
prepared to foreswear trade opportunities as a cost of advancing democratic
values. Part of the reason for Canadians' willingness to make sacrifices on the
Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective
(Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1996), 67.
1
Erin Carrierre, Marc O’Reilly and Richard Vengroff, “’In the Service of Peace’: Refexive
Multilateralism and the Canadian Experience in Bosnia.” Paper presented at the International Studies
Association Conference, Washington D.C. (February 16-20, 1999). Located on Columbia International
Affairs Online (https.7Avwwc.cc.cohimbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf7cae01/cae01.html) June 4, 2000.
11
For example, see Giles Gherson, “Canadians are activitsts at heart, new poll finds,” Ottawa
Citizen, April 1998.
158
r^ht thing™do^
and hUma" ri8htS ^ SimP 'y 'ha‘ 'hey bdieVe this WOuld
More recently, scholars have termed this activism in Canadian foreign policy, ‘mission
diplomacy.’ According to Kim Richard Nossal, a well-respected expert on Canadian
foreign policy, mission diplomacy is “very much in keeping with a long-standing
tradition in Canadian statecraft- a tradition that puts a value on seizing the day, taking the
initiative, and getting involved to solve a problem that confronts the international
community.” 13 He asks:
[C] an we conclude that mission diplomacy constitutes a Canadian vocation? I
would argue that everything certainly points in this direction: the pride that
political leaders and policy makers take in these initiatives; the persistent
willingness to engage in worthwhile initiatives year after year; the fact that even
those who come to power knowing little about foreign policy (like Mulroney), or
who are not inclined toward activism (like Chretien) or who are actively opposed
to foreign-policy initiatives (like Trudeau) all end up pursuing initiatives in their
foreign policy.
4
Canadians are not just interested in world politics; they have specific ideas about the role
they want their government to play on the global stage.
Surveys confirm that Canadians expect their government’s foreign policy to
reflect a certain set of values and identities. When asked about foreign policy priorities,
most respondents (ninety-five percent) asserted that pursuing world peace and protecting
12
“Eighth Article in the Southam News/CNC-ISS Poll on Foreign Policy: Spreading Democratic
Values-Strong Interventionist Consensus,” April 24, 1998 (http://www.compas.ca/html/archives/spreading
demo_surv.htm) January 30, 2002.
13 Kim Richard Nossal, “Mission Diplomacy and the ‘Cult of the Initiative.’ in Canadian Foreign
Policy,” in Worthwhile Initiatives? Canadian Mission-Oriented Diplomacy. Andrew F. Cooperand
Geoffrey Hayes eds., (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2000), 1.
14
Ibid, 4.
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the global environment should be Canada’s top concern. Over eighty percent of those
asked also emphasized the importance of discouraging human rights abuses and
participating in the United Nations. 15 When asked about their international objectives
over 60 percent of Canadians answered that they wanted “a lot more emphasis” on
protecting the environment and almost half wanted “a lot more emphasis” on promoting
democracy and human rights. Only 42 percent wanted “a lot more emphasis” on
increasing exports. 16 The bar graph that follows reflects this poll about Canadian foreign
policy objectives.
Figure 2: Canadian Foreign Policy Priorities
Source: Southam News/CNC-ISS Poll on Foreign Policy (April 24, 1998)
This survey also revealed that Canadians want the twin goals of “getting other countries
to respect rules of war and peace,” and “spreading democracy around the world”
15 Canada Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of National Defence and the
Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian Opinion on Canadian Foreign Policy, Defence
Policy and International Development Assistance (1995) conducted by Insight Canada Research.
16
“Eighth Article in the Southam News/CNC-ISS Poll on Foreign Policy: Spreading Democratic
Values-Strong Interventionist Consensus,” April 24, 1998 (http://www.compas.ca/html/archives/spreading
demo_surv.htm) January 30, 2002.
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emphasized over other foreign policy goals, such as increasing Canada’s influence over
world affairs. 17
Similarly, another survey taken in 2001, reports two-thirds of Canadians said that
their government should promote human rights in other countries, even if doing so would
hurt Canadian trade. 18 Likewise, Canadians chose these values over geopolitical
concerns. A 1998 poll showed that Canadians think that development aid should be given
first and foremost to countries that “have relatively honest and effective governments.”
This survey reported that the other considerations carry less weight with the public,”
including if the country is “friendly to Canada” or “vote[s] with western countries at the
UN. These surveys confirm that Canadians want to see their foreign policy reflect
these values above, and beyond, other economic or more pragmatic considerations. Thus,
Canadian foreign policy has consistently been characterized by Canadian scholars, policy
makers, and the public as actively promoting the values of peace, order, mediation and
social justice.
This set of values and their relationship to Canadian foreign policy has been
especially noticeable since the mid-1950s. Many scholars point out that the role Canada
played in solving the 1956 Suez crisis and Mike Pearson’s subsequent award of the Nobel
17
Ibid.
18
Centre for Research and Information on Canada, “Trade, Globalization and Canadian Values,”
Montreal: Centre for Research and Information on Canada, 2001), 18.
19
“Fourth Article in the Southam News /CNC-ISS Poll on Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid-Division
over Money, Unity over Principle,” April 24, 1998(http://www.compas.ca/html/archives/foreignaid
surv.htm) January 30, 2002.
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Peace Prize influenced the Canadian self-identity.20 Canadians were, and still are; very
proud of the role their government played in solving this international crisis. Out of this
experience grew “an inchoate sense that it is right and good and just that Canadian
governments try to embroil themselves in international matters...”21
The foreign policy establishment acknowledges this connection between values
and foreign policy. Louis St. Laurent, Canada’s prime minister from 1948-1957, but at
the time secretary of state for external affairs, told an audience in 1947 that, “[n]o foreign
policy is consistent or coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some
conception of human values.... If Canada’s liberal humanitarian values are not reflected
in Canada’s foreign policy, then popular attachment to them domestically will likely
itself decline.”22 Similarly, the Liberal government’s 1994-1995 foreign policy review
stated:
Foreign policy matters to Canadians. They have deep-rooted values that they
carry over into the role they want Canada to play - nurturing dialogue and
compromise; promoting democracy, human rights, economic and social justice;
Scholars have explained this tendency in Canada’s foreign policy behavior in a variety of ways.
Some describe Ottawa’s foreign policy actions in terms of middlepowermanship. Initially the term middle
power was limited to describing Canada’s place in the international hierarchy. In 1944 Lionel Gelber
explained that Canada was not a great power, and yet with Canada’s “natural wealth and human capacity
she is not a minor power like Mexico or Sweden. She stands in between as a Britannic Power of medium
rank. Henceforth in world politics, Canada must figure as a Middle Power.” See Lionel Gelber, “A Greater
Canada Among the Nations,” Behind the Headlines (1944), quoted in Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of
Canadian Foreign Policy 2
nd
ed. (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall, 1989), 48. However, during the post
WWII years Canada became increasingly involved in international mediation, the highlight being Ottawa’s
mediation of the Suez crisis in the mid-1950s. As a result, Canadians began to associate an emphasis on
international peace and order with ‘middlepowermanship.” See John W. Holmes, The Shaping ofPeace:
Canada and the Searchfor World Order (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979) for an excellent
introduction to middlepowermanship.
21
Nossal, “Mission Diplomacy,” 6.
22 Quoted in Paul Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, “Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The
Good Governance Initiative,” in Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign
Policy, 1984-93 Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal, eds. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 194.
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caring for the environment; safeguarding peace; and easing poverty. And they
can offer corresponding skills- mediating disputes; counseling good governance
in a diverse society, helping the less fortunate; and peacekeeping.23
In 1995 Andre Ouellet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, echoed St. Laurent, stating that
although the government was undertaking a comprehensive review of the country’s
foreign affairs, he assured Canadians that they would not attempt “to overturn all the
values that have guided us in conducting our foreign policy until now.”24 Kim Richard
Nossal argues “expectations now play an important role in shaping mission diplomacy.
One of the consequences of Suez was that it created an expectation, particularly among
the attentive public in Canada, that a good foreign minister is an initiative minded foreign
minister.”
25
The Canadian emphasis on these values can be understood as part of two highly
connected identities. Both identities promote an active role for Canadians on the world
stage. Firstly, Canadians see themselves as good international citizens. Canadians value
dialogue and believe that they have excellent communication skills that can be used to
solve international problems. Canadians traditionally have a high respect for international
law, non-intervention, and multilateral organizations. These qualities are understood to be
essential elements of good citizenship.
"Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada’s Foreign Policy:
Principles and Prioritiesfor the Future Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian
Foreign Policy (November 1994), 1.
24 Quoted in Dean Oliver, “Foreign Affairs and National Defence,” in Canadian Annual Review of
Politics and Public Affairs, 1994, David Leyton-Brown, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000),
79.
25
Nossal, “Mission Diplomacy,” 6.
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Secondly, Canadians identify themselves as peacekeepers. Though often included
under the good citizen umbrella, this identity is so influential that it deserves its own
category. Peacekeeping is a source of pride for Canadians and guides much of their
international action and policy. As this chapter will demonstrate, Canadians believe that
they are excellent mediators and often attempt to solve, for good or ill, international
disputes.
Canada as a '‘Good International Citizen”
In world affairs, Canadians see themselves as the international equivalent of the
good neighbor, block parent, the family that brings the rest of the community together
and helps out whenever asked. According to David Black “Canadians have generally
wished to think of themselves as naturally ‘good international citizens,’ particularly on
issues ot peace and justice. Instances of high profile activism on ethical issues (e.g.,
peacekeeping, nuclear diplomacy, North-South mediation, landmines, and the
International Criminal Court) are constructed as representative of Canada’s ‘natural’
vocation in world affairs .”26 Canadians embrace this identity and they expect their
government to conduct its foreign policy based on its components.
Components include a high respect for international law, the principle of non-
intervention and sovereignty. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT): “Canadians recognise that their interests are best served by
a stable, rules-based international system.”
27
Ottawa has consistently promoted
26
David R. Black, “How Exceptional? Reassessing the Mulroney Government’s Anti-Apartheid
‘Crusade’,” in Diplomatic Departures., 190.
21
Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada’s International Human
Rights Policy ( http://www.dfait-maeci.iic.ca?foreign policy/human-rights/hrl-rights-en.asp) (February 19,
1999) April 4, 2003.
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international legal organizations. For example. Canada launched a campaign to promote
the creation of an International Criminal Court. 28 The government asserts that “Canadians
can be proud of Canada's role at the forefront of the effort to establish the International
Criminal Court.”29
Canadians also have a strong preference for recognizing the government of the
day and Ottawa recognizes new governments expeditiously. There have been a number of
important exceptions but most of these are a result of external pressures, mainly from the
United States. Ottawa’s decision not to recognize the People’s Republic of China was a
direct result of the importance of China to the Americans. Ottawa determined that going
against the Americans on this issue would have been too costly for Canada. However, as
Kim Richard Nossal points out “Washington’s attempt to keep Beijing isolated in
international affairs was seen in Ottawa as both mistaken and exceedingly short-sighted.”
30 By the 1960s surveys reveal that a majority of Canadians felt that China should be
recognized by Ottawa and admitted to the United Nations. 31 Pressure for Ottawa to alter
its policy was strong. In 1966 the Canadian delegation advocated that both the PRC and
Taiwan be seated in the General Assembly and that the PRC should take the seat on the
Security Council. 3 “ Recognition of China was one of Pierre Trudeau’s campaign
28
See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada’s ICC
Campaign,’’ (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign policv/icc/icc campaign-en.asp ’) April 4, 2003.
29
See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and the ICC,”
(http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign policv/icc/canada icc-en.asp#leadership ) April 4, 2003.
30
Nossal, Kim Richard, ed. The Politics ofCanadian Foreign Policy 2nd ed. (Scarborough,ON:
Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1989), 32.
31
J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 179.
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promises in 1968. Thus, under Trudeau, Ottawa officially recognized the PRC and
Trudeau made an official visit to the country in 1973
Robert Jackson, a Canadian political scientist specializing in sovereignty issues
asserts that Canada has been especially supportive of the doctrine of non-intervention. He
explains:
Canada’s traditional role has been to uphold the universal framework of
international society against its detractors, and to remind those who are apt to
orget.... that it remains the only conceivable normative foundation of world
politics. Of course it is maintained at the expense of those who live in chaotic or
police states; they pay a heavy price for the universal doctrine of non-
intervention.
Foreign Affairs officials often find their desire to take initiatives, at odds with their
support for the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty. Prime Minister Jean
Chretien spoke out about this issue during the UN Millennium Summit in September
2000. At that meeting he proposed the creation of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to address this dilemma. In response to the
discussions begun by the prime minister, the Canadian government sponsored a
Commission to: “produce a comprehensive report that would assist the international
community in reconciling respect for the sovereignty of states with the need to act in the
face of humanitarian crises.”34 This report, issued in 2001, reflects the Canadian concern
32
Ibid, 180.
33
Robert H. Jackson, “Morality, Democracy and Foreign Policy,” in Canada Among Nations
1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy, Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, eds. (Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1995), 58.
34Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Media Room: Canada Launches
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,” (December 18, 2002)
(http://www.dfait-maeci.uc.ca/iciss-ciise/press2-en.asp ) April 5, 2003.
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for sovereignty.
.( cautions that: “exceptions to the princip.e of non-intervention should
he limited. Military intervention for human protection purposes must be regarded as an
exceptional and extraordinary measure, and for it to be warranted, there must be serious
and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur.”35
Canadians have also been very reluctant to use economic sanctions. Ottawa has
imposed sanctions but not as a routine tool of statecraft, and in those cases, almost always
multilaterally. For example, Canada did not follow the American lead in the 1950s and
impose economic sanctions against the People’s Republic of China. Kim Richard Nossal
argues that “Canada’s historical reluctance to invoke economic sanctions cannot... be
attributed merely to greed.” He points out that the Canadians engaged China long before
Canadian wheat sales to the communist country became profitable. 36
Similarly, Canadians believe that a “good international citizen” uses dialogue, not
force. The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
reflects this preference. It states that coercion should be used as a last resort, after all
other methods have been exhausted. 37
Policy makers believe that Canadians are especially skilled at dialogue. A recent
DFAIT document maintains: “We have been called on by other countries to share our
experience with dialogue and the peaceful resolution of differences; many opportunities
35 Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, The Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (December 2001)
(http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report2-en.asp#criteria ) April 5, 2003.
36
Nossal, The Politics, 66.
37 Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “The Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,” (December 2001)
(http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report2-en.asp#eriteria ) April 5, 2003
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exist for us to serve a mediating role.’- The Dialogue on Foreign Policy paper published
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Internationa. Trade asserts: “Amid current
international tensions, Canadians may he able to play an important global role in
fostering dialogue among different cultural communities. By reaching out to partners at
home and abroad, we can work to show all nations that diverse religions are compatible
with shared core values of democracy, human rights, diversity and civility.”39
The emphasis on communication and dialogue is evident in a variety of Canadian
global initatives. For example, at the Santiago Summit in 1998, Canada promoted a
Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue Group on Drugs to address the problems associated with the
international narcotics trade in the Western Hemipshere. During the subsequent meetings.
Secretary of State, David Kilgour stated: "We believe that dialogue among the countries
of the Americas can be an effective mechanism to deal concretely with the problem of
illicit drugs, which affects human security within the entire hemisphere."10 He also
stressed that: "Canada's approach to the illicit drug problem is to see it as a human
security issue, rather than one of only enforcement," 41 Dialogue means engagement. The
38
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Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release “Kilgour to
Travel to Latin America to Promote Canada’s Hemispheric Dialogue on Drugs Initiative ” (Januarv 22
1999)(http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca ) April 4, 2003.
41
Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release “ Kilgour to
Travel to Central America,” (http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca) April 4, 2003.
168
Canadian government favors engagement and almost always restricts their use of
sanctions to multilateral actions
.
42
The emphasis on dialogue, engagement, and the rule of law is evident in how
Canada approaches democracy and human rights issues abroad. Canadians value
democracy and human rights, yet, Canadians traditionally have not aggressively
promoted these values in their foreign policy. Furthermore, when Ottawa has attempted
to advance these values, it is through dialogue, not coercion. According to Tom Keating,
an accepted authority on democracy in Canadian foreign policy, “Taking up the “White
man’s burden” has never been particularly appealing to Canadian foreign policy makers,
at least until recently.... Promoting democracy abroad has been an established tradition
of American foreign policy for a good part of the past century.... Canadians, on the other
hand, have been more reticent about, if not deeply suspicious of, such adventures.”43
Robert Jackson similarly argues: “Canada still has the problem of living beside a
superpower which periodically understands its historical role as that of a country which is
destined to be the vanguard of democracy in the modem world. The special awkwardness
for the making of Canadian foreign policy is Canada's sharing and avowing the same
democratic values while balking at the Hegelianism of America’s historic self-
,
• ,.44
conception.
42
Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canadian Economic
Sanctions,” (http://wvvw.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/sanctions-en.asp ') April 4, 2003.
43 Tom Keating, “Promoting Democracy in Haiti: Assessing the Practical and Ethical
Implications,” in Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy, Rosaland Irwin, ed. (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2001), 208.
44
Jackson, 58.
169
However, sinee the early 1990s, Canadian foreign policy has more actively
championed democracy and human rights. The change has been expressed in Ottawa’s
good govcn““cc” policy initiative. The term was adopted by the government of Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney in 1990 and refers to the combination of three values: “respect
for human nghts, democratic government, and sound public administration.” 45 Human
rights, for example, traditionally had a place in Canada’s foreign policy but had generally
been “non-aggressive and often understated.”46 With the advent of good governance in
the early 1990s the twin values of human rights and democracy became an integral part
of Canadian foreign policy. Some say this development represents one of the most
fundamental changes in Canadian foreign policy in recent time. However, scholars and
policy makers alike, both emphasize that ‘good governance’ is consistent with, and is a
natural evolution of, the traditional Canadian identity. Some scholars refer to this
enlarged foreign policy agenda that combines traditional values and good governance as
internationalism. Heather A. Smith states that “there remains a broad commitment to the
ideal ot internationalism, which includes an emphasis on dialogue, compromise, and
mediation as well as the promotion of democracy, peace, prosperity, and good
governance.”47
Keating, 210.
46
Gerald J. Schmitz, “Human Rights, Democratization, and International Conflict,” in Canada
Among Nations 1992-93, Fen Osier Hampson and Christopher Maule, eds. (Ottawa: Carleton University
Press, 1 992), 24 1
.
47
Heather A. Smith, “Niche Diplomacy and Mission-Oriented Diplomatic Behaviour: A Critical
Assessment,” in Worthwhile Initiatives?, 14.
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Canada as a Peacekeeper
Closely tied to Canada's identity as a “good international citizen” is the Canadian
identity as a “peacekeeper.” The first sentence of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT)’s introduction to peacekeeping reads “For Canada,
peacekeeping is an important aspect of our national heritage, and a reflection of our
fundamental beliefs.”48 Though Canadians have nothing to match the scale of the Statue
of Liberty, the monument to Canadian peacekeepers near the Parliament Buildings
certainly represents vital Canadian values. As a paper presented to the International
Studies Association so aptly stated:
Engraved are the words, “In the Service of Peace,” This monument, which so
eloquently characterizes Canadians’ view of their most important role in world
politics, highlights a self-image that has become an integral part of the Canadian
political culture. It permeates the thinking of both elites and the general citzenry,
the printed and electronic media, school social studies texts, the foreign and
defense policy statement of most political parties and even traverses the broad
cultural divide between English and French Canada
.
49
According to Canadian political scientists, Manon Tessier and Michel Fortmann:
Peacekeeping is so firmly rooted in the collective Canadian ‘psyche’ that it is
almost impossible to imagine an elected government openly opposing or
fundamentally questioning the importance of peacekeeping in the country’s
foreign policy. This unconditional support is fuelled by more than just a feeling of
pride, a vocation, or accumulated expertise. It is sort of founding myth that the
collective Canadian imagination feeds on and that refers to the societal values of
tolerance, respect, and mediation. Within this logic, peacekeeping is custom-made
48
Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Backgrounder: Canada and
Peacekeeping,” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/Deacekeeping/back-e.asnl/23/02') January 23, 2002.
49
Erin, Carrierre Marc O’Reilly and Richard Vengroff, “’In the Service of Peace”’ :Refexive
Multilateralism and the Canadian Experience in Bosnia.” Paper presented at the International Studies
Association Conference, Washington D.C. (February 16-20, 1999). Located on Columbia International
Affairs Online (https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/cae01/cae01.html) June 4, 2000.
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and opposition to it is tantamount to a rejection of ‘Canadian
Peacekeeping and the values it represents are fundamental elements of the Canadian
identity.
Canada has a long history of mediating international conflict. Canada was
involved in the most number of peacekeeping missions of any country between 1948 and
1 990. In the decade after the Suez crisis, Ottawa sent peacekeepers around the globe to
places such as Yemen, Cyprus and Lebanon. Over the next few decades, Canadians
attempted to mediate the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, among many others too
numerous to list.'
2
The Chretien government has continued this mediating tendency in
Canadian foreign policy by becoming immersed in disputes all over the world. For
example, in 1997 the Canadian government organized a meeting between Peru’s
President Alberto Fuijimori and Japan’s Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in Toronto to
discuss the hostage crisis at the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, in 1997. 53 From the
5U Manon Tessier and Michel Fortmann, “The Conservative Approach to International
Peacekeeping,” in Diplomatic Departures, 1 14.
51 Andrew F. Cooper, “The Evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Re-
orientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas,” in Paths to Power, Andrew Hurrell
et al., eds. No. 244 (Washington D.C The Latin American Program, Working Paper Series, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2000), 13.
52
See Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and
Peacekeeping,” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menu-en.aspO April 4, 2003.
53
Though the crisis was ended by the Peruvians when they stormed the embassy, the discussions
in Toronto appeared to be fruitful at the time. See transcript of interview with Fuijimori on James Lehrer’s
Online Newshour on PBS ( http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin america/february97/fuiimori 2-3.html )
(April 2, 2003).
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war in the Great Lakes region in Africa to Yugoslavia, the Chretien government has
attempted to reduce international tension.
Canada's peacekeeping identity has weathered a number of blows. The most well
known recent example was the Somalia incident. The image of Canadian soldiers
torturing and killing a Somali teenager in 1993 raised doubts about Canada’s traditional
international role, as did the failure of peacekeepers to stop the genocide in Rwanda in
1994. Despite these and other, less well-known, failures, Canadians remain wedded to
this identity and continue to support Canadian peace operations around the globe.
Furthermore, just as American exceptionalism is often not viewed as positively by
other countries as it is domestically, Canada's emphasis on these values is sometimes
viewed as self-righteous behavior by others. Canadian perceptions of their global role do
not always match international opinion. Canadians often have an inflated sense of their
ability to solve the world’s problems and overestimate the degree to which others will
accept Canadian moral leadership. Fen Osier Hampson and Dean F. Oliver claim: “The
idea that Canada is particularly suited to lead coalitions of the willing in pursuit of a
better world is another oft-repeated assessment that would leave many of our closest
allies at best perplexed and at worst infuriated.”54 Kim Richard Nossal notes: “mission
diplomacy demands the initiative taker take maximum credit. But this is a strategy
guaranteed to annoy other actors whose involvement might have been crucial to the
successful outcomes.” Nossal cites the Canadian spin on the landmine treaty as an
54
Fen Osier Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, “Pulpit diplomacy,” International Journal 53 3
(Summer 1998) (Summer 1998): 379-406.
55
Nossal, “Mission Diplomacy,” 10.
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example of “how to annoy one’s friends.”56 Dean Acheson’s chapter in Livingston
Merchant’s book Neighbors Taker, For Granted, entitled “Canada: ‘Stem Daughter of the
Voice of God,’” advises Canadians that these efforts can be seen as self-righteousness.57
Nossal also reminds us that “sticking one’s nose into someone else’s thorny and
intractable problem can produce outcomes that one had not anticipated.”58 He gives
Canada’s efforts to stop the American bombing ofNorth Vietnam in 1965 and attempt to
combat the Algenan civil war in 1997 as examples where Canada’s involvement
worsened an already terrible situation.
Whether seen as good citizenship or self-righteous behavior, the values of peace,
order, mediation, democracy and human rights have guided Canadian actions on the
world stage. They have played a constitutive role in foreign policy. However, this is not
to say that Ottawa always acts accordingly, nor does so simply because those actions
would reflect the Canadian identity or values. Clearly, there is a significant element of
pragmatism involved. As many have pointed out, Canada’s actions do not always reflect
these principles, and foreign affairs officials often use the peacekeeping or good citizen
roles to gain advantage; economic or otherwise on the world stage. The Canadian
economy, so reliant on international trade clearly benefits from a predictable and peaceful
environment that facilitates trade.
56
Ibid.
57
Dean Acheson, “Canada: ‘Stem Daughter of the Voice of God’,” in Neighbors Takenfor
Granted: Canada and the United States, Livingston T. Merchant, ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 1966), 134-147.
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However, Realists and others are mistaken to ignore the influential role played by
this element of the Canadian identity. The Cuba case examined in this study demonstrates
the problems related to relying solely on the economic explanation of Canadian actions.
Chapter Seven will demonstrate that economic motivations cannot adequately explain
Canada’s policy toward the island.
Being “Not American” and Canadian Foreipn Policy
Another element of the Canadian identity, which often has a significant influence
on Canadian foreign policy, is an intense desire to be distinct from the United States.
When asked for a description of what it means to be Canadian most Canadians will
emphasize how Canada differs from the United States. Being “not American” has
become an inherent element of the Canadian identity.
Canadians have always been somewhat anxious about their much larger and more
powerful neighbor. Two hundred years ago and occasionally since, Canadians worried
about outright territorial annexation. Today, they worry more about their cultural and
economic independence vis-a-vis the United States. During the Free Trade debates of the
early 1980s these concerns were voiced daily in Canadian newspapers, news programs
and in anti-free trade commercials that dominated Canadian television. More recently,
anti-Americanism was given expression in a series of very popular Molson beer
commercials in which “Joe Canada” proclaimed Canadian uniqueness and superiority
vis-a-vis the U.S. These commercials, referred to as “I am Canadian,” started a wave of
national pride and demonstrate that Canadians continue to identify themselves in relation
to the United States. There is no sign that this attitude is changing. In fact, 2003 polls
indicate that anti-American feelings are on the rise in Canada. A February 2003 poll
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reports that 40 percent of Canadians want their country to become less like the United
States. Only 8 percent said they wanted Canada to become more like the United States,
the lowest percentage expounding this view since 1996/1 997. 59
This need to emphasize their independence from the United States has an
important influence on Canadian foreign policy. A 1989 poll asked Canadians and
Americans if they supported Canada and the United States “adopting common and
identical policy related to all matters related to defense and foreign affairs?” Nearly
eighty percent of Americans thought this was a good idea whereas under half of
Canadians responded positively. 60 In a 2002 poll, 65 percent of Canadians agreed with
the statement that: ‘The U.S. has no business telling Canadians to increase defense
spending or to support U.S. foreign policy as these are sovereign issues for Canada.”61
As would be expected, this attitude influences the bilateral relationship. Over the
years there have been countless disputes between the two countries that can be traced to
Canadian insecurity about their sovereignty in the face of their much more powerful
neighbor. For example, Canada has always considered the arctic waters of the Northwest
Passage part of its territory. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s this was an issue in
59
Ekos/CBC/SRC/Toronto Star/La Presse Poll, “Presentation to Media Partners, Ottawa”
(February 21, 2003) (http://www.ekos.com) (April 3, 2003).
Macleans 102, no. 27 (July 31, 1989). Polls done in the last ten years continue to report similar
opinions. See for example, Canada Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of National
Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian Opinion on Canadian Foreign
Policy, Defence Policy and International Development Assistance (1995) conducted by Insight Canada
Research.
61
Ekos/CBC/Toronto Star/La Presse Poll, “Canada-US Relations (December 6, 2002)
(http://www.ekos.com/admin/articles/6dec20Q2CanUS.pdf) (April 2, 2003).
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Canadian-American relations as the United States argued that the passage was
international waters. Ottawa’s response to this challenge reflected the common
perception that the United States has designs on Canada. J.L. Granastein and Robert
Bothwell describe the Canadian position: “Canadian nationalist nerves were tetchy.
Canadians felt their resources were on the verge of another American ‘steal’ and the
government must step in.”62 In another example, Canadian sovereignty (in cultural and
economic independence terms) was the crucial issue for Canadians during the debates
over the Free Trade Agreement. During the election debate in October 1988, John
Turner, the leader of the Liberal Party, declared that the Free Trade Agreement would
remove “the political ability of this country to [resist] the influence of the United States,
to remain as an independent nation - that has gone forever, and that is the issue of the
election....” He told Prime Minister Mulroney “With one signature of a pen, you’ve...
thrown us into the north-south influence of the United States, and will reduce us, will
reduce us I am sure, to a colony of the United States, because when the economic levers
go, the political independence is sure to follow.”63 J.L. Granastein and Norman Hillmer
argue that in that debate “John Turner’s impassioned declarations expressed the doubts
and fears of countless Canadians. The Canadian concern over its independence has
profoundly influenced the course of Canadian-American relations.
62
Granatstein and Bothwell, 80.
63 Quoted in J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worse: Canada and the
United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), 288.
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The influence of this identity on Canadian foreign policy goes beyond the
bilateral relationship, as Canadians want to demonstrate to themselves, and to the rest of
the world, that Canada is a distinct country with an independent set of policies. For
example, the Canadian government’s recent embrace of the human security agenda was
clearly influenced by a wide range of factors, both internal and external to Canada
.
65
Yet.
the need to be different from the United States was acknowledged even by senior
statesmen. In Lloyd Axworthy's introduction to Human Security and The New
Diplomacy, he writes:
The best Canadian foreign policy remains an independent policy based on our
competences and capacity to deliver....This independence is a credit to Canadians
and their desire to have a distinctive international voice. This is especially
significant given that we live next door to the world’s political, military, and
economic superpower. Canadians want their country to be more than a junior
partner to the United States. They expect their government to have a voice that
reflects their priorities and concerns....to promote an agenda of international
peace, security, and development
.
66
This change in the Canadian foreign policy paradigm, one that embraces and promotes
this new definition of security, is the result of many factors, but like most foreign policy
decisions made in Ottawa, is influenced by the Canadian perception of their relationship
with the United States. This aspect of the Canadian identity, the need to be a distinct actor
on the world stage, has had a major influence over a wide range of Canadian foreign
policies.
65 Human security focuses on protecting individuals and includes initiatives like the campaign to
ban landmines.
66
Lloyd Axworthy, “Introduction,” in Human Security and The New Diplomacy: Protecting
People Promoting Peace, Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds. (Montreal: McGuill-Queen’s University Press
2001 ), 8 .
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Conclusion
In 1974, Canadian historian, G.L. Granatstein described the Canadian self-image.
He wrote: “All too often Canadians had found themselves regarded as Americans when
they traveled abroad...." This did not sit well with Canadians. Granatstein continued:
The Americans, after all, with their wild west, shoot first image, their huge
mthtary forces and their world-wide net of bases, advisors, and arm sales had a
hrol rr/,Ve peaceftl1 Canadians ' Canadians were middlemen, honestbrokers, helpful fixers in a world where these qualities were rare. 67
This image of Canada on the world stage continues. Canadians see themselves as
fulfilling a very particular and important role in world affairs. Everyone from the
Canadian teenager behind the counter at the local Tim Horton’s doughnut shop to senior
policy makers will tell you a similar story of Canada’s international role and how that
differs from the American role in the world. As this chapter has shown these identities
and associated values and ideas are found in speeches and statements, government
documents, and in policies that direct Canadian global action. The next chapter will
demonstrate that these identities and values are integral to Ottawa’s approach toward
Cuba.
67
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CHAPTER 7
CANADA’S CUBA POLICY
Introduction
In the four and a half decades since 1959, when Fidel Castro’s band of rebels
emerged from the Sierra Maestra mountains to overthrow the regime of Fulgencio
Batista, Canada’s approach to Castro has at times been warm and inviting and at other
times been termed “coldly correct.” Yet, Ottawa has always maintained diplomatic ties
and when possible, economic, educational and cultural connections with the Castro
regime. Officially, the Canadian foreign policy establishment contends that these ties
between the two countries is the best method of encouraging greater respect for civil and
political rights and democratization on the island. This policy is most often referred to as
one of ’constructive engagement.’ Likewise, the Canadian public continues to be
sympathetic to Fidel C astro and supports the maintenance of a close relationship between
the two countries.
Canada has maintained this policy toward the island even though the pressure to
take a very different approach has come from many quarters, most seriously from
Canada’s primary trading partner, closest neighbor and friend, the United States. This
chapter explores the reasons why Canada’s policy has developed in this way.
Ottawa’s approach toward the island is most often understood as a reflection of
Canadian economic self-interest. However, this reasoning ignores a number of other
factors that play a crucial role, such as Canadian values, identity, and perception of the
Cuban situation.
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These variables have been most recently studied by constructivists. Though most
scholars of Canadian foreign policy are relatively new to constructivist analysis it has
great potential to shed light on the Canadian global experience. As one scholar of
Canadian foreign policy wrote: “One potentially promising way of rescuing the concept
[of middle powers] is to go down a constructivist route—to see middle powers not as a
category defined by some set of objective attributes or by objective geopolitical or
geoeconomic circumstances; but rather as a self-created identity or ideology. This is, for
example, a potentially promising way of making sense of Canadian ‘middle-
powermanship’ with its emphasis on responsibility, morality, and multilateralism.” 1
Adopting a constructivist approach, I will demonstrate that the Canadian self-
created identity and corresponding values influence the way Canadian policy makers
make sense of the Cuban situation and consequently, have an enormous impact on policy.
I will show that there is much more than a rational calculation of interests involved in
determining policy toward Cuba. Policy makers rely on: 1) their own self-identities, and
2) their ideas and culture (which includes values) and 3) their perceptions and images of
other actors and situations, in order to determine the appropriateness of different actions
and/or policies. 2
The first part of this chapter reviews the case of Cuba, highlighting important
Andrew Hurrell, “Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers in International
Institutions,” in Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies ofIntermediate States No. 244(Washington D.C
The Latin American Program, Working Paper Series, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
March 2000), 1
.
2
The ‘logic of appropriateness’ is borrowed from the organization/bureaucratic literature. For
additional information, see James G. March and Johan P. Olson, Rediscovering Institutions: The
Organizational Basis ofPolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 23.
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milestones in the Canadian-Cuban relationshtp, then demons,rating that Canadian identity
and values, as well as the Canadian understanding of the Cuban situation (i.e. perceptions
and images of Cuba), influences the development of a specific set of norms. This study
then outlines how the Canadian approach toward Cuba evolved from those norms.
Evidence from interviews, the secondary literature, and archival research confirm that the
Canadian identity, values and resulting norms have influenced the development and
continuation of this policy.
To fully understand Ottawa’s approach to Cuba it also necessary to problematize
the existing narrative. Thus, the second part of this chapter addresses the traditional
economic explanation for Canada’s policy toward Cuba. The economic argument is not
without merit and contributes to a full understanding of the policy. However. I will
demonstrate that it offers an incomplete account because it ignores the impact of values,
identity, perceptions, and norms on the formation of this policy.
A Brief Overview
Canada s relationship with Cuba has enjoyed a rather quiet, yet long, history.
Trade considerations dominated the relationship in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Cuban rum and sugar were traded for Canadian lumber and other natural
resources. Canadian financial institutions were also active in Cuba prior to the
3
Trade increased fairly steadily into the first quarter of the twentieth century. In 1902 Canada
exported US$265,000 worth of goods to Cuba and imported US$396,000 in Cuban goods. By 1910 these
figures wereUS$ 1,87 1,000 and US$1,259,000, and by 1925 they had reached US$8,619,000 and US
$6,455,000 respectively. See Harold Boyer, “Canada and Cuba: A Study in International Relations,” Ph.D.
dissertation, (Simon Fraser University, 1972) and James Rochlin, Discovering the Americas: The Evolution
ofCanadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994).
182
revolution.4
Canada established diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1945 and exchanged
ambassadors in 1950. When Fidel Castro’s rebel movement overthrew the government
of Fulgencio Batista in 1959, Ottawa officially recognized his revolution as legitimate
and consequently, maintained normal relations with the new regime. 5 This policy has
continued throughout Castro’s reign. Though generally warm, relations between Canada
and Cuba have not always been friendly as a number of issues including Havana’s
involvement in African conflicts, have come between the two countries. However, formal
diplomatic relations have never been severed
Canadian investment in Cuba dramatically increased as the Cold War faded. As Table 3
in Chapter 3 shows Canada was the largest foreign investor in Cuba during the 1990s. In
2002, Canada was Cuba’s third largest trading partner, after Venezuela and Spain. 6
Official Canadian development assistance was re-established in 1994, and since, the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has disbursed $35 million in Cuban
development projects. 7
Ottawa believes that trade, investment, and aid are not only good for the Canadian
and Cuban economies, but that these contacts will encourage a movement toward
John Kirk, Back in Business: Canada - Cuba relations after 50 years (Ottawa: FOCAL
Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 1995), 7.
Canada and Mexico were the only states in the hemisphere that maintained normal relations with
Havana during this period.
6
Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada-Cuba Relations,”
(http://www.dfait-maeci.gov.ca/latinamerica/cubarelations-e.asp l January 23, 2002.
7
Ibid.
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democratization and improved civil and political rights in Cuba. According to DFAIT,
the policy, frequently termed constructive engagement, “means a determined attempt to
work with the Cuban government and Cuban society in order to encourage institutional
change and political and economic opening.’’
8
This includes raising human rights issues
with the Castro government and in multilateral forums like the United Nations. In 1997,
Ottawa and Havana signed a fourteen point Joint Declaration, which established
cooperation between the two governments in a number of areas, including human rights
and good governance issues." For example, this declaration established cooperation
between Canadians and Cubans on legal andjudicial matters, counter-narcoties, and
enhanced communication between the Cuban and Canadian parliaments, ministries of
health and NGOs. 10
The Canadian embassy in Havana keeps in contact with human rights activists
and non-governmental organizations active in Cuba. 11 People to people contact is an
important element of the Canadian approach. Various Canadian organizations such as
universities and cultural groups maintain links with Cuban counterparts.
Recently, relations between Ottawa and Havana have cooled somewhat. The
initial tallout arose from a 1998 visit by Prime Minister Chretien to Cuba. Chretien’s
8
Ibid.
9Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada’s Relations with Cuba ”
(http/Avww.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latin/cuba/8 1 600-e.htm).
l0Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada-Cuba Joint Declaration
Implementation Checklist,” Provided to the author by David Kilgour, Secretary of State (Latin America
and Africa), Ottawa (October 1999).
" Ibid.
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personal pica on behalf of four dissidents that were scheduled to be tried in Cuba was
ignored. 1 - Relations worsened during the subsequent 1999 Pan-American games held in
Winnipeg. Fidel Castro charged that Canada allowed sports scouts to promote the
defection of Cuban athletes, withdrew metals from Cuban winners under false charges,
and tried to disadvantage Cuban teams. 13 In addition, a number of Cuban students
attending Canadian universities defected while in Canada, creating tension between the
two countries. Furthermore, the CIDA program to modernize the Cuban taxation system
backfired as the Cuban government used it to hinder the establishment of private
enterprise.
14
At the same time, Canadian businesses were becoming more disillusioned
with Cuba. 1 ' John Manley, the Minister of Foreign Affairs who replaced Lloyd Axworthy
in 2000, took a much harder line with Cuba. Cuba was not invited to the Summit of the
Americas meeting in Quebec City. As a result of these problems, the Chretien
government cooled relations with Cuba. Official high level visits to Cuba were suspended
and a number ofjoint projects were reconsidered.
Despite these problems there is virtually no discussion of ending Canada’s policy
of constructive engagement. The author was told by a senior official in the Canadian
embassy in Havana in 2000 that even after these problems, on the ground relations
Cuban trial step backward, Axworthy says,” Globe and Mail
,
March 3, 1999
13
“Castro: 1999 on PanAm Games, Excerpts from the speech given by Dr. Fidel Castro, President
of the Republic of Cuba, related to the Pan American Games in Winnipeg, Cienfuegos, Cuba, July 26th
,
1999 ” (bttp2Avww.pbs.org/stealinghome/sport/castro99b.htmP
. January 31, 2002 .
14
Archibald Ritter, Speech delivered to the City University ofNew York’s Queens College and
Graduate School, Cuba Project, 2001.
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between the two countries remained essentially unchanged. 16 1, is remarkable that the
bilateral relationship has weathered often-intense disputes between the two countries so
well. Despite its ups and downs, Ottawa’s policy toward Cuba remains one of
engagement.
Thus, engagement best describes the Canadian policy toward Cuba for the past
fifty years, despite, at times, considerable international pressure to follow the American
lead of breaking relations, isolating Cuba and putting immense pressure on the Cuban
regime, and despite bilateral divisiveness that could have potentially caused very serious
schisms in the Canadian-Cuban relationship. The Canadian policy has withstood these
pressures because it is a fundamental reflection of deeply held Canadian values and self-
perceptions. The following section highlights the influence of these variables on this
particular Canadian foreign policy.
Canada’s Cuba Policy: The Influence of Ideational Factors
This section will demonstrate that Ottawa’s policy toward Cuba is dictated by a
certain logic of appropriateness. 17 A country that places a premium on stability, peace,
order, social justice, dialogue, democracy, human rights, and mediation; and one that sees
itself as an international “good citizen,” peacekeeper, and as “distinct from the United
States,” contributes to a certain perception of the Cuban situation and the rise of a set of
corresponding norms. These norms play a constitutive role in policy formation and lead
Confidential interview with senior Canadian government official, Havana, 2000.
See James G. March and Johan P. Olson, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis
ofPolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 23.
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to a policy dominated by engagement and dialogue. This chapter explains how the
Canadian identity as a good citizen, peacekeeper and “not-American” influence
perceptions and norms about Cuba and. hence, construct policy.
Jhe 'good citizen' and Cuba
Canada’s approach toward Cuba is influenced by their self-image as a “good
international citizen ” This identity reflects, and is informed by, a particular set of values
that include, among others, peace, stability, international law, social justice and dialogue.
This section reveals the connection between these values and identity and policy toward
Cuba.
Hie Canadian focus on communication and dialogue contributes to their policy of
engagement. The federal government has consistently advocated dialogue with the Castro
regime. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade explains that.
“Canada’s hope for Cuba is a peaceful evolution to a society with full respect for human
rights, genuinely representative institutions and an open economy. Canada has sought to
do this through engagement and dialogue, rather than isolation.” 18 During Prime Minister
Chretien s visit to Cuba in 1998, he told a Cuban television audience that their two
countries, “have always chosen dialogue over confrontation, engagement over isolation,
exchange over estrangement and emphasized that “now this approach is more important
than ever.”
19
This emphasis on communication has influenced many policy decisions. For
18
Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ’’Canada’s Relations with
Cuba,’’ 1999, (http://www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latin.. ,tinent=Latin&country-l l&name=81600).
1
’ Paul Knox, “PM uses Cuban TV to push trade links,” Globe and Mail, April 27, 1998.
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example, though it has not been a consistent goal of Canadian policy, Ottawa has been
one of the most vocal proponents of Cuba’s re-entry into hemispheric bodies including
possible re-admittance into the OAS.2» In 1998 Lloyd Axworthy told the OAS “surely the
"me has Come for a11 0AS “embers to consider when the suspended 35 th member of the
organization, Cuba, could once again be seated at the table.”21 However, under the
Santiago Plan of Action the OAS members further reiterated the importance of
democracy, effectively solidifying Cuba’s suspension.
Communication is a key feature of the bilateral relationship. Direct discussions
between Fidel Castro and senior Canadian officials including Prime Minister Trudeau,
Lloyd Axworthy, and Prime Minister Chretien are examples of the influence of these
values. Though they have frequently been frustrated with the lack of results, each has
spoken to Fidel Castro directly about human rights issues. The 1997 Joint Declaration
reflected this identity. The Declaration states:
Both Ministers reaffirmed the high value of the longstanding and uninterrupted
bilateral relationship between Canada and Cuba since its establishment in 1945
They underscored the fact that Canada-Cuba relations have always emphasized'
the importance of maintaining a frank and open dialogue in a spirit of mutual
respect, not only on issues in which both sides agree, but as well on issues on
which they differ.
The Declaration also states:
20
Paul Koring, “Axworthy, Helms aide slug it out on Cuba.” Globe and Mail, March 7, 1998.
21 Quoted in Peter M. Boehm, Ambasssador and permanent representative of Canada to the
Organisaton of American States, “Notes for a Speech to the Annual Meeting of the Cuban Committee for
Democracy," Miami, September 12, 1998 (http://.dfait-maeci.gcxa/oas/oas04d-e.htm l January 23, 2002.
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The Ministers emphasized their mutual commitment and their right to conductJ“ "al relatlons on the basis of the defense of International Law Theyeiterated the commitment to peace of their respective peoples and their commonendeavours to promote social justice in an atmosphere of stability and unitybased upon the consensus of their respective citizens.22 y ’
Canadian policy toward Cuba has been significantly shaped by the emphasis on
international law, communication and dialogue inherent in the Canadian psyche. These
elements within the “good citizen” identity influence norms about Canadian policy
toward Cuba. To Canadians, dialogue is key to being a good international citizen. This
creates a preference for engagement over isolation and contributes to the development of
policies such as the 1997 Joint Declaration. Lloyd Axworthy said that this major piece of
Canadian Cuba policy: “was primarily to open up a dialogue to see if we can support and
produce changes that would open the system up.”^
Canada has a tradition of recognizing the government of the day, supporting non-
intervention, and deferring to the principle of sovereignty. Canada’s own preoccupation
with its sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States, and the knowledge that one of its own
provinces might attempt to leave the federation have influenced this cautious approach to
the issue of sovereignty. However, the Canadian identity as a ‘good international citizen’
that values international law, also embodies a deference to the principle of sovereignty.
However concerned Canadians might be about Fidel Castro’s regime, they believe he is a
legitimate leader of a sovereign state and thus, maintain that Cuba’s sovereignty should
22
“ Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Joint Declaration of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Canada and Cuba,” (January 22, 1997).
23 PBS Online NewsHour, “Lloyd Axworthy,” (January 23, 1997)
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/january97/canada_l-23.html) (April 3, 2003).
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be respected. Charles Ritchie, the Canadian ambassador to Washington during the
Dtefenbaker era wrote:
-Do we consider what has happened in Cuba as a popular social
revolution and not a Russian-inspired Communist take-over?... It is unthinkable that
anything similar to the developments in Cuba should occur in Canada, but if it did,
should we not regard this as our own business and resent intervention?”24 Ottawa has
maintained this approach to Cuban sovereignty. For example, decades later during the
Elian Gonzalez saga, officials at the Canadian embassy in Havana told the author that
they thought the boy should be returned to his father in Cuba. They believed so because
that decision would be in accord with international law, implying not only that
international law is a key concern for Canadians, but also the belief that Cuba should be
treated like any other sovereign state.
The Canada as a Peacekeeper / Helpful Fixer
The importance given to mediation and peacekeeping within Canada is evident in
their approach toward Castro’s regime. Ottawa has, at various times, attempted to
mediate between the United States and Cuba. For example, Joe Clark, as Secretary of
State for External Affairs (1989-1991), attempted to bring the two sides closer together.
He asserted in 1990 that: ‘Canada can't solve the contest between Cuba and the United
States, but we may well be able to create some conditions...to create some room where
the principle actors might move.”26 Ottawa repeatedly stresses its willingness to work
24 Quoted in John Kirk and Peter McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations: The Other Good Neighbour
Policy (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 41. Originally from Charles Ritchie, Storm Signals:
More Undiplomatic Memories, 1962-1971 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1983), 16-17.
25
Interviews with senior Canadian government officials, Havana, 2000.
“ 6
Cited in Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations, 134.
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With the governments of Cuba and the United States. Canada tries to maintain its
credibility with each side, usually by offering sympathy and support to both while
encouraging policy change.- For example, when speaking to Americans they emphasize
that Ottawa and Washington have the same goals, while highlighting the benefits of
engagement over isolation. When asked about the different approaches to the regime
during a joint press briefing with Madeleine Albright, Lloyd Axworthy said “we share the
end objective, which is to see a transition in Cuba into a democratic society. We have
chosen different methods. We don’t think an embargo works.... [0]ur approach to Cuba
has been through a form of engagement. We made some progress over the past year. We
think it’s worth continuing that kind of engagement...”28 Thus, subtly, and not so subtly,
Canada tries to act as a mediator between its closest neighbor and Cuba.
The Canadian people also want their government to act as a mediator between the
United States and Cuba. In 2001 the Anglican Church of Canada “urge[d] the Canadian
Government, through the Department of External Affairs to offer to mediate between
Cuba and the United States with a view to a normalisation of relations between the two
countries and the reintegration of Cuba into the Organisation of American States.”29
Policy toward Cuba is clearly influenced by the importance placed on mediation by both
the government and citizens of Canada. The Canadian peacekeeping identity embodies an
emphasis on mediation and contributes to the norm that Canada should mediate
international disputes. Thus, a key undercurrent of Canadian policy toward Cuba is an
attempt to mediate between the United States and Cuba.
This approach has its risks. At times it has angered both the Cubans and the Americans.
28
U.S. Department of State “Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Canadian Foreign
Minister Axworthy: Remarks in Press Briefing,” Ottawa, March 10, 1998
(http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980310a.html) February 22, 2002.
29 •
Anglican Church of Canada, “Resolution A280: Cuba,”
( http://www.anulican.ca/gs200 l/rr/resolutions/resolution.php?res+a280 ) February 22, 2002.
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The values and identity associated with Canada’s “helpful fixer” and “good
cmzen roles in world affairs has played an important role in the design and development
of policy toward Castro’s regime. This emphasis on mediation and dialogue produces a
norm that extols the virtues of engagement and thus contributes to the Canadian decision
not to isolate the Castro regime. However, other aspects of the Canadian identity also
factor into the policy. The next subsection will highlight how the tendency toward anti-
Americanism has influenced Canadian behavior toward Cuba.
Canada as “Not American” and Cuba Policy
Canada’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ toward Cuba has been held up as
an example of independence vis-a-vis the U.S. since 1959. While this policy is a clear
reflection of Canadian values and represents other elements of the Canadian identity, the
emphasis on being non-American has played an important role in this policy since its
beginning. In many respects Cuba represents a relatively “safe” issue for the Canadians.
They can take an independent stance on this issue without fear of significant reprisal
since Cuba is not one of the principal concerns of American foreign policy makers. 30
Cuba became a symbol of Canada's independence during the Diefenbaker
administration. The personalities of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (1957-1963) and
President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) shaped the two countries’ policies toward
Castro's Cuba. The emphasis Diefenbaker placed on Canadian independence was one of
the most significant factors that would influence the development of Ottawa’s policy
toward Cuba. The Prime Minister was known for his nationalism and tended to react
30
However, occasionally the Canadian government opposes American foreign policy on more
significant issues. The Canadian decision to oppose the 2003 US war with Iraq is a recent example.
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strongly against any real or perceived American pressure. This perception was greatly
reinforced by what has become widely known among Canadians as the Rostow memo.
His relationship with President Kennedy, and his belief ,ha, the Kennedy administration
was attempting to 'bully' him, worsened after the Prime Minister found an American
memo accidentally left by the President’s staff following a meeting between the two men.
The memo stated that Kennedy should “push” Diefenbaker on a number of issues
.
31
Forgoing polite diplomacy, Diefenbaker did not return the memo but instead wen, public
with it, which infuriated the President. This animosity intensified Diefenbaker's desire to
forge an independent Canadian foreign policy, particularly over Cuba, since Kennedy
seemed focused on moving Canada on this issue. Furthermore, tending to see Kennedy as
a bully, he sympathized with Castro’s determination to char, a course independent of
American influence
.
32
Tension between Canada and the United States over Cuba came to a head during
the Cuban missile crisis, when Diefenbaker refused to put Canadian forces on full alert
and implied that the American version of events was possibly unreliable. Kennedy once
again voiced his anger, and Diefenbaker in turn became more determined to take an
independent path on this issue. The stage was thus set. Canada would not follow the
American lead over Cuba. At this time, Canada and Mexico were the only countries in
the Americas that did not acquiesce to U.S. demands to sever relations with Cuba in
Though Cuba was not mentioned in this memo it convinced Diefenbaker to not follow the
American lead on many issues. Cuba soon became a sore point in the bilateral relationship and eventually
developed into a symbol of Canadian independence.
See Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended
Border (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990) for a detailed discussion of the relationship between the
two leaders.
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accord with the hemispheric vote at Punte del Este in 1962. Cuba became a symbol of
Canadian independence in foreign affairs.
Every prime minister since has been concerned about appearing too pro-American.
Policy toward Cuba has been highlighted by each administration as an example of their
determination to chart an independent foreign policy for Canada. However, Prime
Minister Pieire Trudeau (1968-1979; 1980-1984) was especially concerned about
Canadian dependence on the United States. Of the United States, Trudeau said, “Canada
has increasingly found it important to diversify channels of communication because of
the overpowering presence of the United States of America and that is reflected in a
growing consciousness amongst Canadians of the danger to our national identity from a
cultural, economic, and perhaps even military point of view.”33 This was reflected in the
Trudeau government’s promotion of the “Third Option,” a policy that attempted to
reduce Canada’s vulnerability to the U.S. by diversifying Canadian trade. A feature of
this policy was to increase Canada’s ties to Cuba. Cuba was an important Third Option
country. First, it served simply as an additional trading partner. Second, it represented
another way for the Trudeau government to distinguish Canada from the United States.
Trudeau was the first leader of an American ally to officially visit Castro’s Cuba.34
Even Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984-1993), widely recognized as being
the most pro-American Canadian prime minister, did not commit Canada’s support to the
33
J.L Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 195.
34
James Guy, “The growing relationship of Canada and the Americas,” International Perspectives
(July-August, 1977), 6.
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embargo. In fact, he sent Louise Frechette, the then Assistant Deputy Minister for Latin
American and the Caribbean, to Cuba in the spring of 1990 where she stressed the
importance of Canadian - Cuban cooperation. A senior official at the Canadian embassy
in Havana during the Mulroney years told the author that the opportunity for Prime
Minister Mulroney to demonstrate to Canadians that he was not an American “lapdog”
was an important reason behind the continuation of Canada’s policy toward Cuba in
those years.
35
Prime Minister Jean Chretien (1993-) has been even more adamant that Canada’s
Cuba policy remains distinct from American policy toward the island. Andre Ouellet,
Chretien’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted, “I also indicated to Mr. Christopher
that this government was determined to set its own independent course in foreign policy.
By being independent I do not mean that we are opposed to the American policy but that
we want to see action being taken with a Canadian point of view in mind. Our hope to see
the end of the American commercial embargo against Cuba is a clear affirmation of our
wish. A senior official with the Canadian government during this period told the
author that the need to be distinct from the United States was just as important as any
other reason for Canada’s policy of engagement. 37
The enactment of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 has incensed Canadians and led
to even more of a desire to oppose the American policy. The federal government’s
35
Author interview with former embassy official, Ottawa, October 1999.
36
Andre Ouellet, “Canadian Foreign Policy,” Commons Debates 133, no.37, 1 st session, 35 th
parliament, March 15, 1994, 2259.
37 • •
Confidential interview with senior Canadian government official, Ottawa, October 1999.
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••Cuba: Trade and Economic Overview” has a section devoted to the Canadian response
to Helms-Burton. It states “Canada does not tolerate the extra-,erritoria, application of
foreign laws contrary to our laws and policy and accordingly expects Canadian
companies to carry out business under the laws and regulations of Canada, not those of a
foreign country.” 38 A 1996 poll revealed that only five percent of Canadians felt that the
Canadian government should ban trade with Cuba and almost halfwanted to institute
retaliatory trade sanctions against the United States. 39 A majority of senior Canadian
officials interviewed told the author that Ottawa’s reaction to Helms-Burton was first and
foremost an issue of Canadian sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States, and much less so
about Canada’s relationship with Cuba.
Canadian policy toward Cuba was heavily promoted and defended by Ouellets’
successor, Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy’s policies were reminiscent of Trudeau’s Third
Option approach. He actively sought to strengthen Canada’s ties to other countries in an
effort to refocus policy away from the United States. This policy was outlined by
Axworthy and Roy MacLaren, the then Liberal critic for international trade, in the “Part
of the Americas: A Liberal Policy for Canada in the Western Hemisphere.” This
document stressed that Canada needed to diversify its ties to the rest of the hemisphere.
Axworthy’s policy on Cuba was clearly influenced by his position on Canadian-
American relations. More so than past foreign ministers, Axworthy was known for his
outspoken opposition to the U.S. embargo of Cuba. In 1998 Axworthy and Senator Jesse
38
“Cuba: Trade and Economic Overview,” (http://www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/cubatrade.htm).
39
Gallup Poll, April 4, 1996.
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Helms exchanged heated words over Cuba. Axworthy declared “The whole embargo and
«he Helms-Burton bill is totally counterproductive. I, just doesn’t work... Cuba is facing
a form of economic victimization through the embargo.’’* A senior Canadian diploma,
with the United Nations in the early 1 990s told the author that Cuba was a “cheap way
for them [the Liberal Party] to distinguish Canada from the U.S.” 41
Canada’s unique relationship with the United States has infiltrated most areas of
Canadian foreign policy, and policy toward Cuba stands out as a particularly relevant
example of this dynamic. Since Diefenbaker angrily said of Kennedy during the Cuban
mtssile crisis that, “That young man has go, to learn that he is not running the Canadian
government," Canadian prime ministers, the foreign policy establishment, and the public
have all held Cuba up as an example of Canadian independence.42 For Canada to reverse
policy over Cuba would involve much more than a recalculation of Canadian-Cuban
relations - it would require a fiindamental adjustment in Canadian thinking about their
relationship with their largest neighbor, or a very creative spin on the trilateral story that
would allow Canada to keep its pride and maintain every appearance of not “bowing to
the Americans." Thus, the Canadian identity as “not American” creates norms that argue
that Canadian foreign policy ought to be independent from American foreign policy.
Clearly, much of Canadian foreign policy is similar to American foreign policy.
They are alike for two main reasons. One, because Canadian and American interests
40
Koring, “Axworthy, Helms”.
41
Interview with a former senior Canadian official with the United Nations, New York, September
42 Quote from Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 190.
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often coincide and, two, because Ottawa often feels pressured to adopt similar policies.
Cuba has stood out for a number of reasons. Cuba issues began to attract both American
and international attention at the same time as the relationship between President
Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker was deteriorating. Given the good citizen and
helpful fixer identities in Canada and the exceptional ist identity in the United States the
two leaders disagreed on what was happening in Cuba and how to best respond. Cuba
became a symbol of the animosity between Kennedy and Diefenbaker and of the
Canadian leader’s desire to keep Canadian foreign policy distinct. Thus, Cuba grew to be
a symbol of Canada’s independence in foreign policy, influencing the direction of policy
toward the island ever since.
In summary, the identities and values reflected by the good citizen, helpful fixer
and anti-American roles have had a significant impact on Canadian policy to Cuba
because they not only create boundaries on possible actions, but actually work to
construct certain policies. The norm that “engagement is the best approach toward Cuba”
is a direct outcome of Canada’s emphasis on values such as mediation, dialogue and the
desire for international stability and order. Canadians believe isolation is not compatible
with either mediation or dialogue. They also argue engagement is not an antagonistic
policy and, is thus, less likely to lead to instability. This section has also shown that the
Canadian identity as “not-American” contributes to their policy of engagement, as it is
essentially the opposite of the American goal to isolate the regime. Thus, Canada’s policy
toward Cuba runs deep. It is a reflection of strongly held Canadian values and identity.
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Canadian Perceptions of Tnh;,
Another important pathway front identity to norms and policy outcomes travels the way
of perceptions. Our identity and the ideas and values within that identity, influence the
way we perceive situations and perceptions limit the possibilities of actions. This
subsection reveals how Canadian values and identity lead to certain perceptions of the
Cuban situation, and thus, constructs policy.
The Canadian emphasis on social justice and the Canadian identity as “not
American
-
” have influenced the way they see Fidel Castro. The perception of Castro in
Canada is overall positive. Many Canadians admired Castro when he overthrew Batista.
The young Jean Chretien was one of those who held him in great esteem. Chretien told a
reporter that Castro “was a very popular person, a young man taking on the Batista
regime... He had been in jail, he had risked his life, he wanted to change society... he
was a star for a lot of us .”43 Prime Minister Diefenbaker identified with Castro because he
saw him as the leader of another state that must contend with the overwhelming presence
of the United States. Largely, all prime ministers since have shared this sentiment with
Diefenbaker. Canadians still perceive Fidel Castro as somewhat of a lone ranger,
struggling against a much larger force in order to establish a better society.
In the same way, many Canadians feel a natural connection to Cuba and tend to
emphasize the similarities between the two countries and differentiate Cuba from other
communist countries. Trudeau's foreign policy advisor, Ivan Head, said that Cuba
43
Bruce Wallace, “Jean and Fidel,” Macleans 3, 19 (May 11, 1998): 30.
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represented “a departure from classical Communism. There is an opportunity to work
With these guys in the multilateral field.- In 1998 the House Speaker. Gilbert Parent
defended the Castro regime by comparing it to Premier Frank McKenna’s one party
government ofNew Brunswick, where in 1987, the Liberal Party won all 58 seats in that
provincial election. Parent said “You know, we do have some of our provinces where
they only elected one party-I’m thinking ofNew Brunswick.... I’ve never heard anyone
say that they weren’t carrying out the wishes of their people down there. Besides, I don’t
think it’s for us to dictate or tell other people how to run their countries.”45 Parent also
referred to Cubans as “fellow parliamentarians” and discussed their “so-called political
prisoners. Though Parent s remarks did encounter considerable criticism from other
members of the House of Commons, they do represent a tendency toward a more
favorable perception of Castro’s regime in Canada. 47 This perception is rooted in both a
desire to be independent from the United States- notice Parent’s remarks regarding
dictating to other countries’- and the emphasis on social justice in the Canadian identity.
These more positive perceptions of Castro and his government lead to policies
such as the Joint Declaration. Canada’s policy of engagement assumes that it is possible
to change the current Cuban government. The Joint Declaration, that was chiefly
44 Quoted Granatstein and Bothwell, 274.
MPs irate over Cuba comments: House speakers remarks assailed,” Miami Herald, March 1 1,
46
“Canada’s Cuban Confusion,” Globe and Mail, March 11, 1998.
47
This perception was also evident during interviews with senior Canadian officials.
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concerned with increasing ,he dialogue between Canada and Cuba, was based on this
assumption. Jus, after the Join, Declaration was signed, Axworthy said tha, he believed:
-that there are some changes taking place. I can’, predict where they’ll go, bu, a, leas, it’s
worth making an effort to promote them.
.
. I think as long as we can maintain a healthy
respect for our differences on this approach we may be able to see some real changes
with Cuba.”48
The way Canadians perceive human rights in Cuba is directly related to Canadian
identity and values. Canadians pride themselves on their social welfare programs. This
emphasis inherent in Canadian political culture leads Canadians to conceptualize the
human rights situation in Cuba differently than their American counterparts. Canadians
perceive human rights as including economic and social rights, and thus, look more
kindly on Castro’s nghts record. They also believe improvements in civil and political
rights in Cuba are very possible, and thus, are more easily encouraged by signs of
potential change in these areas.
In the early 1990s Ottawa was confident that the state of human rights in Cuba
was improving. In 1996 the Secretary of State, Christine Stewart told an audience in
Ottawa This constant dialogue that Cuba has had with Canada and other countries has
helped lead to reform. Cuba is moving ahead with changes to economic policy. There are
changes too, in human rights areas.”49 In 1998 Prime Minister Chretien told a reporter
48 PBS Online NewsHour, “Lloyd Axworthy,” (January 23, 1997)
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/january97/canada_l-23.html) (April 3, 2003).
49
“Notes of an Address by the Honourable Christine Stewart, Secretary of State (Latin America
and Africa), to the Symposium on Helms-Burton and International Business Sponsored by the Canadian
Foundation for the Americas and the Center for International Policy,” Ottawa (May 16, 1996)
(http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/statements/96 state/96 023e.htm ) February 22, 2002.
201
.hat
-I think he [Castro] is changing. The fact that my speech was on the air is a large
change; the fact that I met the Cardinal in public...”50 Similarly, Lloyd Axworthy told
reporters in 1 998 “We made some progress over the past year. We think it’s worth
continuing that kind of engagement. We have for example, just recently, as a follow-up to
the Pope’s visit, agreed to accept a number of political prisoners, who will be coming
directly to Canada.”51 In 1999, Axworthy described these changes in Cuba as “major
changes.”52
Although Canadian officials have become more disillusioned with Cuba’s
potential tor human rights improvement than they were in the 1990s, they continue to see
at least some reason to be hopeful. A 2001 government document states that though
Canada remains concerned about the “continued lack of respect in Cuba for civil and
political rights,” they stress that:
On the other hand, systematic violations of the integrity of the person (torture,
forced disappearances, summary executions) have not occurred since the early
1960s. Despite a deterioration in services due to the state of the economy, Cubans
continue to enjoy widely accessible systems of health, education and social
security. ,..[T]he Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister continue to raise
human rights concerns directly with the Cuban government, and provide
leadership to other Western counterparts who are only now beginning to engage
with Cuba. Canada is also working hard to support the creation of practical space
for non-governmental actors in Cuban society, including improved practices with
50
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unconditional release of political prisoners
.
53
th
Despite the recent disappointments, Canadians remain hopeful that Castro’s Cuba win
move toward a greater respect for human rights. They still believe their policy of
engagement will encourage more changes than a policy based on isolation.
Canadian government documents concerned with Cuba are careful to demarcate
civil and political rights from economic and social goals of the Cuban revolution. Foreign
policy officials stress that economic and social rights are respected
.
54
As in the quote
above, Canadians stress, “Cubans continue to enjoy widely accessible systems of health,
education, and social security.” 55 Canadians may not agree with communism but they are
sympathetic to what they understand to be Castro’s goals. Prime Minister Chretien has
said Castro, “still wants to use communism; I don’t believe in it... I’m a practical
politician- that doesn't mean I don’t have goals, that I don’t want to have social justice.
I m just not doctrinaire on the means. My view is we have to have growth in the world so
there will be more money for governments to give to people who are suffering in society.
I’m not in politics to make the rich richer. Castro wants the same thing. He has a
different technique. The values that contribute to a greater emphasis on economic and
53
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Canada- Cuba Relations (http/Vwww.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/cubarelations-e.asp) March
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55 Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada’s Relations with Cuba”
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56
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social rights within Canada (at least when compared to the United States) give Canadians
more sympathy for the economic and social goals of the Cuban revolution. As such.
Canadians also identify with the current regime in Cuba. Consequently, because
Canadians perceive the revolution and its goals in this way they are more likely to be less
critical of the regime and more likely to favor less drastic measures to encourage change.
Engagement thus becomes the preferred policy.
None of these identities, values, and perceptions are enough, alone, to explain
why Canada has maintained a policy of engagement toward the Castro regime for over
four decades. Yet, taken together these variables reinforce each other and direct policy in
one direction. Interviews, government documents, policy statements and press releases all
reveal the crucial undercurrent played by these identities and perceptions. Though other
countries have had similar relationships with Cuba, Canada has stood out as one of
Cuba’s closest friends in the West, despite the fact that as a close friend and neighbor of
the United States, Ottawa has been under the greatest pressure to “get in line” with US
policy. As such, the Canadian-Cuban relationship has been the focus of many scholarly
endeavors. The next section reviews the most popular explanation put forth by these
scholars for this policy and points out the problems with this account of the relationship
between the two countries.
Other Explanations
National economic interest arguments are frequently put forth to justify Canada’s
role in world affairs. In 1 999, Axworthy told an audience in Princeton, New Jersey that
Canada’s involvement in Kosovo was tied to Canada’s national interest because: “in an
increasingly interconnected world, where we are travelers, exporters and importers.
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investors and donors, we cannot afford to ignore the problems of others - even if we
wanted to.- Yet, as scholars of Canadian foreign policy have potnted out, in the Kosovo
case,
-[new Canadians travel there, export to or from there, or invest money there. The
same can be said of virtually all the other places where the Canadian Forces recently have
been deployed on peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions.”58 Thus, the national
interest is not always, or some would argue, is rarely, enough to explain Canadian foreign
policy.
Yet, a variant on this argument is most often put forward as the explanation for
Canada’s Cuba policy. Current Canadian scholarship emphasizes the role of trade in
Ottawa’s approach toward Cuba. Trade does have a significant impact on this policy but
its influence has often been exaggerated. For example, the popular impression that the
Diefenbaker government welcomed the American embargo as a potential windfall for
Canadian business is not correct. Many cite the visit of the Cuban Trade Mission to
Canada that occurred very shortly after the U.S. embargo was initiated as evidence that
Canada attempted to profit from the tension in U.S.- Cuban relations. According to the
Canadian-American Committee, this is false. The Canadian government did not invite the
mission and was embarrassed by the visit . 59 Prime Minister Diefenbaker asserted that it is
57 Quoted in Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Lloyd Axworthy’s Legacy,” International Journal
LVI, no. 1 (Winter 2000-2001): 2.
58
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Association of Canada and the National Planning Association, USA, which included leaders of big business
in both countries.
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“not our purpose to exploit the situation arising from the United States embargo, and we
have no intention of encouraging what in effect would amount to the bootlegging of
goods of United States origin.”60
In addition, while Canadian exports to Cuba did increase after the introduction of
American embargo, so did Canadian exports to other Latin American countries. Exports
to Cuba rose from $17.5 million in 1955 to $52.6 million in 1965, a three-fold increase.
However, exports to Argentina went from $6.8 million to $32.7 million in the same ten
years, an almost five-fold increase; and exports to Venezuela increased from $30.8
million to $73 million during that same period. Even though this bilateral trade continues
to be substantial, it comprises a relatively small percentage of Canada's overall trade, a
mere five percent of total Canadian exports to Latin America. 61
Additionally, many Canadian companies are hesitant about investing in Cuba
because of the special difficulties related to Cuba’s economic system. The Canadian
government counsels caution. The government publication Cuba: A Guide for Canadian
Business warns potential investors that, “Cuba is not for the timid or the unprepared. The
risks are substantial.”62 Thus, though trade is important to Canada, Cuba represents a
relatively minor and risky market for Canadian businesses.
Furthermore, according to a senior trade specialist in the Department of Foreign
60
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61
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Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadians did not beeome incensed about the
Cuban Democracy Act and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act because
they might interfere with Canadian trade with Cuba. They were angry because they think
that the bills are further evidence that the U.S. is attempting to dictate Canadian policy.
The extraterritoriality provisions were disturbing because they offer further evidence to
Canadians that the United States does not fully respect Canadian sovereignty. 63
Additionally, various aspects of Helms-Burton, such as Title III that allows American
citizens to sue foreign companies in American courts, are not in accord with international
law. Given Canada’s strong tradition of support for international law and concern over
American encroachment, it is not surprising that these considerations predominate over
concerns for Canadian - Cuban trade, demonstrating that trade with Cuba is not the only
reason behind the current policy of engagement.
It trade considerations were Canada’s main priority vis-a-vis Cuba, given
American attempts to discourage Canadian - Cuban trade and the importance of
American trade to the Canadian economy, then it would follow that Canada would likely
bow to American pressure. Canada’s relationship with the United States is much more
important than any benefits accrued from trade with Cuba. Trade with the United States
represents eighty-four percent of Canadian exports and accounts for twenty-eight percent
of Canadian GDP. 64 The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs asserts: “We are each
others largest trading partner, with US$1.2 billion in trade now crossing the Canada-US
63
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border every single day.”65 In 2002, Canada’s total exports to Cuba were Cnd. $259
million. In comparison, in 2002, Canada’s total exports to the United States were Cnd.
$346 billion. Import figures are similar- Canada’s total imports from Cuba amounted to
Cnd. $325milhon and from the United States a total of Cnd. $218 billion.66
David Malone, a former Canadian Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations and
a specialist in Canadian - Caribbean relations, emphasized to the author that even small
aspects of Canadian trade with the U.S. outweigh the importance of all Canadian trade
with Cuba. He asserted that the “Cubans have an erroneous view of the importance of
Canada’s trade with them. It is not nearly as crucial to Canada as they assume.”67 He also
stressed that Canada’s relationship with Cuba is “more so about Canada’s place in the
world, the importance of the rule of law and the feelings in Canada about American
interventions in Latin America and only recently have economic issues been important in
the Canada-Cuba relationship.”68 Thus, there are more than trade considerations at work.
The importance placed on Canadian sovereignty vis-a-vis the U.S. is a factor, as are the
other ideas prevalent in the Canadian psyche.
“Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada- United States: Trade
and the Economy,” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?mid=l&cat= 1029 1 April 4, 2003.
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Conclusion
Canadian foreign policy is a complex reflection of many variables. Without a
doubt, Canadian leaders have manipulated the Canadian public and have used these
variables to hide other more self-interest based policy objectives such as furthering trade.
However, values, identity, and perceptions play a leading role in most Canadian actions
on the world stage. The motto “peace, order and good governance” which includes values
such as mediation, dialogue, respect for international law and social justice, among
others, is taken seriously by both the foreign policy establishment and the Canadian
public. The Canadian identity as a “good international citizen,” “peacekeeper,” and as
“distinct from the United States” are also deeply interwoven into foreign policy
decisions. Everything from the Canadian perception of Fidel Castro to the decision to
negotiate the historic Joint Declaration in the late 1990s are influenced by these variables.
And while the traditional economic explanation for Canada’s Cuba policy is not without
weight, we cannot afford to ignore that this policy is driven by more fundamental
variables. Cuba is clearly an example of the degree to which Canadian foreign policy can
be value and identity driven.
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CHAPTER 8
CUBA POLICY IN TANDEM: PERCEPTIONS, VALUES AND IDENTITIES
Introduction
Americans and Canadians not only share the world’s longest undefended border
but are the closest of friends. Over 200 million people cross the border each year. 1 People
from both countries often work, live or have friends or relatives in the other country.
Most people on both sides of the 49,h parallel view their neighbor as we might view our
nearest relative or friend. Consequently, these two peoples share many world-views and
values.
Yet, despite these similarities, important differences exist. This is particularly true
of foreign policy. The United States and Canada have very different views about their
respective roles on the world stage. Clearly, the fact that the United States is a
superpower and Canada is a relatively minor (or middle) power is an important factor in
the daily foreign policy calculations made in Ottawa or Washington. By examining each
country s policy toward Cuba in tandem, this chapter will demonstrate that there is far
more than these strategic, realist calculations involved in the formulation of foreign
policy. Differences exist because the two countries are different in other ways- they have
their own identities, values and perceptions that contribute to the formation of very
distinct approaches toward this island regime.
As Chapter Five demonstrated, the American identity as an exceptional nation had
1
Canada Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Border- Update 2000, (Minister of Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 2000)
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210
a major influence on their approach toward Cuba. And as Chapter Seven showed.
Canada's identity as an international good citizen, peacekeeper and as “not American”
had a similarly important influence on their approach toward this same state. This section
will further illustrate, through direct comparison, that these identities and their
corresponding values contribute to the disparate policies of isolation and engagement.
We must remember that, especially in the post-Cold war era, policy makers in
Ottawa and Washington claim to have the same ends in mind- the transition of Cuba into
a more democratic and human rights respecting state. Yet, the two have chosen opposite
routes to that same goal, and despite movements in both countries to adopt policies that
resemble their neighbor’s approach- in Canada many feel the foreign policy
establishment has been naive and want a harsher line taken with Castro; in the United
States there is a strong movement to get their government to try engagement - the
powers that be continue to be relatively confident that their policy remains the “best way
to deal with Castro.” By examining the American and Canadian reactions to two high-
profile post-Cold War issues that captured the attention of the public and officials in both
countries this chapter illustrates how the different identities and their associated ideas and
values translate into unique perceptions, distinct norms and thus, policies. First, we
examine the Brothers to the Rescue shoot-down in 1996, and second, the renewed
speculation that Castro’s regime in involved in terrorism in 2002-2003,
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and Helms-Rurtnn
On February 24, 1996, the Cuban government shot down two planes flown by the
Cuban-American group. Brothers to the Rescue. This group, founded in 1991. was
initially formed to assist Cubans who ventured out in often-unseaworthy vessels, across
the Florida Straits, headed for American shores. The Brothers to the Rescue planes
would spot these rafts and alert the U.S. Coastguard. The Coastguard ships would then
pick up the rafters and bring them to the United States to be processed by Immigration.
However, by the mid-1990s this group was using these flights for an additional purpose.
They would fly over the Cuban mainland, dropping leaflets critical of the Cuban
government trom their planes. On January 9 and 13, 1 996 the planes distributed
thousands ot these flyers in flights over Havana, obviously embarrassing and angering
the government. As a result, the Cuban Air Force received instructions not to tolerate
further incursions into Cuban airspace. Thus, when the Brothers to the Rescue planes
approached Cuba on February 24 the Air Force went after them and downed two.
The international community largely condemned this action by a government
against unarmed civilian aircraft. However, the interpretation of the events and the degree
of condemnation varied considerably among nations. In particular, countries disagreed
about whether the airplanes were over international or Cuban waters when they were shot
down and the degree to which the Brothers to the Rescue provoked the Cuban response.
The American motion to condemn the attack in the United Nations was passed only after
it had been watered down, reflecting the different interpretations of the circumstances.2
2 CNN, “U.N. ‘strongly deplores’ Cuban action,” CNN
(http://www.cnn.com/US/96Q2/cuba shootdown/27/8am/index.htmn (July 2 1 , 2002).
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Reactions in Canada and the United States differed significantly and illustrate the distinct
approaches toward Cuba and the importance of the underlying constructivist variables.
The American Response
Condemnation was strong and swift in the United States. The American
government maintained that the planes were in international airspace at the time and that
there was no possible justification for the shoot down. On February 26, 1 996, President
Clinton began his speech that announced new sanctions against Cuba with: “Two days
ago, in broad daylight and without justification, Cuban military aircraft shot down two
civilian planes in international airspace... The planes were unarmed and clearly so...
They posed no credible threat to Cuba’s security...”3 Members of Congress who were
vocal opponents of the embargo did not challenge the administration’s interpretation of
events. Democratic Senator, Christopher Dodd stated: “It is inexcusable for a heavily
armed plane to attack unarmed commercial private planes under any circumstances.”4
In response, the Clinton administration, which until then, had been opposing a bill
sponsored by lawmakers Jesse Helms and Dan Burton that would tighten the embargo,
acted quickly to sign it into law. This bill reflected an official American perception of the
events. It stated that: “Brothers to the Rescue is a Miami-based humanitarian organization
engaged in searching for and aiding Cuban refugees in the Straits of Florida, and was
“Remarks Announcing Sanctions Against Cuba Following the Downing of Brothers to the
Rescue Airplanes,” Weekly Compilation ofPresidential Documents (February 26, 1996)
(http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov ') (April 15,2002).
4
U.S. State Department, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity [Libertad] Act of 1996
Conference Report (Senate - March 05, 1996),”
(http://www.senate.gov/~dood/press/Speeches/104 96/0303.htm ) (January 28, 2002).
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engaged in such a mission on Saturday, February 24, 1996.”5 The U.S. also campaigned
for a UN motion to condemn Cuba. In addition, though eventually rejected, military
action against Cuba was seriously considered in the White House.6
Most American policy makers on both sides of the embargo debate adopted
similar intetpretations of the incident. No, everyone was supportive of Helms-Burton bu,
most felt the government had to take significant action against Cuba. While there were
important political reasons (such as the political clout of the Cuban-American
community) for the American response, this incident involved deeply held U.S. values
and identities.
Americans have always believed that America is a special nation, above all
others, and as such, is obliged to assist less fortunate nations to follow the U.S. example.
This American exceptionahsm, with its embodying American-centric world-view and
ideas ot the American moral mission, helped to construct the U.S. response to the shoot
down. Stuart Eizenstat, Clinton’s spokesperson on Cuba, explained to an international
audience that the American reaction to the downing could be traced to the fact that there
is a moral core to our foreign policies.” 7 The Helms-Burton Act itself states that “The
United States has shown a deep commitment, and considers it a moral obligation, to
U.S. State Department, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity [Libertad] Act of 1996-
PL 1 04- 1 1 4,” (http://usinfo.state.gov/reuional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm ') (August 26, 200 1 ).
Richard Nuccio, Cuba. A U.S. Perspective,” in Trans-Atlantic Tensions Richard N. Haass, ed.
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 7-28. See also Dominguez, “U.S.-Cuban
Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War,” Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World Affairs 39
no. 3 (Fall 1997): 62.
7 Quoted in Heather N. Nicol, “The Geopolitical Discourse of Helms-Burton,” in Canada, the US
and Cuba Helms Burton and Its Aftermath Heather N. Nicol ,ed. (Kingston, ON: Centre for International
Relations, 1999), 96.
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promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms...” 8
The passage of the Helms-Burton Act showed that the United States still saw
ttself as the “city on the hill” whose responsibility it was to demonstrate to the rest of the
world how to correctly and morally respond to the incident. Helms-Burton declares: “The
Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has
oppressed them for 36 years, and the continued failure to do so constitutes ethically
improper conduct by the international community.”9 As such. Helms
-Burton builds upon
the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act which “calls upon the President to encourage the
governments of countries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit
relations with Cuba in an manner consistent with the purposes of that Act.” 10 Title III of
Helms-Burton allows for citizens of other countries to be punished in American courts
for “trafficking” in property previously owned by U.S. nationals and confiscated by the
Castro regime, rule IV bars those people from entering the United States. In accordance
with Title IV the State Department has informed executives of Canadian and Mexican
companies engaged in such activity in Cuba, that they will be prevented from gaining
entry into the United States. These titles are designed to pressure other countries into
adopting similar policies toward the island regime. These extraterritorial elements
demonstrate that the United States, still acting as the “city on the hill ” believes it needs
to guide other wayward states into doing the right thing.
U.S. State Department, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996”
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-Cuba/libertad.htm) (August 26, 2001).
9
U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996”
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-Cuba/libertad.htm) (August 26, 2001).
10
Ibid.
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Underpinning the Helms-Burton Act is the belief that Cuba is the most wayward
state in the hemisphere and is, thus, most in need of American guidance. This Act is an
evolution of a century-long perception of Cuba as a less than capable country that needs
American guidance. This perception emanates from the American view of the Western
Hemisphere as part of the U.S. sphere of influence." Since Cuba is located “only ninety
miles from the United States" i, is understood to be naturally within the American sphere
of influence and hence, not fully sovereign. The Helms-Burton Act was influenced by
this perception. Helms-Burton, in part, justifies its embargo tightening measures by
arguing that the United States led an embargo against Haiti and since Haiti is “a neighbor
of Cuba not as close to the United States as Cuba" it follows that the United States should
have a tighter embargo against Cuba
.
12
Cuba’s “special status” in relation to the United States is described in many ways.
Often Cuba is referred to as part of the “American family.” For example, Michael
Ranneberger, the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs at the State Department explained their
policy this way: “We do not react to repression and hardship in Cuba as we would to the
plight ot a stranger, but rather as we would to a crisis that befalls a close family
1
'The idea of spheres of influence is completely accepted by the United States’ foreign policy
establishment. The academic and foreign policy communities in other countries do not as readily accept
theories that place the United States at the center of international relations. For example, see Robert M.A.
Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis eds. International Relations- Still an American Social Science? (Albany
University ifNew York Press, 2001 ).
U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996”
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-Cuba/libertad.htm) (August 26, 2001).
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member.
As such, American policy makers assume the United States is within its rights to
‘bend’ Cuban sovereignty. Helms-Burton is a product of this line of reasoning as it
illustrates the degree to which the United States believes it has a natural right to intervene
in Cuban affairs. Helms-Burton assumes that the US has a responsibility to oversee, if not
direct, any transition to democracy in Cuba. This piece of legislation lists numerous
criteria for a democratic Cuba that clearly demonstrate this perception of Cuban
sovereignty. It stipulates that Fidel or Raul Castro could not be part of a legitimate
Cuban government. If Fidel Castro was elected (even in a free and fair election), Helms-
Burton forces the U.S. to automatically treat the election as invalid. Helms-Burton also
requires that the Cuban government release all political prisoners, make all political
activity legal, and establish free and fair elections
.
14
The new government must also
permit the American broadcast of Radio and TV Marti or risk being declared not
legitimate by Washington. Furthermore, this Act dictates that Cuba give up its socialist
system
.
15
Jorge Dominguez argues that these requirements well surpass any accepted
OAS or UN requirements tor the determination of democratizing governments. He
believes: mandating them in US legislation as defining characteristics of a democratic or
transitional Cuban government makes a mockery of the pledge to respect Cuban
U.S. Department of State, Cuba: U.S. Policy Now and in the Future- Remarks by Michael
Rannaberger, Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, before the Governor’s Cuba Advisory Group, Miami, Florida,
February 28, 1997,” (http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/970228 rannebenrer.html 1 fSentemhpr 0
2002 ).
14
U.S. House of Representatives, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
(Washington DC, 1996), Report 104-168, sec. 201.
15
Ibid, sec. 206.
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sovereignty." 16 This perception that the United States is naturally entitled to intervene in
this way beeause Cuba is. more than any other eountry, within their sphere of intluence,
has greatly influenced the course of American-Cuban relations.
In addition, the metaphors and symbolic references used in the discourse about
the shoot down reflect and reinforce the good vs. evil comparison and moral reasoning
characteristic of discussions of U.S.-Cuban relations. For example, in the opening
statement at the hearing about the shoot down before the House of Representatives the
Chairman declared: “We are here because we, as Americans, are a Nation of freedom and
independence, because we believe in liberty, and we certainly believe in human rights
and human dignity.”' 7 In contrast, Cuba and Cuban actions are demonized: “On that
fateful afternoon, the ruthless nature of the Castro regime was clearly revealed. Like
vultures awaiting their prey, Cuban MiGs circled and hovered until they locked on to the
frail Cessna planes...” 18 These representations reinforce the intense emotions about U.S.
- Cuban relations and influence how those listening think about the incident and
consequently, greatly affect their response.
Thus, the American response to the February 24 downing was a product of deeply
entrenched identities, values and perceptions. Though not disputing the importance of
other factors (such as the political power of the Cuban-American community nor the fact
16
Dominguez, “U.S.-Cuban Relations,” 58.
17
U.S. House of Representatives, “Shoot-Down of the Brothers to the Rescue Planes, Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary,” 106 Congress, First session (July
19, 1999) (http://commdocs.house.Kov/committees/iudiciarv/hiu63608.000/hiu63608 0 htm) (August 21
2002).
6
18
Ibid.
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that US citizens were killed) this section revealed the significance of other variables.
Factors such as American exceptionalism and the long-standing perception of the
legitimacy of Cuba's sovereignty vis-a-vis the American sphere of influence cannot be
discounted in calculations of the U.S. response to the shoo, down of the Brothers to the
Rescue planes.
The next subsection will examine the Canadian response to this same
international incident, revealing the influence of a different set of perceptions, identities,
and values.
The Canadian Response
The Canadian response to the incident was a reflection of Canadian values,
identity and perceptions. Reaction in Canada, though critical of the Cuban action, was
more mixed and muted than the American response. The Cuban justification for the shoot
down was given greater consideration in Ottawa. Canadians, always sympathetic to
Cuban claims of American interference in their sovereignty tended to emphasize the
previous incursions by the Brothers’ planes. For example, Keith Martin, a Canadian
Member of Parliament and the Opposition Critic for Foreign Affairs, wrote the following
about the incident:
However, as is often the case, all is not what it seems to be. Although the shooting
down of these two planes was quite rightly condemned by the international
community, the dead pilots were not exactly on a quixoitic mission. They ... were
committed to overthrowing the regime of Fidel Castro by whatever means
necessary. This organization was flying up to thirty-two missions per week,
ostensibly to look for Cubans fleeing their homeland so they could guide them
safely to U.S. shores. However, their activities have often taken on a much more
invasive role... dropping leaflets over Cuba encouraging the people to insurrect
and depose Mr. Castro . . . These activities can hardly be looked upon favourably
by Mr. Castro. In fact, the Brotherhood has been repeatedly warned to stay away
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from Cuba airspace but has refused. 19
He goes on to state that ”[m]a„y of its members are CIA trained and some even took par,
in the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.”20 While Dr. Martin’s interpretation was
no, accepted by all Members of Parliament, most of these points were no, disputed by a
majority of Canadians. In fact, high-level Canadian officials told the author in interviews
that the Brothers to the Rescue planes were inside Cuban airspace on a mission to drop
leaflets and that the Cuban military warned the planes to leave before they were shot
down. 21 This understanding of the events of February 24, 1996, differs considerably from
the perception reflected in Helms-Burton that the planes were engaged in a solely
humanitarian mission to rescue rafters and were shot down without warning.
The shadow of Canadian sovereignty and perceptions of American encroachment
loom large over a great deal of Ottawa's foreign policy calculations. As such, the
Canadian reaction to the shoot down became principally focused on the American
decision to pass Helms-Burton, which Canadians saw as a direct challenge to their
sovereignty. The following was heard on the floor of the Senate and typifies the reaction
in Ottawa:
Canada, of course, strongly condemned the shooting down of two civilian aircraft
by the Cuban air force on February 24, the incident which helped the passage of
the Helms-Burton Act, and we were active in the consideration of the incident by
the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO. However, we do not think
Keith Martin, “America’s Cuban Debacle,” TV Times (Ottawa March 15, 1996). Posted on
Keith Martin’s website (http://keithmartin.org/policv/foreign/foreign cuba.shtmH (July 17, 2002).
20
Ibid.
1999.
21
Confidential interview with senior Canadian government official, Ottawa, Canada, October
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Helms-Burton is the way to deal with the Cuban problem. 22[my emphasis]
Similarly, Darrel Stinson (Reform MP) explained Ottawa’s reaction: “I do no, appreciate
another country’s telling Canada how to tun our foreign policies. 1 may no, agree with
Canadian foreign policy but that is for us, this House and the other place representing the
C anadtan people to decide. Canadian foreign policy toward Cuba or any other nation
must not be dictated by another country.”23 James Blanchard, the US ambassador to
Canada during this period recalled that in Canada, “Helms-Burton was a headline story in
all the newspapers and TV reports, because it looked as though Canadian companies and
their executives were being told wha, to do by the American government. It became a
sovereignty issue.”24
Another Member of Parliament, Bill Blaikie (New Democratic MP), illustrates
how the issue of sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States draws Canada and Cuba together
and influences the Canadian response to related international events. During a discussion
about the Brothers to the Rescue downing and Helms-Burton, he stated, “...Cuba, like
Canada, is in the so-called American sphere of influence and is supposed to behave like a
good little neighbour. However, when it comes to Cuba, Canada has shown a streak of
independence that we do not always show on other issues.
.
.” He went on to urge the
Canada Parliament, Foreign Affairs, Issue 11, Evidence Proceedings ofthe Standing Senate
Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Ottawa, November 5, 1996) ('http://www.oarl.gc.ca/search/qfnllhit-
EJ}tw?CiWebHitsFile=/35/2/parlbiis/commbus/senate/com ~) (April 16, 2002).
23
" Canada Parliament, “Government Orders (071) 4507 Government Orders- Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act,” (Ottawa, Friday September 20, 1996) (http://www.narl gc ca) (Anril 16
2002 ).
—
James J. Blanchard, Behind the Embassy Door: Canada, Clinton and Quebec (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1998), 147.
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Minister of Foreign Affairs to continue to resist ‘this latest manifestation of the bully i„
the American psyche."25 Canadians are quick to identify themselves with Cubans,
especially when it comes to Canadian and Cuban bilateral relations with the United
States. This perception clearly had an influence on their response to the downing as
Canadians empathized with the Cuban position.
The discourse about Helms-Burton reflects not only the emphasis Canadians place
on protecting their sovereignty from the United States and their corresponding
identification with the Cuban predicament, but also reflects other Canadian values. The
Canadian mantra of "peace, order and good government” that is so evident in domestic
affairs is also manifested in foreign policy. Policy toward Cuba after the Brothers to the
Rescue tragedy reveals the influence of this triad and the corresponding identities as a
good international citizen and as a peacekeeper on Canadian foreign policy. For
example, Ottawa attempted to reduce the conflict between the Americans and Cubans
over this issue. Officially and unofficially, Canadian diplomats raised the issue with their
Cuban and American counterparts. During a 1996 visit by a group of parliamentarians
from Cuba, Senator Grafstein asked of the Cuban delegation:
Please do not take this as being undiplomatic, but it was a question that we, as
Canadians, could not answer in our private conversations with senators and
congressmen. It is the theory of the Americans - which we do not accept, but I
pass it on - that Cuba provoked the Americans by overreacting to the planes that
were flying over Cuba. The suggestion is that there were other means, other
forceful means, available to Cuba to remove those planes from the airspace over
Cuba if, indeed, those airplanes had invaded Cuban airspace. During the Cold
War in Canada we were used to this. The Russians invaded our space, the
Americans invaded our space, and we tried to kick them out as gently as we
25Canada Parliament, Thursday February 29, 1996 - Statements by Members (003) 128
Statements by Members [English], (http://www.parl.gc.
c
a/35/2/parlbus/chamhiis/liniise/dehatpc/ons 96-02-
29/003SM 1 E.htmn (April 16, 2002)
' ~
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could. That is a rather long prologue to a very short question. We hone that
confljcts can be kept to a minimum between now and next year, when we hope
lmPaCt °f ‘hiS terriWe [^e *ms"^urton ] bill. Wha, is your
Another Canadian senator told the Cubans in this same meeting:
We have a dispute between two countries, Cuba and the United States It hasalways been my experience that, in a dispute, nobody is 100 percent right andnobody is 100 percent wrong. Each side has responsibility to try and resolve ihedispute. I am not blammg either side here, but 1 want to know what efforts if anyCuba ,s taking to resolve this dispute. There are other ways to resolve disputesthan speaking directly to the person with whom you are having the dispute. There
are what known as - and you will know this - diplomatic initiative. You cango through third parties; you can ask other people to try to broker a deal 27
As Senator Grafstein alluded above, Canadians held similar conversations with American
politicians. Interviews confirmed that officials at a number of levels discussed the shoot
down with their American counterparts.28 As Chapter Seven demonstrated the belief in
mediation is a deeply entrenched Canadian value and an intimate part of the Canadian
identity. The attempt to mediate this dispute was a natural reaction for Canadian policy-
makers, reflecting deeply held values and identities.
Because Canadians give great weight to peaceful and orderly resolutions of
international incidents and international law, they pushed for the dispute to be deliberated
by the International Court. Warren Allmand, a Liberal Member of Parliament, argued:
“The shooting down of the two U.S. planes was indeed a deplorable incident. Both sides
26
Canada Parliament, “Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Issue 2-
Evidence,” (Ottawa, May 28, 1996) (http:// www.parUc.ca/35/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/FORE-
E/02EV-E.htm ') (April 16, 2002).
28 t • • •
Interviews with senior Canadian government officials, Ottawa, Canada, October
,
1999.
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claim to be right. Consequently, that is a matter for the International Court and not one
(or unilateral action.-’ 2’ Similarly, one objection to Helms-Burton was that the bill was
contrary to international law and
-proper’ behavior. Mr. Charlie Penson, a Canadian
Alliance MP voiced this opinion: “I make the point that the United States has every right
to challenge Cuba and to put trade sanctions of a binational nature in place. However, it is
simply not within the international parameters of good citizenship or international trade
to take that outside its borders and apply it to countries such as Canada.”30 Arthur
Eggleton, the Minister for International Trade, told parliament: “Helms-Burton is
unacceptable because it flouts long established international legal practices for settling
disputes between nations regarding claims by foreign investors who have had their
property expropriated.... By choosing to ignore them now, Helms-Burton sets a
dangerous precedent .’'31 Likewise, Canada sought recourse against the United States in
international law. Charlie Penson (Canadian Alliance MP) declared: “Nowadays when a
bully bullies us we do not have to put our tail between our legs and run. We do not have
to get bloodied in the fight either. We can take that bully to international court. Let us
29Canada Parliament, “Thursday, March 14, 1996 - Statements by Members (013) 703 Statements
by Members [Translation], (http://www.parl. gc.ca/35/2/parlbus/chambiis/ion<;e/Hphatp<;/nn 96-03-
14/013SM1 E.html ~) (April 16, 2002).
30Canada Parliament, “Government Orders (071) 4507 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act,”
(Ottawa, September 20, 1996) (http://www.parl.gc.ca) (April 16, 2002).
31 Canada House of Commons, “Government Orders Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act,”
(Ottawa, September 20, 1996) ( http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/2/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/071 96-09-
20/07 lG01E.html ) (August 20, 2002).
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take the Americans to court to see if we can get the Helms-Burton bill overturned.”33 The
fact that Canadians think of themselves as peacekeeping, law abiding, good international
citizens had a significant influence on their response to the events of February 24. 1996
and reaction to Helms-Burton.
“Non-Americanism” and the values of “peace, order, and good government” that
are inherent in the Canadian identity largely determined the Canadian response to the
shoot down and the ensuing Helms-Burton legislation enacted by the American
government. Speaking about Helms-Burton, Roger Simmons, a Liberal MP, rather
bluntly summarized the influences on the Canadian perception. He said: “Apart from the
fact that it flies in the face of everything we understand about the rule of law, about the
territorial integrity of sovereign nations, it also says volumes about the arrogance of the
people who would advance that kind of legislation.”33 Always fiercely protective of any
American encroachment on Canadian sovereignty, and perceiving that Cuba is, to a
certain degree, also on constant guard against American infringement, it was natural for
Ottawa to first, give the Cuban “story" of the events more credence and second, to react
very strongly against the American decision to pass Helms-Burton. However, invariably
focused on international law, peace, and order it was also natural for Canada to attempt to
resolve the dispute and call on the involvement of the International Court.
Thus, the Canadian and American interpretations of, and reactions to, that fateful
Canada House of Commons, “Foreign Affairs, Issue 1 1, Evidence Proceedings of the Standing
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs,” (Ottawa, November 5, 1996).
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t
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Canada Parliament “Friday September 20, 1996- Government Orders (071) Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act,” (http://ww\v/parl.iic.ca) (April 16, 2002).
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downing on February 24, .996 illustrate the crucial role played by values, pereeplions
and identities in foreign policy. The American response was a natural evolution of values
and identities rooted in American exceptionalism and long established perceptions of
Cuba’s place within the U.S. sphere of influence. The Canadian reaction had a great deal
to do with their non-American identity and the values and identities associated with their
role as an international good citizen and peacekeeper.
The Power of Perception
The popular phrase ‘perception is everything” is a bit of an exaggeration but
perception certainly carries a great deal of weight over outcomes and is indeed an
important factor in foreign policy. Perception plays a significant role in the development
and continuation of Canadian and American policies toward Cuba.
From the earliest point in Ottawa and Washington’s relationship with Castro’s
regime the two sets of policy makers perceived the situation very differently. At a 1960
meeting between the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green,
and the U.S. Under Secretary of State, Norman Robertson, the differences in perceptions
of Cuba were clearly evident. Robinson reported, “the Canadians spoke with such force
and candor that the Americans present were shocked at the extent of the division between
the Canadian analysis and their own. ’3 This difference caused some tension between the
normally friendly neighbors. Americans protested in front of the Canadian embassy in
Washington and were discouraged from vacationing north of the border, and Canadian
tourists in Florida noticed a colder reception. 35
34 Quoted in Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations, 49.
35
Ibid, 49-50.
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Over forty years later, Canadian and American perceptions of Cuba remain
antithetical. Both the State Department and the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) provide fact sheets on all countries. The two descriptions of
Cuba are telling. The DFAIT sheet on Cuba states the following under type of
government:
-Republic. 14 provinces and 1 special municipality (Isle of Youth).
Unicameral National Assembly of the People’s Power. Assembly sits twice a year;
representatives of the Assembly serve 5 year terms.”36 In contrast, the State Department’s
Background sheet on Cuba states the following under government type: “Communist
state; current government assumed power by force January 1, 1959. Independence: May
20, 1902. Political party: Cuban Communist Party (CCP); only one party allowed.
Administrative subdivisions: 14 provinces, including the city of Havana, and one special
municipality (Isle of Youth).”37 Both descriptions are presented as fact and neither
description is factually wrong. Each reflects a different perception of the Cuban
government.
To most American policy makers Cuba’s totally undemocratic status is taken for
granted. Cuba represents the antithesis of democracy. Indeed, most countries do not
consider Cuba to be a model of democratic governance. Yet, there is considerable
disagreement among the countries of the world about Cuba’s democratic status. The
United States and Canada are both democracies that believe that democracy is the best
form of government. Yet, the United States believes more deeply than Canada that there
36
Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Cuba Fact Sheet,”
(http://wvvw.infoexDort.gc.cat February 14, 2002.
37
U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba (09/01),”
(http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/bgn/2886.htm t February 15, 2002.
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is one form of democracy and that it is their duty to spread democracy. Consequently, the
Americans emphasize the undemocratic nature of the Cuban regime to a greater degree
than Canada. This became especially clear during my interviews in Havana. In my
interview with a senior officer at the Canadian embassy in Havana I was told quite
sternly that they did not presume that the Cuban form of government was undemocratic,
that there were “many forms of democracy .”38 Although this does not represent the
official Canadian policy, Canadians generally are more receptive to non-westem
conceptions of democracy. While most Canadian officials believe that Cuba does not
have fair and free national elections and that there are considerable restrictions on press
freedoms they perceive that Cubans have considerable impact on local affairs and have
other democratic-like features. They are also more sympathetic to Castro’s argument
about the failings of western democracies. In contrast, the officials at the American
interest section in Havana stressed that the current Cuban regime was extremely
undemocratic.
Both Canadians and Americans reduce the revolution, Castro, and the Cuban
people to caricatures that serve to perpetuate the two approaches to the island. For
example, in most American discourse Castro is portrayed an evil tyrant and the Cuban
people are poverty-stricken victims of his tyranny who require American rescue.
Whereas, in much ot Canadian discourse Castro is described as a freedom fighter turned
leader who has considerable support among the Cuban populace and who has had to
contend with the overwhelming presence of the United States. For decades, Canadians
38
This does not represent the official Canadian position vis-a-vis Cuba but demonstrates a much
greater diversity of acceptable views on the subject within the Canadian foreign policy establishment.
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have maintamed that while freedoms are restricted in Cuba, in comparison to many other
regimes, Castro’s crimes are less serious. They claim that crimes like disappearances
prevalent in other regimes do not occur in Cuba. The next section examines American
and Canadian perceptions of Cuba’s ties to terrorism.
Iwo Perceptions: Cuba as a Terrorist
-Snonsorino s, al„o
Recently, American discourse about Cuba has speculated about Fidel Castro’s
terrorist connections and activities. Americans are concerned that Castro not only harbors
terrorists, but is actively trying to disrupt the U.S. ability to combat terrorism and is also
engaged in biological weapons research and development. In contrast, Canadians do not
seem at all worried about those charges. The Canadian discourse about terrorism does not
single out Cuba.
The American Perception
Especially after September 1 1, 2001, terrorism is considered the most important
threat to the American way of life. To associate Castro with terrorism has potentially
serious consequences for American policy toward the island. The State Department lists
Cuba as one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism. The other countries on the list are
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. In April of 1999, Michael Sheehan, the
Acting Coordinator for the Office for Counterterrorism stated, “Cuba, quite bluntly,
continues to provide safe haven for terrorists, period. They will remain on the list while
they continue to provide safe haven for a number of terrorist organizations.”39 After the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, speculation about Castro’s role in
39
U.S. State Department, Press Briefing on Release of "Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998"
(Washington, DC, April 30, 1999).
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international terrorism took center stage in many Washington discussions about the island
nation, in the spring of 2002, the Undersecretary of State, John R. Bolton, suggested that
Cuba was developing biological weapons. 40 He said, “Cuba has at least a limited,
offensive biological warfare research-and-development effort.”41 In September of that
year the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere AfTairs accused the
Castro regime of supplying false information to the United States’ investigation into
terrorism, effectively sending American officials on “wild goose chases” and thus,
“impeding our efforts to defeat the threat of terrorism.”42
These accusations and Cuba’s inclusion on the list of sponsors of terrorism are
challenged by many, calling into question the security rationale for these charges.
According to most estimates Cuba does not pose a terrorist threat and, when pressed for
specifics, even American government sources that issued the various accusations are hard
pressed to come up with significant or recent evidence of such a danger. Many
government documents that address terrorism omit any mention of the Cuban threat even
though its place on the list suggests it is one of the most serious offenders. For example,
though the State Department document entitled Patterns ofGlobal Terrorism lists Cuba
in its state-sponsored terrorism section, it does not discuss any threat posed by Cuba in
40
Christopher Marquis and Eric Schmitt, “Bush Faces Pressure From Congress to Alter Cuba
Policy,” New York Times
,
May 19, 2002 (http://www.nvttimes.com/2002/05/2Q
/intemational/americas/20CUBA.htmn (May 20, 2002).
U.S. State Department, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,
“The U.S. Position on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the BW Threat,” Remarks at Tokyo
America Center, Tokyo, Japan, August 26, 2002 (http://www.state.gOv/t/us/rm/13090.htm ) (September 18
2002 ).
42
Christopher Marquis, “U.S. Accuses Cuba of Trying to Disrupt Antiterrorism Effort,” New York
Times, September 18, 2002
(http://www.nvtimes.eom/2002/09/l 8intemational/18CUBA.html?tntemaill )(September 18, 2002).
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the section which details the specific terrorist threats in Latin America. This section
devotes significant space to discussing the threats posed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, none of which are
on the list of seven states highlighted by the State Department as the most serious threats
Paul Pillar, the former deputy chief of the CIA Counterterrorist Center wrote the
following about Cuba's inclusion on the list:
Cuba s remaining links with terrorism consist of providing a home for a handfiilmembers of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group (ETA) and other
fugitives and providing some accommodations to the Revolutionary AimedForces of Colombia and National Liberation Army... The Castro regime’s post-co war retrenchment has been so extensive that it is doing nothing either in
itspariah status^
^ " eX,ema ’ aC ' ivitieS tha ' W0U 'd aPPear ,0 V*® * for
When pressed, Michael Sheehan also admitted that Cuba’s inclusion on the list was
questionable. He stated, “It is true, in fact, that Cuba and several other states on that list
could take what we would consider not difficult steps to move them off the list of state-
sponsorship.”'-' Thus, the inclusion of Cuba on the list has little to do with the seriousness
of the terrorist threat emanating from the island.
What then explains the inclusion of Cuba on this list of the state sponsors and the
frequent speculation about Castro’s terrorist activities? Clearly, the political clout of the
Cuban-American community is partially responsible for this designation. Yet, as Chapter
Five pointed out, the Cuban American community is not all-powerful. Recently, CANF
has failed to stop the growing movement within Congress that favors easing restrictions
Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 2001), 161.
44
U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing on Release of "Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998"
(Washington, DC, April 30, 1999).
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on trade and travel with Cuba. 45 Thus, despite their influence over the year 2000
presidential elections, this lobby appears to be losing, not gaining, strength. So, even
though they do their best to publicize a link between the Cuban regime and tem>rism,
there are additional factors that explain the frequent characterization of the island as a
terrorist haven. The prevalence of a certain way of thinking about Cuba and the values
and identities that underlie that thinking have influenced the popular and often official
depiction of Castro as a terrorist.
Alter September 11, 2001 the United States (and arguably the rest of the western
world) had a new all-important enemy- terrorism. The horrific attacks on the World
I rade Center and the Pentagon were immediately understood by Americans as an
deliberate attack on American values; in particular, democracy and freedom. It was
believed that the terrorists attacked the United States because the U.S. represents these
values.
46
Castro, seen as a long-term enemy of these values, was naturally perceived to be
on the side of the terrorists. American officials often compare Fidel Castro to Saddam
Hussein and other pariahs. For example, Dana Rohrabacher (Rep- Calif) told Congress
that Castro is “demonstrably stronger than (Iraqi President) Saddam Hussein in his
Cuban American National Foundation, “CANF Deplores Latest House Actions on Cuba;
Expresses Confidence in President's Commitment to Maintain Policy” (July 25, 2002)
(http://www.canfhet.org/News/020725releasea.htm) (September 20, 2002).
46 On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush told a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People that: “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in
this chamber - a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our
freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree
with each other.” See: U.S. White House, George W. Bush “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People,” ( http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001092Q-8.html ) (September
26, 2002).
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ability to hurt the U.S .”47 Dennis Hays, the former head of the State Department Cuba
Affairs and now the Executive Vice-President ofCANF argued “Enlisting Castro in the
light against terrorism is like deputizing John Gotti in the fight against organized
crime .”48
To assume that his regime would be engaged in the production of chemical or
biological weapons, regardless of international norms or agreements against their
production, is a natural evolution of that line of thought. Thus, the logic is that since
Castro is without morals, if he has the means to produce biological weapons, then it is
most likely that he is doing so. Hence, all that needs to be said is that Cuba has the
capacity to make these weapons for many Americans to assume that Cuba is indeed
engaged in biological weapons production.
Since they do not have proof that Fidel Castro is developing biological weapons,
most statements made about Cuba as a biological weapons threat almost always stress
that Cuba has the “capability or capacity” to produce these weapons. Though most
official reports do not unequivocally state that Cuba has these weapons they do intimate
that because Castro has the means to do so it is more than likely that they are being
produced on the island. For example, Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said the United
States was concerned about Cuba's “capacity and capability to conduct such [biological]
research.”49 However, a few members of the administration have taken this narrative to
47
Dan Morgan, “Federal Pay Raise Near House Passage: End to Cuba Travel Curbs Also
Backed,” Washington Post, July 24, 2002 (http://www.washingtonpost.com') (September 18, 2002).
48
“CANF Deplores Interpol Chiefs Acceptance of Cuba Terrorism Ties,” Latnn.com (January 22,
2002) (http://www.latnn.com ) (September 20, 2002).
49
“Powell Backs Down on Cuba Weapons Claims,” Comcast (May 14, 2002)
(http://www.comcast.net/smedia/abcnews.com ) (May 14, 2002).
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the next step. Undersecretary of State, John Bolton asserted:
For tour decades, Cuba has maintained a well-developed and sophisticatedbiomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the Soviet Union. This industry isone of the most advanced in Latin America and leads in the production ofpharmaceuticals and vaccines that are sold worldwide. Analysts and Cubandefectors have long cast suspicion on the activities conducted in these biomedicalfacilme,
... The United States believes tha, Cuba has a, least a limited
““
bio ogical warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-usebiotechnology to other rogue states/ 0
Shortly after Bolton made this speech to the Heritage Foundation, both Colin Powell and
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were careful to distance themselves from Bolton’s
remarks, stressing that the U.S. can only say that Cuba has the capacity to produce these
weapons. 51 Yet, most states with pharmaceutical research capabilities have the same
wherewithal to produce these weapons as Cuba. The crucial difference is the perception
of Cuba in the United States. 52
Furthermore, Cuba’s location within the American sphere of influence heightens
both the strategic and value-based rationales for these concerns. The island’s location
only ninety miles from U.S. shores’ is stressed in discussions about the regime’s
terrorist activities. For example, Dennis Hays stated, “[w]e need to know if a nation 90
John R. Bolton, “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” Heritage Foundation Heritage Lecture #743 (May 6, 2002)
(http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/HL743.cfrn
) (September 26, 2002).
51
Marquis Schmitt, “Bush Faces Pressure.”
52
Other countries do not believe that Cuba is on the side of terrorism. Interpol (the international
police organization) investigated Cuba’s ties to terrorism and was satisfied that Cuba was committed to the
fight against terrorism. See: Cuban American National Foundation, “CANF Deplores Interpol Chiefs
Acceptance of Cuba Terrorism Ties,” Latnn.com (January 22, 2002) (http://www.latnn.com ) (September
20
,
2002 ).
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miles from our shores is experimenting with deadly biological agents.”53 John Bolton
asserted, “In addition to Libya and Syria, there is a threat coming from another BWC
signatory, and one that lies just 90 miles from the U.S. mainland-namely, Cuba ” 54 This
fact is emphasized both for strategic and normative reasons. If Cuba does have biological
weapons the proximity to the United States would make delivery somewhat easier.
However, the location is stressed for another implicit reason - because Cuba is so
intimately a part of the American sphere of influence its interests cannot be separated
from those of the United States’, thus justifying American involvement in Cuban affairs.
Lincoln Diaz-Balart (Rep-Florida) repeatedly stressed the connection between the
Western Hemisphere and policy toward Cuba in an attempt to convince other members of
Congress to vote down an 2002 amendment that would make public financing available
for sales to the Cuban government. He said, “Cuba is in this hemisphere. It is the only
country oppressed by tyranny in this hemisphere.... Cuba remains in this hemisphere,
despite what some would like on the other side of this debate. It remains in this
hemisphere, and the Cuban people deserve our continued solidarity, and not financing for
the terrorist regime...” 55 Diaz-Balart clearly believes that Cuba’s location within the
hemisphere is an important consideration in the determination of American policy toward
the island. It is also obvious that he thinks this fact is important to the other members
53
Dennis Hays, “Inspect Cuba for Production of Biological Weapons,” Miami Herald
,
July 29,
2002 (http://www.canf.org/Nevvs/020729nevvsa.htm ) (September 10, 2002).
54
Bolton “Beyond the Axis of Evil.”
55
U.S. House of Representatives, Motion to Instruct Conferees on H.R. 2646, Farm Security Act
of 2001 (House of Representatives/Extension of Remarks - April 18, 2002) [Page: H1453] Hon. Lincoln
Diaz-Balart of Florida in the House of Representatives (April 18, 2002)
(http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/fl2 1 diaz-balart/st0204 1 8.html ) (September 20, 2002).
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because he uses it in an attempt to convince them to oppose the amendment. The idea of
the American sphere of influence and Cuba’s special place within that sphere has
influenced the official debate about American policy toward the island, including the
discourse about Castro’s ties to terrorism.
The image of the Castro regime as a pariah and the location of Cuba within the
Amencan sphere of influence have contributed to the American designation of Cuba as a
terrorist sponsoring state and influenced the more recent accusations about the regime's
involvement in biological weapons production.
The View From North of the Border
In contrast, these perceptions are not prevalent in Canadian discussions about the
island even though terrorism is considered one of the top threats to Canadian security. A
1999 report put out by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) entitled “Trends
in Terrorism'’ lists forty-two categories of terrorist threats including threats from Latin
America. It lists Colombia and Peru as potential sources of danger but does not mention
any threat from Cuba.'^ 6
Though Castro is no longer considered the honorable freedom fighter he once
was, he is not considered a pariah either, and Canadians remain highly skeptical that his
regime is engaged in terrorist-friendly activities. Just as Americans are inclined to believe
the worst about Castro, Canadians are predisposed to downplay reports that he is
involved in terrorist activities.
A Globe and Mail article about U.S.-Cuban relations captures the Canadian
56
Canada Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, “Report #2000/01 Trends in Terrorism,”
Perspectives: A Canadian Security Intelligence Service Publication (December 18, 1999)
(http://www.csis-scrs.ac.ca/enu/miscdocs/20000 1 e.htmH (April 5, 2002).
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response to the charge that Cuba has biological weapons: “John Bolton, publicly widened
the Bush “axis of evil" to include Cuba, which Mr. Bolton claimed is developing
biological weapons. Conceivably
- just - that might be true. As with Iraq there is no way
to tell. But more likely it is not." 57 Canadians remain highly skeptical of the American
characterization of Castro as a terrorist or that he is engaged in bioweapons production.
The issue is almost a nonstarter in Canadian government circles. In fact, the Canadian
International Development agency (CIDA) supports a number of programs that either
directly or indirectly aid Cuba’s biotechnology sector. For example, CIDA funds a
project between the Universidad Central de Las Villas "Marta Abreu" (UCLV), Santa
Clara, Cuba and the Institute of Biomedical Engineering at the University ofNew
Brunswick. The stated objective of the project is “to establish a Biomedical Engineering
Education Infrastructure in Cuba.”58
The Canadian tendency to disregard or minimize the possibility that Castro
supports terrorism is causally tied to Canadian identities and values. Canadians have a
great deal invested in their policy toward Cuba as it represents independence from
American policy. Since the accusations are coming from the United States and they want
to be independent from the American position on Cuba, Canadians are even more
skeptical of the reports. During a CBC interview about the September 1 1 attacks. Prime
Minister Chretien mentioned Cuba, but only in the context of defending Canadian policy
toward the island and to suggest how American foreign policy could be improved to deter
The Old Foe in Havana, Globe and Mail, May 16, 2002 (http://www.the2lobeandmail conU
(May 16, 2002).
58 •
University ofNew Brunswick, The Institute of Biomedical Engineering, “Developing a
Biomedical Engineering Program in Cuba,” (http://www.unb.ca/biomed/cida.htm ') (September 13, 2002).
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terrorism. He said that the United States and the western world needed to shoulder some
of the blame for the attacks because the West is “looked upon as being arrogant, self-
satisfied, greedy and with no limits.”59 He used Cuba as an example of how the
Americans, because they are so powerful, should be “nicer.”60
Canadians also have a history of identifying with Cuba. Though they have often
drawn tenuous comparisons (such as the one party state comparison discussed in chapter
seven) Canadians remain empathetic to the Cuban situation and thus would be prone to
question the American accusations of Cuban as a terrorist state. Furthermore, “Cuba as a
terrorist” runs counter to the deeply held perception of Castro as essentially a well-
meaning, though misguided, leader. To acknowledge a terrorist connection, Canadians
would have to seriously question their whole picture of the Cuban regime and their
relationship with Cuba. It is much easier to chalk it up to another example of the
“American bully” in action.
Discussions of terrorism in Canadian government circles emphasize the values
that have come to dominate Ottawa’s foreign policy. Bill Graham, Canada’s Minister for
Foreign Affairs told an audience in March of 2002 that:
our challenge in responding to terrorism is to not lose sight of the values and
norms we cherish. Respect for the rule of law underpins Canadian society and is
fundamental to Canadian values and identity. Canadians believe in the rule of law
and in legal institutions to remedy injustice. Throughout our history, the rule of
law has been our strength and the foundation upon which we have built this
country. It is a fundamental part of our democratic tradition and is a principle that
Jean Chretien, Chretien interview on Sept. 1 1,” CBC News, Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (September 16, 2002) (http://www.cbc .ca/news/features/chretien interview.html) (September
18,2002).
60
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Canada promotes internationally. 61
The fact that terrorism is against international law dominates most Canadian discourse on
terrorism.
Thus, the United States and Canada, in many ways, so much alike, believe very
different things about Castro’s Cuba. Americans place the Cuban regime on their list of
sponsors of terrorism, insinuate he is developing biological weapons and misleading the
global effort to combat terrorism and the Canadians are skeptical of all of these charges.
The values, identities and past perceptions at work in both countries have influenced
these different characterizations of Fidel Castro and his connections to terrorism. Since it
would be difficult to underestimate the affect of the designation of a state as terrorist-
friendly in a post-September 1 1 world, this perception is exceedingly relevant to policy
formulation.
Conclusion
Canada and the United States have long had distinct policies toward Castro’s
Cuba. Clearly, we cannot discount the effect of the Cuban-American community nor the
death of American citizens on the response from the United States to the downing of the
planes and the absence of those factors on the Canadian response. Likewise, the Cuban-
American community has a role in the identification of Castro as a terrorist in the United
States and the absence of such a clearly anti-Castro group in Canada has likely had an
impact on the Canadian perspective on this issue. Yet, as the examples in this chapter
61
Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Notes for an Address by the
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have demonstrated, neither poliey ean be reduced to a simple political or economic
variable since they also reflect a complex interplay of values, identities and perceptions.
By comparing the Canadian and American responses to the same issues this chapter
further demonstrated the relevance of constructivist variables. Both the shoot down of the
Brothers to the Rescue planes and the perspective on Castro’s association with terrorism
were understood differently in Canada and the United States largely because of the
unique combination of values, identities and perceptions at work in both countries.
In the U.S. the shoot down was seen as an act of evil that demanded an immediate
response. This interpretation reflected the long-standing perception of Castro and Cuba’s
place within the American “family.” Helms-Burton more than any other document of the
post-Cold War era explicitly reveals the degree to which the Americans place Cuba
within their “sphere of influence” and the latitude they believe that gives them to
determine the future of the island country. In contrast, the Canadians, generally
sympathetic to sovereignty issues vis-a-vis the United States, saw the downing more so as
an unfortunate overreaction to repeated incursions on Cuban sovereignty. In typical
Canadian fashion they tried to defuse the tension between the U.S. and Cuba by talking to
both sides. However, the Canadians were most concerned with the enactment of the
Helms-Burton bill because they saw it as another attempt by the Americans to dictate
Canadian policy.
Similarly, both countries reacted very differently to suggestions that Castro has
ties to terrorism. Based on long-standing views of Castro, Americans are inclined to
believe the worst about the dictator and as such are receptive to charges that Castro is
trying to scuttle the American efforts to combat terrorism and is involved in the
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production of biological weapons. Canadians, inclined to generally have a fairly positive
view of Castro (and tend to question the American version of events when Cuba is
involved) are highly skeptical of the American charges.
However, as the next and final chapter will reveal, both Canadian and American
policies toward Cuba are changing. Each approach reflects new perceptions of the island
nation that began to emerge in the late 1990s and are slowly gaining strength. Ironically,
the two strategies are becoming more similar as both sets of perceptions about the island
and Castro evolve. A number of incidents have spurred these new images. In the United
States - the Pope’s visit and the Elian Gonzalez incident and; in Canada - the failure of
Prime Minister Chretien to secure the release of the dissidents during his visit to the
island, the Pan American games fiasco and the rhetoric surrounding the Quebec Summit
ot the Americas - countered the popular narratives operating in both countries.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
I have painted a picture of two complex, but very dissimilar policies that are
based on two different identities, rooted in particular and ingrained values, ideas, and
cultures. Does this mean that these policies are doomed to remain as they are today? Will
the United States continue its policy of isolation until Castro dies or the regime becomes
a model of liberal democracy? Will Canada continue to engage the regime even if Castro
jails even more dissidents?
The two policies are dynamic, like the underlying identities, values, ideas,
cultures, and perceptions, they are constantly ebbing and flowing. They are socially
constructed and thus open to change. Indeed, in the last five years the two policies have
shown a potential for considerable change. The next two subsections will describe the
recent alterations in both approaches, highlighting how these changes are connected to
ideational factors.
Recent Developments in US Cuban Policy
The norms, identities, and images that underlie the construction of U.S. policy
toward Cuba are not easily altered. They have, to different degrees, become internalized
or institutionalized. However, relatively recent international and domestic events have
caused some re-examination of a few of these variables.
Having won the Cold War, Americans are less likely to fear communism and the
Castro regime. Surveys indicate that most Americans still perceive that Cuba is an enemy
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but that the numbers believing this have deelined since the Cold War ended. 1 Though still
unpopular, Castro and his communist regime are no longer seen as threatening. Over half
of the Americans polled in 2000 thought that Cuba did not represent a serious threat to
the United States. Only 15 percent thought the island was a “very serious threat.”2 The
changing perception of threat, while remaining important, is only one of the variables that
have caused some Americans to re-examine their policy toward Cuba.
The visit of Pope John Paul II to Cuba also influenced American perceptions of
the island. Most Americans, believing in their country’s exceptional character and
perceiving that the United States is taking the most morally correct position, were
surprised by the Pope's message in Cuba. Since the Vatican and the Catholic Church
have considerable moral authority, the Pope’s opinion of the embargo as “deplorable”
made many people question whether their government was pursuing the best policy. 3
Though his visit did not cause a major policy change, his remarks about the U.S. embargo
and the plight of the Cuban people did influence many Americans. A senior U.S. official
said the Pope swayed the American public, the Clinton administration, and even some
hard line Cuban Americans. 4 Democratic Representative Lee Hamilton said that the
Pope s visit Got an awful lot of people thinking. The Pope’s approach is the exact
See for example, Darren Carlson, “Poll Analyses: 40 years After Bay of Pigs, Most Americans
have Unfavorable Opinion of Cuba,” (April 17, 2001) The Gallup Organization
(http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/prO 1 04 1 7.asp) (August 13, 2001).
2
Polling the Nations (1986-2001), “Cuba,” (June 16, 2000).
Donna Cassata, Foreign Policy: Papal Visit Highlights Divisions Over Cuban Embargo,” CQ
(January 24, 1998), 195.
4
Interview with senior U.S. government official, 2000.
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opposite of the American Government’s. The Pope is trying to engage the Cuban people.
The U.S. policy is to isolate the Cuban people. The contras, is apparent.- After visiting
Cuba for the Pope’s visit, the Archbishop of Boston, Bernard Cardinal Law, argued for a
change to the US approach toward the island. He stated that he was accompanied by
“heads of social service agencies and representatives of foundations, there were lawyers
and judges, congressmen, presidents of colleges, a law school dean and an university
professor, and the editor of a national magazine. We were a wondrously diverse group,
but we found unity in our conviction that the time is now for a change.”6 President Bill
Clinton stated after he introduced a number of changes to Cuba policy that “The
measures I have announced today are designed to build on [the Pope’s] visit...”7
The Pope’s visit was still having an impact on US policy years later. The House
of Representatives’ Cuba Working Group referred to the Pope’s message in Cuba in
2002. They stated: “we heartily embrace the message of Pope John Paul II, who began
his visit to Cuba, in 1 998.”8 The Pope’s remarks prompted a reexamination of the
assumption that the United States’ policy toward the regime was the morally correct
policy. It interrupted the logical pathway between the America identity as an exceptional
country (a moral leader) and the norm that the US should be isolating the regime.
January 2mJ ^ Weiner’ “Pope vs ' Embarg° : StiH a Sharp Divide in U.S.,” New York Times,
Quoted by U.S. Senator Chris Dodd, “His Eminence Bernard Cardinal Law, Archbishop of
Boston, Reflecting on Cuba, Senate
-March 19, 1998,
(http://www.senate . gov/~dood/pres/speeches/105 98/03 1 9.htm J January 28, 2000.
7
“Statement on Cuba,” Administration of William J. Clinton, March 20, 1998.
g US House of Representatives, Cuba Working Group, “A Review of US Policy Toward Cuba,”
(May 15, 2002). (http://www.cubafoundation.org/CWG-Review.htm ) April 13,2003.
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Furthermore, the media frenzy surrounding the custody battle over Elian
Gonzalez also caused many people to reconsider their perceptions. This six-year old
Cuban boy who was part of a group that lied the island in November of 1999, lost his
mother when their boat sank off the coast of Florida. After he was rescued, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service turned him over to his relatives in Miami. The
custody battle that ensued between those relatives and Elian’s father in Cuba made
headlines for months.
The publicity altered many people’s perceptions of Cuba, Cubans, and Cuban
Americans. First, it served to humanize Cubans. Americans identified with Elian’s father.
Juan Miguel Gonzalez and his family in Cuba. People remarked that they “seemed like
just like us,” and reported that they felt empathy for Juan Miguel. Additionally, many
people questioned their perception of life in Cuba after Elian’s father refused an offer to
remain in the United States. Lastly, during the custody fight, the Cuban American
community often appeared overly emotional and sometimes irrational. It encouraged a
growing skepticism ot the community and their capacity for objectivity. A former senior
government official who remains very influential in policy toward Cuba told the author
that a New Republic article correctly analyzed the impact of this most recent crisis on the
community. This article claimed that the community’s reputation was tarnished during
the custody battle. Their insistence that Elian’s survival was an actual miracle, and their
claims that he was saved by angels in the form of dolphins, as well as by their passionate
outbursts on national television and the appearance that they seemed to think the
community is above the law, hurt their credibility. 9
Charles Lane, And a Child Shall Lead Them: Miami’s passionate, self-defeating fight for Elian
Gonzalez,” The New Republic (January 24, 2000) ( http://www.thenewrepublic.comL August 1 9, 200 1
.
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Opinion polls taken at the time confirm these perceptions. Americans were asked
if they approved or disapproved of the way people handled the Elian Gonzalez case. “The
boy’s father” achieved the highest approval rating- 67 percent said they approved of his
actions. In contrast, only 34 percent of those polled approved of the way “the boy’s
relatives in Miami” handled the case. The publicity also influenced the public’s view of
the wider Cuban American community. Only 27 percent of those polled approved of the
way the community handled the case. 10 A NBC/Wall Street Journal poll reported that
even fewer respondents thought that the Cuban American relatives (23 percent) and the
wider community (20 percent) acted responsibly. In contrast. 71 percent of those polled
said they believed that Elian’s father acted responsibly. 11 These events have caused a re-
examination of some of the most prevalent images, norms and ideas of Cuba and the US
Cuban American community. The custody battled called into question some long held
perceptions- that the Cuban American community’s view of Cuba is correct; that Cubans
are “different” from Americans; and that life in Cuba is as bad as Cuban Americans
report.
Former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Cuba in 2002 also had an impact on
people’s perceptions of Cuba and of the US policy. This was the first visit by an
American of this stature since Castro assumed power. Carter is one of the most popular
former presidents. He is more popular now than he was during his presidency. 12 His work
l0ABC News Poll, April 24, 2000 “Elian Gonzalez,” PoIllingReport.com
(www.pollingreport.com/oldnews.litm t (August 1 7, 200 1 ).
11 NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll, “Elian Gonzalez,” April 29-May 1, 2000
(www.pollingreport.com/oldnews.htm t (August 17, 2001).
12
Daniel Merkle, ABC News. Com “Carter Improves with Age,” (October ), 1999)
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/poll990929.html (April 14, 2003).
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m human rights and other humanitarian issues is well respected. Thus, many Americans
listened when Carter visited Cuba and spoke out in favor of engagement.
Perceptions within the Cuban American community are also changing. Surveys
conducted in the 1970 and 1980s indicated that a large majority of Cuban Americans
favored isolation or removing Castro from power by force. Dialogue was opposed by as
many as 80 percent of the community. 13 In those days, Cuban Americans who advocated
dialogue were harassed by others in the community. One Cuban American was killed for
promoting those views in 1975. 14
Over the last few years, the community has become much less united behind a
single solution. There are growing divisions within the community. A majority of Cubans
in the Miami area are recent immigrants. These “economic refugees” that arrived from
the 1980s on, are known to favor dialogue much more than their predecessors. 15 Surveys
taken in 2003 indicate that more than half of all Cuban immigrants believe that the US
approach toward Cuba has failed to improve the lives of people in Cuba. A majority also
believes that exiles should be talking to the Cuban government and approved of a
meeting between the two groups held in April of 2003. 16 The Miami Herald reports that
polls taken of Cuban Americans in Florida during 2003 show “a major shift towards
13 Andrea Elliot and Elaine De Valle, “Cuban exiles shifting hard-line position,” The Miami
Herald, February 12, 2003 (http;//www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/cuba/5 1 60039 htm) Amil
13,2003.
' F
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Christopher Marquis and Eric Schmitt, “Bush faces Pressure From Congress to Alter Cuba
Policy,” New York Times, May 19, 2002 (http://www.nvtimes.com t (May 20, 2002).
l6Dana Canedy, “Cuban Exiles Finding Spirit of Reconciliation,” New York Times
,
March 23
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moderation by Cuban exiles.”” The New York Times reports that: “the change in attitudes
reflects an ideological split between the original Cuban exiles and their children and
grandchildren, a recent influx of immigrants who fled for economic rather than political
reasons, and a concerted effort by some exile groups to improve the image of Cuban
Americans after a nationally televised struggle over the young shipwreck survivor Elian
Gonzalez.” 18
To a certain degree, the Cuban American National Foundation has also changed
its views, rhetoric, and policies. The organization is now willing to meet with members of
the current Cuban government to discuss democracy issues. This would have been
virtually unheard of in the 1990s. It is telling that CANF did not come out in opposition
to Carter’s visit. They only asked that Carter raise the issue of human rights while he was
in Cuba. 19 These new views are not accepted by everyone. The change in the main Cuban
American lobby group has caused divisions within its former members. Those members
who have been upset with the changes in the organization’s hard line views have banded
together in the new Cuban Tiberation Council. 20 However, given the evolving views of
the community, this group is unlikely to achieve the monolithic status achieved by CANF
in the 1980s.
17
Elliot and De Valle.
18
Canedy.
19
David Gonzalez, “Carter’s Trip to Cuba Raises Many Hopes From All Sides,” The New York
Times, May 11, 2002 (http://www.nvtimes.com ) May 16, 2002.
20
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The Pope’s visit to the island, the effect of Elian Gonzalez, the declining
perception of threat, and dtvisions with the cotntnunity have changed perceptions and
influenced the nomrs directing this policy. Significant elements of the American public
are now questioning isolation. For example, even though it is still illegal, more
Americans are visiting Cuba. Approximately 50,000 Americans illegally visited Cuba in
200 1
. Business leaders and lawmakers are also travelling to the island in record
numbers. Over 700 American business people, representing almost 300 companies
participated in the 2002 Havana Trade Show.22
There has also been a movement in Congress to end the embargo. Both the House
ot Representatives and the Senate have formed Cuba working groups for the explicit
purpose of critically examining American policy toward Cuba. The Senate group formed
in March of 2003, announced in its first letter that they would look at the right of
Americans to travel and the capacity of Cuba to serve as a market for American products.
In July 2002 an amendment in the House to remove fiinding for the enforcement of the
travel ban passed by 262-187. Similarly, a measure to remove restrictions on the amount
of money Americans send to Cuba won by 251-177. Other similar measures also passed.
Though an amendment to end funding for the enforcement of the whole embargo did not
“Former President Carter on landmark visit to Cuba,” Globe and Mail, May 12, 2002
(http://www.theulobeandmail.com ) May 13, 2002.
22 Cuba Policy Foundation, Press Release, “At Least 1 04 U.S. Congressional Districts, 66 Senate
Seats Represented at Havana Trade Expo,” (October 10, 2002) (April 13, 2003).
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win a majority, it did gamer 204 votes 23 Thm tW. n ui s. I bus, there has been an unmistakable movement
in many quarters to normalize US relations with Cuba
Poliey is beginning to reflect these changing perceptions and norms. Americans
were given permission to sell agriculture products to Cuba in 2000. In 2002, Cuba
purchased over $138 million in U.S. agricultural products, making the island one of the
top fifty markets for American agricultural sales.24 These policies reflect changing
perceptions and notms about the island, its people, the Cuban Ameriean community, and
the US approach. These perceptions have the potential to have a longer-term influence
over the direction of this policy.
However, there has also been an increase in countervailing pressures in support of
isolation. Florida's pivotal role in the 2000 election and the perception in Washington
that the Cuban American community was a crucial player in the outcome has influenced
the Bush administration. Bush has filled openings in his administration with
representatives of the hard-line elements of the community. Furthermore, September 1
1
and the subsequent war on terrorism created tension between the United States and Cuba
since the regime remains on the State Department’s list of states that support terrorism.
As chapter eight showed, the inclusion of Cuba on this list and charges that Cuba
supports bioterrorism are serious barriers to normalization.
Furthermore, President Bush has taken a harder line with Cuba than did his
predecessor. In 2001, he said that his administration “will oppose any attempt to weaken
i r .
Cuba Policy Foundation, Press Release “U.S. Congress Votes Against Cuban Embargo
U^y 24 2002) (IprU MM)”"
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Cuba Policy Foundation, “Embargo Update,” (March 28, 2003)
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sanctions against Cuba's government.”25 Bush has increased support for human rights
achvists in Cuba. He has definitely adopted a more confrontational approach, and
according to some, has actively goaded the Cuban government. 26
Much of the new tension in the relationship has taken place between the
American diplomats in Havana and the Cuban government. According to the Associated
Press, the Principal Officer in Havana during Bush’s first two years in office, Vicki
Huddleston, “has walked a rocky road that turned sharply to the right when President
Bush took office in 200 1 .” They report in contrast, “(djuring the Clinton administration,
Huddleston kept a relatively low profile, meeting quietly with dissidents and traveling to
provincial areas to ensure unsuccessful migrants weren't harassed after being returned
home by the U.S. Coast Guard.”22 Under Bush, Huddleston, distributed short-wave radios
programmed to receive Radio Marti and books to activists in Cuba. Huddleston also
increased her criticisms of Cuban government and her support of dissidents.28
Huddleston’s replacement, James Cason, has further increased the tension
between the US Interest Section and the Cuban regime by intensifying the contact
between the dissidents and US diplomats. Dissidents were frequently invited to Cason's
home and also to the US mission. Cason has also spoken at opposition meetings. 29 Castro
25 Quoted in Cuba Policy Foundation, History of U.S. Policy
(http://www.cubapolicyfoundation.org/policv.htmn ( April 1,2002).
26
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ed by severely limiting the movement of U.S. personnel in Cuba. The hostility
between Havana and Washington has been intensifying.
The regime also claims that the renewed effort to harass and jail dissidents that
began in the spring of 2003 is a reaction to the “American offensive”. A representative
of the Cuban government in Washington, Juan Hemadez Acen claimed, “These people
have not been arrested for what they think.
.
. They were arrested beeause they are directly
linked to the active conspiracy and subversion being done by James Cason.”30 Though
firmly stating that Castro alone is responsible for the 2003 crackdown, Washington
insiders admit that Cason's activities have given Castro the excuse he needed to engage
m this most recent crackdown. 31 In any case, this series of arrests and trials has been
described as the most serious crackdown in years. Some dissidents were given jail
sentences as long as 27 years. As a result of this repression, the tension between Havana
and much of the rest of the world is palpable.
Lastly, the seemingly easy victory of the Americans in the 2003 war versus
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq has made many Cubans nervous. The American government’s
new preemptive approach to rogue regimes has spurred speculation that Washington
might take unilateral action against the Cuban regime. This conjecture has been fueled
by the growing jingoism of the Bush administration. On April 10, 2003, the US
30
David Gonzalez, “Cuba Arrests More
2003.
Dissidents Amid Outcry,” New York Times
,
March 22,
31
Knox, “Why did Washington Goad Cuba?”
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Ambassador to the Dominican Republic warned that Iraq was a “very good example for
Cuba.”32
The American self-identification as an exceptional country, and as such, as a
moral and political leader and as a defender of democracy and human rights, are deeply
internalized. Castro’s Cuba does and will, for the foreseeable future, continue to represent
the antithesis of the U.S. identity. Likewise, a number of the norms that provide the
foundation for this approach toward Cuba are also stubbornly ingrained. The norm that
Cuba is within the U.S. sphere of influence is unlikely to change. However, norms that
are related to certain images about Cuba, Cubans, and Cuban Americans are more easily
changed. Those perceptions and norms have been evolving and have resulted in a
movement toward normalization that has influenced policy in that direction.
However, whether the movement in Congress and among the American public to
end the embargo will continue will have a great deal to do with what happens in Cuba. If
Castro continues to increase the repression on the island, few members of congress will
feel confident arguing for a relaxation. As the Cuba Policy Foundation put it: “[i]f the
move to end the embargo was like a political campaign, we had a great candidate.... This
dissident roundup is the candidate being caught with the intern. The fear is people will be
less inclined to listen to a positive message. Because of the fear, distrust and justifiable
outrage, the message of engaging Cuba will be lost.”33 If this repression eases, the
pressure to change this policy is likely to continue and it is very possible that specific
32 Ann Louise Bardach, “A Purge with a Purpose,” New York Times, April 13, 2003; “Fidel’s reply
to statement by U.S. Ambasador in the Dominican Republic,” Granma
,
April 1 1, 2003
(http://www.granma.cu/inales/abril03/vierl 1/1 5respuest.html ) (April 14,2003).
33 •
David Gonzalez, “Cuban Crackdown on Critics Stalls a Drive to Ease U.S. Embargo,” New
York Times
,
April 13, 2003.
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elements within the wider policy will be altered (further restrictions on travel, food and
medical sales etc. will be lifted,. If they continue, these piecemeal changes will
eventually nullify “isolation However, if the trend toward repression continues these
piecemeal changes will stop. Furthermore, until there is significant change in Cuba the
ingrained ideational factors will continue to work against the full normalization of US-
Cuban relations.
Recent Developments in Canada’s Cuba Policy
Canada’s policy toward Cuba is equally influenced by ideational variables. These
variables push Canadian policy toward engagement with the island. However, recent
events have challenged the Canadian identity in relation to Cuba policy, undermining this
approach.
During the mid-1990s, Canadian-Cuban relations seemed to be at an all-time
high. In 1997, Ottawa and Havana signed a Joint Declaration, which established
cooperation between the two governments in a number of areas including on human
rights and good governance issues. 34
However, by the end of the 1990s, this warming trend between the two
governments had cooled. The initial fallout arose from the 1998 visit by Prime Minister
Chretien to Cuba. This was the first visit at this level since the 1970s and was played up
in the Canadian press. During that visit, Fidel Castro publicly referred to the American
embargo as genocide, which put the Canadian Prime Minister in an awkward position.
34
See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada’s Relations with
Cuba (http//www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latin/cuba/81600-e.htm). In recent years the success of the Joint
Declaration has been called into question as there appears to be little progress on these issues in Cuba.
Canadian government officials respond that they did not expect rapid change in Cuba and maintain that
constructive engagement is a long-term policy. Based on confidential interviews with senior Canadian
government officials, Ottawa and Havana, 1999 and 2000.
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Canadians wish to be seen as distinct from the U.S. bu, do not respond well when others
publicly criticize this friend and ally.
To make matters much worse, Chretien made a point of raising with Castro the
case of four dissidents
.ha, were scheduled to be tried in Cuba. He pressed for an open
trial and felt fairly confident tha, Castro would follow through. However, the four were
summarily tried and convicted in a closed trial. 35 This greatly embarrassed the Prime
Minister and contributed to the Canadian sense of disillusionment with their efforts on
the island. This was a direct challenge to the Canadian identity since Canada was no, able
to achieve the desired release even though the dialogue occurred at the very highest
levels. Canada immediately cooled relations. Ministerial visits were suspended.
Relations worsened during the subsequent 1999 PanAmerican games held in
Wtnnepeg. Fidel Castro was very angry about a number of issues surrounding the games.
He said “never before had we seen such abusive and trickery actions in a Pan American
sport competition. The whole purpose was to harass Cuba, to displace Cuba from the
second position in order to benefit the host country and to discredit our sport.”36 He
charged that Canada allowed sports scouts to promote the defection of Cuban athletes,
withdrew medals from Cuban winners under false charges, and tried to disadvantage
Cuban teams. Castro concluded his speech with, “it is in that spirit that our athletes have
been competing in the face of hostility, seduction and traps, on a field that has been
turned into enemy ground. So, be it. The same has happened in other places where
35
“Cuban trial step backward, Axworthy says,” Globe and Mail, March 3, 1999.
36
“Castro: 1999 on PanAm Games, Excerpts from the speech given by Dr. Fidel Castro, President
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authorities front the North have been present. But, there are two in that Nonh now; the
one that was already there and another one further North."” Lumping Canada and the
United States together was no. only the most serious insult .ha, Fidel Castro eould muster
bu, it was also a challenge to the Canadian identity. Relations had reached a new low.
At the same time, Canadian development programs were encountering difficulty
in Cuba. A number of Cuban students attending Canadian universities defected while in
Canada, creating tension between the two countries. Furthermore, the CIDA program to
modernize the Cuban taxation system backfired as the Cuban government used it to
hinder the establishment of private enterprise. 38 In 2000, Fidel Castro visited Ottawa for
Pierre Trudeau’s funeral but he did not meet with the Prime Minister.
Canadian investors also began to shy away from Cuba. The Wall Street Journal
reported as early as 1999 that, “[f]or many Canadian companies as well as for the
government, it’s the morning after their love affair with the island nation.”39 Archibald
Ritter, a well-known expert on Canadian-Cuban relations from Carelton University,
confirmed the Journal report in 2001 when he told an audience at the City University of
New York that Canadian businesses were becoming more disillusioned with Cuba. In
particular Ritter pointed out that Sherritt International, the largest Canadian investor in
Cuba, had only invested half of what they expected to invest in ventures on the island.40
37
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Cuba's exclusion from the 200, Summit of the Americas meeting in Quebec City
caused even more tension in the biiatera, reiationship. John Maniey, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, told the author a, a meeting of the Canadian Society in New York in
April of 2001, that Cuba would not be invited to the Summit of the Americas because it
was no, a democracy. Manley’s remarks at that meeting were pubiished in Canadian
newspapers. Castro was infuriated. He responded by encouraging the protesters a, the
Summit as well as criticizing Canada’s treatment of the protesters. He stated: “We have
jus, seen the images of the brutal way in which Canadian authorities repressed the
peaceful demons,ra,io„s...They cannot sustatn this unjust order imposed on humanity.
We send you our total solidarity. Cuba supports you.”4 '
However, when Castro released the last member of the “Group of Four” in August
of 2002, relations warmed. These four dissidents were the same four that Prime Minister
Chretien spoke to Castro about on his visit to the island. Most believe the worsening of
relations that followed that trip were caused by Chretien’s embarrassment. DFAIT
explains: “In March 1999, Canada had suspended ministerial visits as a signal of our
dissatisfaction with Cuba's response to our demarches on various human rights issues
(including the sentencing of four prominent political dissidents, the "July Four"). In May
2002, the last of the lour dissidents, Vladimiro Roca, was released.”42 Thus, the release of
the four was an important step in the relationship.
Fidel Castro sends Message of Solidarity to Protesters in Quebec ” (April 21 2001
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The first evidence of a friendlier attitude came in September 2002 during a CBC
interview with the Pnme Minister. During that interview. Chretien emphasized that
Canada had a “normal" relationship wit Cuba and criticized the American approach
toward the island. 43
High level visits were resumed. In November 2002, Denis Paradis, Secretary of
State for Latin America, Africa and La Francophonie, wen, to Cuba to attend the Havana
International Trade Fair. During that visit the secretary also inaugurated an exhibit
honoring Pierre Trudeau.-14 The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
asserts: “Denis Paradis visited Cuba in November 2002, the first ministerial visit in
almost four years. Secretary of State Paradis' visit signals Canada's willingness to
reinvigorate political dialogue with Cuban officials and to support Canadian interests in
Cuba. In Cuba, Paradis asserted : "We should be encouraging as wide a dialogue as
possible, comparing perspectives and values. The large numbers of Canadians that visit
Cuba every year are testament to the affection between our two peoples and the
importance of understanding each other better.
.
"46
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In addition, in March 2003, the Canadian Embassy in Cuba held a photographic
exposition called "Canada-Cuba: A View over One Hundred Years". DFAIT explained:
“The images will cover the wide diversity of contacts between the two countries
including political visits, commercial projects, development programs, cultural, scientific
and educational exchanges and sporting activities.'^ Canada was once again celebrating
its friendship with Cuba.
The American war with Iraq seems to have also prompted closer Canadian-Cuban
relations. Kirk and McKenna point out it is “plausible that re-energizing the Canadian-
Cuba relationship is somehow linked to Canada’s increasingly muddled position on Iraq.
In other words, a political overture to Cuba- an arch enemy of Washington- may be
designed to convince Canadians that our foreign policy is distinctive of that of the
Americans.”48
Nevertheless, this warming trend came to a halt in the spring of 2003 when Castro
stepped up repression. According to the Globe and Mail :
Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham summoned Cuba's ambassador to Canada tohis office last night to express "extreme concern" over a dramatic crackdown on
peaceful dissent by Fidel Castro's regime. The highly unusual move came after
the sentencing of dozens of dissidents to prison terms of 12 to 27 years. Their
trials had been brief and closed, some on charges of co-operating with the United
Mates to oppose the Communist government49
47
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Canada’s push toward warmer relations would have continued as long as the regime
continued to show an even slight willingness to improve human rights. I, is Canada’s
natural inclination to engage Cuba because so many elements of the Canadian identity
construe, norms promoting friendship with the island. However, the Canadian identity as
an international good citizen could not let such a severe and public crackdown go
unnoticed. Unless, Castro seems to be responding to the international calls to end this
round ot repression it is unlikely that the Canadian-Cuban relationship will continue to
improve in the near future.
Foreign Policy Impotence and Cnha
Cuba remains an island in many senses of the word. For four decades, the Cuban
regime has kept a tight rein over events on the island regardless of international events.
Castro survived being the only Warsaw Pact country in the Western Hemisphere; he
survived the end of the Cold War and the death of the Soviet Union; he survived Helms-
Burton; and he survived chaotic relations with various friends and enemies, including
Canada and the United States.
It seems as though Castro’s regime is relatively unaffected by international events
and other countries’ foreign policies. Just as Canadian-Cuban relations were warming;
just as the embargo was under the most serious congressional attack in its history; just as
Cuban Americans seem to be moderating; and just as the Miami Mafia seemed to be a
relic of the past; Castro initiates the most serious crackdown on activists and journalists
in years. Castro blames the 2003 crackdown on the Bush team in Havana and
Washington but his argument ignores the serious warming trend that was underway in
Miami and on Capitol Hill.
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The crackdown elicited the expected reactions. Countries all over the globe have
expressed then opposition to this latest repression. Most countries predict that their
with other countries’ policies toward Cuba than everyone else thinks. Castro came to
power denouncing foreign intervention and he has apparently succeeded in making Cuba
one of the most independent states on the globe. Neither the Canadian nor the American
policy has been successful in altering the political landscape in Cuba. Thus, isolation,
engagement or somewhere in between- this study predicts none of these approaches will
fundamentally change things in Cuba. Even the improbable use offeree, a la the US
invasion of Iraq, is unlikely to produce the desired transition to stable democracy. If
democracy is in Cuba s future it will have to come from within. However, this is unlikely
to happen while Fidel Castro continues to rule. Thus, Cuba's future will look much like
Its past until nature forces an end to the Castro regime.
Summary and Theoretical Implications
This study began with the question why Canada and the United States have adopted such
dramatically different approaches toward Fidel Castro’s Cuba. This difference is
especially apparent in the post-Cold War environment as both countries claim to have the
same end in mind- greater respect for democracy and human rights on the island yet
continue to employ drastically different means. American policy contends that the best
way to ensure change in Cuba is to isolate the current regime. The Canadians take the
opposite approach; that engagement is the most effective means to promote democracy
and human rights.
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The most widely accepted explanations for both policies ignore ideational
variables. The Cuban American community’s intluence over elections is presumed to
fully, and simply, explain the US approach. This explanation assumes the community
favors a hard-line, isolationist policy toward their homeland. It then contends that
because the Cuban American population is concentrated in Miami-Dade county in
Florida (and to a lesser extent also in Jersey City, New Jersey) they have a
disproportionate influence over elections, thus ensuring that their policy preferences are
followed in Washington. The Canadian policy of engagement is attributed to Canadian
economic interests. This argument maintains that because American businesses are
prevented from investing in or selling to the Cuban people, Canadian companies have an
advantage and are keen to trade with Cuba. Thus, the Canadian government, wanting to
support Canadian-Cuban trade follows a policy of engagement.
This study adopted a constructivist approach to this question. It problematized
both these explanations and examined the role of ideational factors such as identity,
values, norms, and perceptions in the two policies. This study has demonstrated that the
widely accepted reasons for the two policies are inadequate explanations. Though each of
the traditional explanations offers some insight into the respective bilateral relationships,
they are incomplete. For example, the Cuban American electoral thesis cannot explain
how the community first began to wield power when, at that time, they represented a very
small, unorganized electoral base. The constructivist analysis can show that the
community was given this power by Washington because their perceptions and policy
preferences were directly in line with the views prevalent in Washington during that
period. Furthermore, the fact that the Bush administration’s policy toward Cuba is more
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hard-line than the previous two administrations while the Cuban American community
itself is growing more divided also reveals the incongruity between Cuba policy and the
wishes of the community. As this chapter has shown, a pro-embargo platform is
attracting less and less support among members of the Cuban American community.
Thus, contrary to popular opinion, policy toward Cuba is not directed from Miami or the
offices of the Cuban American National Foundation.
Likewise, the Canadian policy toward Cuba is not a sole reflection ofeconomic
interests and has far more to do with values, identity, and perception than most scholars
maintain. Canadian trade with the United States is far, far more important than any trade
with Cuba. Canadians trade more in one day with the U.S. than they do in a whole year
with Cuba. If trade was the main reason for Canada’s policy toward Cuba, Ottawa would
have adopted an isolationist policy decades ago.
This study has not just pointed out the weaknesses of the accepted explanations
but has shown that ideational factors have significant independent explanatory power.
The American identity as an exceptional nation that includes an emphasis on the values
of democracy and freedom; a belief in the natural superiority of the United States and,
consequently greater rights as well as a commitment to corresponding duties; encourages
a missionary outlook, especially in the Western Hemisphere. These factors have a major
influence on the way American policy makers conceptualize Cuba and the U.S.- Cuban
relationship. This study argues that Americans, believing in their natural superiority in
political and economic matters, and stressing the value of democracy and freedom, are
affronted by what they perceive to be the total absence of democracy and freedom in
Cuba. The United States believes it must take action in Cuba because it has a duty to
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promote democracy and freedom globally, and especially in the Western Hemisphere.
Furthermore. Cuba has always been seen as ‘special’ to most Americans because of its
geographical and historical ties to the United States. U.S. policy suggests that, like an
inferior or slow little brother, the Cubans need American guidance even if they do not
realize it. Thus, like a big brother, the United States feels a responsibility to ensure that
democracy and freedom are in Cuba’s future. In addition, since Fidel Castro is
understood to be the root of Cuban problems, American policy reflects a determination to
remove him from power. The very idea of working with such an evil regime is abhorrent
to many people in Washington. In many ways the policy reflects this visceral reaction.
Isolation, thus, becomes the preferred policy.
Likewise, the Canadian approach toward Cuba is rooted in Canadian values,
identities, and perceptions. This study argues that the Canadian identity as a good
international citizen, as a peacekeeper and as distinct from the United States contribute to
the Canadian policy of engagement. The Canadian identity as a good international citizen
includes an emphasis on international law, a strong preference for sovereignty and non-
interventionism and places a high value on communication, dialogue, and social justice.
The identity as a peacekeeper is closely related to the good citizen role but also
emphasizes mediation. The importance of being distinct from the United States is another
crucial element of the Canadian identity.
All these elements of the Canadian identity coalesce to produce the Canadian
policy toward Cuba. The emphasis on communication and mediation influence norms of
engagement. The importance given international law and sovereignty contributes to the
Canadian opposition to Helms-Burton. The emphasis on sovereignty and social justice
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encourages empathy with Cuba, and the desire to be distinct from the United States
predisposes Ottawa to choose engagement over isolation. Lastly, Canadians see isolation
as an inherently hostile policy, more likely to lead to instability and international
disorder. They believe that engagement in the Cuba case is compatible with peace and
order.
In sum, the examination of identity and its related values, perceptions, and norms
offers an alternative way ofmaking sense of US-Cuban and Canadian-Cuban relations.
These two case studies reveal how these variables influence foreign policy and enable us
to better understand international relations.
Further Applications
Policy toward Cuba is only one example of the influence of ideational variables
on foreign policy. These findings have implications for many more foreign policies. The
American exceptionalist identity, with its belief in the natural superiority of the United
States and perceptions of the political and economic inferiority of others, influences the
belief that the United States has rights and duties above and beyond those of other states.
This produces missionary norms that the United States must assist other states,
particularly where democracy and freedom are concerned. Consequently, this identity has
wide implications for foreign policy. For example, the ideas, values, perceptions, and
norms associated with the exceptionalist identity that portrayed Cuba as the absolute
opposite of the United States; demonized Castro; and predisposed empathy with the hard-
line Cuban American narrative of life in Cuba, are probably influencing how the
American foreign policy establishment characterizes other leaders and regimes.
Constructivist case studies of U.S. policy toward other ‘rogue’ states would prove
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illuminating. For example, why did the United States believe that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
was still producing biological and chemical weapons when many other members of the
international community believed that Iraq was disarming? I, is possible that the United
States had access to additional information that it could not share with the international
community, but initial observations also point to the role of ideational factors. In any
case, a comparison of American and, for example, French identities and values would
help make sense of this international enigma. Similarly, a constructivist analysis of the
Canadian preoccupation with establishing an international prohibition on ami-personnel
landmines would be fruitful. Why did Canada take the lead on this issue? Initial research
indicates that ideational variables can offer considerable insight into these policies.
Further, this approach to foreign policy is not limited to the Canadian and
American contexts but would offer insight into any country’s foreign policies. For
example, a cursory examination indicates that identity, ideas and values have something
to do With South Africa’s commitment to establishing diplomatic relations with all
countries regardless of their political, economic or social systems and often in the face of
pressure to restrict this commitment to the principle of ‘universality .’ 50 Likewise.
Michael Barnett makes a strong case for the influence of identity on foreign policies of
Middle Eastern states, including Israel and the Arab states
.
51
Thus, the addition of the
50
For example, see Peter J . Schraeder, “South Africa: From the Shadows,” in Comparative
Foreign Policy: Adaptation Strategies ofthe Great and Emerging Powers, Steven W. Hook ed (Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 245-267.
Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” in The Culture ofNational
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics Peter Katzenstein, ed. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996).
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study of domestic values, identity, perceptions, and norms will improve our
understanding of a plethora of foreign policies.
A more self-consciously constructivist approach to the study of foreign policy and
comparative politics would also benefit these subfields. Though there has been a
resurgence in the study of ideational variables in Comparative Politics, the dependent
variables continue to be domestic politics or economic variables, most often political
culture. This study has shown that the Comparative Politics’ study of political culture is a
rich literature. However, accusations that haunted the national characteristic studies in the
1940s and 1950s are often still leveled at today’s cultural studies- that some of the
research still resorts to stereotypes (i.e. South Koreans are thrifty). By seeing ideational
factors as not static, constructivism works against these types of characterizations.
Though they are accustomed to addressing domestic level variables, including
ideational factors, most foreign policy studies that address these topics, reflect their
dialogue with comparative politics, and thus, focus primarily on political culture and
public opinion. Adding constructivist analyses would not only broaden their research but
would also open up the study of foreign policy to the influence of international ideational
factors. Foreign policy studies have tended to ignore the influence of international norms,
values, and perceptions. Foreign policy studies would benefit, for example, by research
on epistemic communities or studies of international norms such as those against
chemical weapons.
Lastly, opening up constructivist theorizing to the methods, concepts, and
questions prevalent in comparative politics and foreign policy studies will help answer
some constructivist critics. For example, Jeffrey Checkel criticizes constructivism for not
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considering cases “when ‘the dog doesn't bark,’ that is, where state tdentity/interests, in
the presence of a norm, do not change.”52 Comparative politics studies that examine
domestic level attributes and foreign policy analyses that take these variables and apply
them to foreign policy can help constructivists point out why the “dog doesn’t always
bark.” Also, a focus on domestic level ideational variables addresses another, related,
common criticism of constructivism- why “social construction... varies cross
nationally.” 5 ’ Domestic factors are most likely at the heart ofmuch cross-national
variation. Further, it is important to understand how international norms initially develop
and that often requires an examination of domestic variables.
This study has only touched the surface of what borrowing from Comparative
Polities, International Relations, and Foreign Policy can offer to our understanding of
international interactions. Furthermore, many other disciplines such as psychology,
anthropology, sociology and economics are treasure-troves of information regarding
ideational variables. Research that borrows from these fields will further our
comprehension of the role of ideational factors in foreign policy.
52
Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics
50 (January 1998): 324-48.
53
Ibid.
268
APPENDIX
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND CUBA
My research for this study included numerous trips to Washington DC, New York
City, one trip to Ottawa and one trip to Havana over 1999 and 2000. During my trips I
interviewed government and non-government officials knowledgeable about Canadian or
American policy toward Cuba. All the interviews listed in the table below were
confidential. In an effort to provide the reader with some sense of the types of people I
interviewed I have categorized them by level. Senior level government officials include
current or former ambassadors, high-ranking State Department officials including Deputy
Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries in the United States or Ministers or Secretaries of
State in Canada and similar level officials in Cuba. Mid-senior officials include current or
tormer Program managers or similar high level consular officers at Canadian embassies
or Desk Officers at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. In the
United States, mid-senior level officials include Senior Advisors at the State Department
and high-level embassy officers. Mid-level officials include everyone from senior support
staff to those people working just below the mid-senior level people.
Senior non-government officials include directors or senior people in foundations
or similar organizations who specialize in Cuba issues and well-known academics or
researchers in all three countries.
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Table 4: Confidential Interviews Conducted
American Government Officials
Senior Level
5
Mid-Senior Level
3
Mid Level
1
Canadian Government Officials 3 7 5
Cuban Government Officials 1 1
Non-Government Officials (Any
Nationality)
9
I also conducted numerous informal interviews in all three countries, usually with
less senior, but knowledgeable people. These unofficial interviews include speaking with
people at conferences, luncheon meetings, short conversations before or after fonnal
interviews held with others in the organization, and email correspondence. Most of these
I kept confidential. However, the non-confidential informal meetings include speaking
with the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley, at a lunch hosted by the
Canadian Consulate in New York City; a few words with Principle Officer Vicki
Huddleston in Havana; a lunch with a Canadian official at the UN in New York; as well
discussions with officers from the Canadian consulate in New York. I participated in at
least 1
8
of these informal interviews. There were others, that were, somewhat,
informative, but did not influence my research.
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